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ABSTRACT
CATHEDRALS OF THE MIND:
THEOLOGICAL METHOD AND SPECULATIVE RENEWAL IN TRINITARIAN
THEOLOGY

Ryan Hemmer, B.A., M.Div.
Marquette University

The aim of this work is twofold. First, it labors to retrieve from the past a
normative account of speculative theological method, in protest of the anti-speculative
fashions and attitudes that have prevailed among theologians since the Second Vatican
Council. Second, and in tension with the first aim, this study outlines the respects in
which conciliar and post-conciliar developments in history, anthropology, philosophy,
and cultural analysis—the same developments that led to speculative theology’s fall from
favor—are the means by which speculative theology might be renewed and made useful
in theology today.
The second chapter squares up to speculative theology’s critics by presenting a
theory of speculative method—comprised of both formal and operational elements—that
can endure their critiques. Chapter three transitions from recovery to renewal by
articulating the scientific, philosophical, theological, and cultural transformations in
thought that have accumulated since the speculative tradition’s apex and indicates how
speculative theology might itself be transformed and renewed through a commerce with
those transformations. The culmination of the third chapter is the notion of speculative
pluralism and its fourfold heuristic structure of basic anticipatory elements.
The last of these elements—the dialectical—is the exigence for the fourth chapter,
which provides both a developmental and a synthetic account of the theorem of the
supernatural, its elaboration of distinct theorematic domains, and its regulative function
over speculative inquiry. The fifth chapter applies these methodical efforts to a particular
speculative locus to show that apparently contradictory approaches to the theology of the
divine processions—in this case, those of Bernard Lonergan and Hans Urs von
Balthasar—can be integrally and constructively related through theorematic coordination.
This instance of speculative cooperation serves as a “proof of concept” for more
ambitious experimental applications of the notion of speculative pluralism.
Bernard Lonergan is the orienting thinker for this project at nearly every point.
His early historical studies of Aquinas, his Latin theology, his essays on culture, his
philosophy of cognition, and his work on theological method inform my own reflections
and formulations throughout. But the subject of this study is not “speculative theology
according to Bernard Lonergan.” Instead, it is a careful application of Lonergan’s thought
toward more constructive ends.
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I) INTRODUCTION

Few matters in contemporary theology invite such consistent, unified, and
ecumenical condemnation as theological method. Modern protestants, Catholics, and
Orthodox may not agree on much (including the question of whether they are obligated to
agree at all), but their leading intellectual lights speak with one voice of method’s
pernicious intent and deleterious effects. Whether as a species of Schleiermacherian
pietism, Kantian idealism, or secular scientism, today’s theologians unite in cataloging
this alleged sickness of mind under the syllabus of sins known collectively as
“modernity.” And while such denunciations have premodern, antimodern, and
postmodern manifestations, little difference exists in the substance of their critiques.
Whatever the major or minor premises, the conclusion is always the same: Method is the
cause of theology’s modern irrelevance, not the source of its contemporary renewal.
Rather than conceiving of theology on an analogy with science (scientia),
theology today is a set of practices, a body of doctrine, a library of texts, or a sociology of
religious expressions. In each case (and some cases are mutually opposed), theology is an
“already-out-there-now” or an “already-in-here-now” real. Its concern is with contents,
with “things”—with books, beliefs, believers, and with pushing around the phantasms of
the past. But theology itself has no truck with and no time for analyzing the nature or
structure of its own concerning, its own believing, or its own knowing.
Jane Jacobs (“Mrs. Insight” as one theologian fondly dubbed her) describes a
rather different habit of thought, one which “does not focus on ‘things’ and expect them
to explain themselves,” a way of thinking that affirms that “Processes are always of the
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essence” and that “things have significances as participants in processes, for better or
worse.”1 Orders and relations, in other words, precede things. And thinking is an order, a
process, a way––a method. This work adopts, advances, and defends the unfashionable
opinion that speculative theological method is no mere artifact of a fallen Catholic
cultural hegemony, but is instead an essential, if neglected, element of theological
rationality made all the more necessary by the contingencies of the present age.
But before the reader mistake it as another tiresome repristination project—a
pitiful longing for the queen’s commonwealth or the “thirteenth, greatest of centuries”—
allow me to state in straightforward and indicative terms that theology, both by charter
and by charge, is not a science of nostalgia. Repristination is erudite obfuscation. And
one need look no further than the ongoing contemporary romance between self-styled
postliberals and their authoritarian patrons for corroborating evidence to support this
indictment. Theologians should not rule the world, and neither should kings or bishops. If
the world has a ruler, it is God. And God is not impressed by coercion—even when the
coercers show up in cassocks and crowns and cite Augustine and Aquinas in their stump
speeches.
Various geopolitical developments in recent years rightfully raise suspicions that
even casual celebrations of Catholic cultural or intellectual patrimony are social wedges
meant to obscure the racial, religious, and sexual politics of anti-liberal Christian
nationalism. And all of us should sit for a while quietly and reflectively at the business
end of those suspicions. But the revolutionary imagination that longs to purify the present

1
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Modern Library edition (New York:
Modern Library, 1993), xvii.
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by setting a refiner’s fire to the past consigns to the conflagration the tools and materials
with which they might remake both themselves (as products of the old regime) and their
world. Only a practiced prudence can discern the difference between the failure of
nerve—cowardice—that is afraid to relinquish ill-begotten gains and the dialectical
processes of ressourcement, which advances what is good in the inherited past and
reverses what is evil. The judgment of one from the other is a wager—known with
certainty only as an undertow in retrospect. And while everyone imagines that they alone
occupy the not numerous center, it is my hope that the reader will at least acknowledge
that my particular practice of prudence in this work has been conducted in good faith,
even if the conclusions are above neither suspicion nor criticism.
That practice, for what it is worth, has been an attempt to direct the critical gaze
that I have learned from revisionary scholarship back at the sources, questions, and
answers that have formed the tradition within which I work. It is possible that that entire
tradition is bankrupt, but suspicion alone cannot secure a conviction. Everyone deserves
their day in court. And, it is my belief that the speculative theological tradition, in spite of
the serious accusations with which it is charged, plays a role in the theological task that
cannot be set aside. If it must be abandoned, it must also be replaced. Perhaps as a
function of centrist, liberal pathology, I have elected to pursue the impulse that revision is
not revolution. Thus, the sources, arguments, and—perhaps—conclusions presented in
this study may conform to the eye-rolling expectations of more revolutionary detractors.
Maybe they are right. Nevertheless, I pursue this course all the same. As a sardonic
Catholic quoting Luther (with little of the conviction and none of the risk), I can do no
other. Enough throat-clearing.
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The second chapter of this study is, undoubtedly, the strangest. Pivoting from
Sarah Coakley’s account of the “modern forms of resistance” to speculative or systematic
theology, I look to the unpublished first chapter of Bernard Lonergan’s 1946 dissertation
for guidance in navigating the contemporary theological scene. In that work, Lonergan
attempted to derive from within the hornet’s nest of medieval disputata a form of
theological rationality that could organize the data on the pressing problems of early
speculative theology by standing to those data as calculus stands to motion. The result,
unappreciated even by his scholastic peers, is a theory of speculative development that
charts the pathway by which understanding travels, diachronically but also intelligently,
from problem to solution, from question to answer. What Lonergan showed was that
absent speculative reconciliation, the best one could hope for is dogmatic consolidation.
Augustine resolved the doctrinal tension between grace and freedom in the fifth century
by saying “yes” to both. But it was not until the thirteenth century that those affirmations
were intellectually reconciled. From Aquinas, Lonergan (and we moderns with him)
learned that theology is Glaubensverständnis. It is the process by which human
intelligere intervenes upon the opposed affirmations of doctrine that constitute Catholic
faith. And even if the conscience of post-structuralist, feminist, Marxist, and
psychoanalytic critiques calls all settled opinion into question, so long as the Catholic
magisterium asserts its own teaching authority, it will require speculative intervention in
order to render its judgments intelligible in a world that has, to its moral and intellectual
benefit, internalized these critiques.
The third chapter lays out the intellectual, social, and cultural achievements in
understanding that inform many anti-speculative projects, but learns from them the
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opposite lesson. It begins by articulating the habit of intellectual, cultural, and ecclesial
synthesis that Lonergan calls the “classicist” notion of culture. According to this notion,
culture is the social objectification of the human soul, its expression in the world of
cooperation. And as the soul is what remains when all manner of material, spatial, and
temporal determinations have been bracketed from the question of being, so the classical
notion of culture is eternal, spiritual, and unchanging. Where classicist culture prevails,
philosophy is philosophia perennis, science is the certain knowledge of things through
their causes, and social, civil, and ecclesial relations mirror the hierarchical order of the
heavens. Forms of living that fail to conform are, by definition, uncultured—even
barbaric.
Classicism was the superstructure within which speculative theology developed
and thrived. But it is now infertile soil. Classicism is dead, and we have killed it––with
modern science, modern philosophy, and the empirical analysis of human living. Modern
science has abandoned the Aristotelian ideal of eternal law through a method of empirical
analysis that pursues only the best explanation or understanding of concrete data. Modern
philosophy has subordinated metaphysics to cognitional theory. And modern
anthropology has discovered that culture is not a permanent achievement but is a set of
meanings and values that inform a way of living. There are thus as many cultures as there
are distinct ways of living.
These shifts signal the end of classicism. But this work argues that the change in
cultural superstructure does not, in itself, mean the end of speculative theology.
Speculative theology can be remade through commerce with these developments. I thus
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propose a fourfold structure of heuristic elements for what I call “speculative pluralism”:
the material, the subjective formal, the objective formal, and the dialectical.
The last of these elements invites further elaboration because its contents require
theorematic reconciliation. Chapter four works out the theorematic elements by
retrieving, transposing, and repurposing the thirteenth century speculative breakthrough
known as the theorem of the supernatural. Drawing on Lonergan’s developmental and
synthetic accounts of the theorem, chapter four elaborates distinct theorematic domains of
analogical relation and, thus, of two sources of analogical structures that, though formally
disproportionate to each other, are organized by the same theorematic control of meaning
and therefore possess an integral and dynamic relationship to each other. By
distinguishing and relating theorematic domains, the theorem of the supernatural
exercises a regulative function over speculative inquiry that makes possible genuine
pluralism in speculative theology without thereby abandoning speculation’s charter of
intellectual mediation.
The fifth chapter applies these methodical efforts to a specific speculative locus
and shows that apparently contradictory approaches to the theology of the divine
processions—in this case, those of Bernard Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar—can
be integrally and constructively related through theorematic coordination. This instance
of speculative cooperation serves as a “proof of concept” for more ambitious
experimental applications of the notion of speculative pluralism.
Bernard Lonergan is the orienting thinker for this project at nearly every point.
His early historical studies of Aquinas, his Latin theology, his essays on culture, his
philosophy of cognition, and his work on theological method inform my own reflections
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and formulations throughout. But the subject of this study is not “speculative theology
according to Bernard Lonergan.” It is instead a careful application of Lonergan’s thought
toward more constructive ends.
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II) RECOVERING SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

1. Introduction

Some of theology was once divided into two parts. The first concerned itself with
the past. It sought harmony between the material and cultural diversity of divine
revelation in history and the Church’s expression of divine revelation in its dogmatic
teaching. Theologians of the first part came to utilize the methods, tools, and techniques
of modern historical study to accomplish this lofty task. And their successes provisioned
their counterparts with the raw materials for an ensuing set of theological assignments.
The second part of theology was engaged with the present. It labored to understand the
Church’s doctrines and the nexus between them through the application of theology’s
handmaid, philosophy—and its techniques of theory and analogy. This theological
domain required faith’s illumination of reason, and reason’s earnest, pious, and calm
advance. The result, with divine aid, was some imperfect, but highly fruitful
understanding of the mysteries made known in revelation and voiced in the Church’s
confession.
The first part of theology, the part concerned with historical revelation and the
development of doctrine, was called “positive theology.” The second part, with its
sanctified ratio and search for faith’s intellectum was designated “speculative theology.”
The working arrangement between these two theological labors persisted from the
sixteenth century through much of the twentieth.2 But in the re-organization of

2
Lewis Ayres notes that “. . . the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘Scholastic’ or ‘speculative’
theology arose in the early sixteenth century, probably in the work of John Mair (1467-1550), and remained
one of the main divisions in Catholic theology through the early 1970s.” See Lewis Ayres, “The Memory
of Tradition: Postconciliar Renewal and One Recent Thomism,” The Thomist 79 (2015): 538. Ayres directs
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institutions and institutional forms of theological study in the wake of the Second Vatican
Council, the positive-speculative division declined, while the historical-systematic
division came to prominence.
The Council itself vindicated certain lines of revision and renewal that had been
steadily, if also controversially, developing in Catholic Europe throughout the pre- and
post-War periods. Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and their associated nouvelle théologie
luminaries—both Dominicans and Jesuits—had for decades committed themselves to a
renewed positive theology, to what Charles Péguy called a ressourcement of the biblical,
patristic, and liturgical sources of faith and doctrine, augmenting classical methods with
modern forms of historical, linguistic, and cultural analysis.3 The priority the nouvelle
théologie assigned to positive theology was not without justification. As Jürgen
Mettepenningen writes, “The representatives of the nouvelle théologie attached the same
importance to this positive theological method as to the speculative theological method.

readers to several classic and recent historical studies that trace this developmental process, including,
Ulrich G. Leinsle, “Sources, Methods and Forms of Early Modern Theology,” in Ulrich Lehner, Richard
Muller, and A. E. Roeber, eds., Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 25–42; Yves Congar, A History of Theology, trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1968), 170–75; Riccardo Quinto, Scholastica: Storia di un concetto (Padua: II Poligrafo,
2001), 238–55; Hubert Filser, Dogma, Dogmen, Dogmatik: Eine Untersuchung zur Begründung und zur
Entstehungsgeschichte einer theologischen Disziplin van der Reformation bis zur Spätaufklärung (Munster:
LIT Verlag, 2001). Jean-Louis Quantin, Le catholicisme classique et les pères de l’église: Un retour au
sources (1669-1713) (Paris: Ètudes augustiniennes, 1999), 103–11. A much older study, cited multiple
times by Bernard Lonergan, highlights Peter Lombard’s role in assembling dogmatic data in his Sentences,
while leaving to others the task of finding systematic coherence in that data. See Franz Pelster, “Die
Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung für die theologische Spekulation des Mittelalters. Ein Zeugnis aus der
altesten Oxforder Dominikanerschule,” Scholastik (1927) 250–255.
3

See Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie: Inheritor to Modernism, Precursor to Vatican
II (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 11. For Mettepennigan, a concern for the renewal of positive theology is
among four characteristics shared by the diverse strands of thinkers that comprise the four phases of the
nouvelle théologie. The other characteristics include: 1) French language and culture; 2) the role of history
in faith and understanding; 3) a critical attitude toward neo-scholasticism.
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In their opinion, all-embracing speculative theology had lost contact with (the) reality (of
faith) to such a degree that a corrective manoeuvre had become necessary.”4
The coupling of positive method with modern historiographical research has
yielded undeniably progressive results in each field of ressourcement focus. In patristics,
generations of researchers have been aided by the production of critical texts of the
Church Fathers published in the Sources Chrétiennes series, founded under the editorial
leadership of de Lubac and his Jesuit confrères, Jean Daniélou and Claude Mondésert,
while the early monographs of Hans Urs von Balthasar have catalyzed decades of
renewed scholarly attention to Greek theologians like Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the
Confessor.5
Early and mid-century reform movements, bolstered by modern historiographical
methodologies, sought to recover more ancient forms of liturgical practice. These efforts
culminated in 1963 with the promulgation of Sancrosanctum concilium at the conclusion
of Vatican II’s second session.6 The controversial use of historical-critical methods in the
study of sacred scripture, vehemently critiqued in Leo XIII’s 1893 encyclical,

4

Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie, 11.

5
See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of
Gregory of Nyssa, trans. Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Communio and Ignatius Press, 1995); idem., Cosmic
Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian Daley (San Francisco: Communio
and Ignatius Press, 2003). In this introduction, Daley suggests that Cosmic Liturgy should be considered a
classic “because of its crucial importance in the development of modern scholarship’s estimate of Maximus
. . .” (11). Elsewhere, Daley notes that though subsequent scholarship has often been critical of Balthasar’s
analysis of both Gregory and Maximus, Balthasar’s efforts have been pivotal in raising awareness and
interest in these figures in western scholarship. See Brian Daley, “Balthasar’s Reading of the Church
Fathers,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, Edward T. Oakes and David Moss,
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 202: “. . . his studies of Gregory of Nyssa and
Maximus were catalysts for a new appreciation of the originality and significance of these figures, an
interest which remains strong sixty years later.”
6
See Massimo Faggioli, True Reform: Liturgy and Ecclesiology in Sancrosanctum Concilium
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 19–58.
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Providentissimus Deus, was vindicated in Vatican II’s Dei verbum (1965).7 And the
renewed dedication to the study of Thomas Aquinas in the wake of Leo XIII’s Aeterni
patris (1879) reached new levels of historical, methodological, and theological rigor in
the Thomistic studies of Marie-Dominique Chenu, Henri Bouillard, and Bernard
Lonergan.8
The enriching effects of positive theology’s renewal in the twentieth century are
numerous, and they continue to reverberate in Catholic theology even fifty years after the
conclusion of the Council. At the same time, however, positive theology’s transformation
and ascendency in modern Catholic thought has coincided with—and even been
purchased by—speculative theology’s relative decline.9 And while striking a balance
between these methods is not impossible, it remains that speculative method today is
largely a forgotten part of theology, an artifact of the pre-conciliar age, and there are
multiple modern ideological constituencies—both conservative and radical—that would
prefer this prevailing speculative amnesia to continue uninterrupted.
Sarah Coakley notes three “forms of resistance” to speculative or systematic
theology in modern thought. The first is a philosophical critique emerging from Martin

See Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus §17; Dei verbum §12. Dei verbum’s approach was
anticipated in Pius XII’s 1943 encyclical, Divino afflante Spiritu, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary
of Povidentissimus Deus.
7

See Marie-Dominique Chenu, Introduction a l’étude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Montreal:
Institut d’études médiévales, 1950); idem., St. Thomas d’Aquin et la théologie (Paris: Les Editions du Seuil,
1959); Henri Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez s. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Aubier, 1944); Bernard
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, Frederick E.
Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds., CWL 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). To these figures,
one must add Thomistic philosopher-historians like Étienne Gilson.
8

9

There were Catholic theologians in the twentieth century writing within a speculative register,
including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Bernard Lonergan. The
theologies of Lonergan and Balthasar figure heavily in this and later chapters. At least one notable effort at
a modern Catholic systematic theology is the collaborative text, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic
Perspectives, 2nd ed., Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, eds. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
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Heidegger’s adaptation of what Immanuel Kant termed “ontotheology.” This form of
resistance “claims that systematic theology falsely, and idolatrously, turns God into an
object of human knowledge.”10 Because God is not a thing within a world, he is not
proportionate to any act of human knowing, for all such acts are circumscribed by being
in the world. Theology must, accordingly, be an un-knowing, a negativity or apophasis,
and so a work of intellect only by way of remotion.11
A second form of resistance, Coakley observes, is political. It is organized around
the Marxist critique of hegemony, casting “systematic theology (amongst other
discourses that provide any purportedly complete vision of an intellectual landscape), as
inappropriately totalizing, and thereby necessarily suppressive of the voices and
perspectives of marginalized people.”12 To grasp a whole from within the multiplicities
of experience, culture, and power is to privilege as universal the individual theologian’s
experiential and cultural horizon. Such privileging is also an exclusion of the subuniversal particularities of the theologian’s experiential and cultural others, rendering
these others’ lives and perspectives sub-theological.
Psychoanalytic and feminist critique, a third form of resistance, “accuses
systematic thinking (of any sort) of being ‘phallocentric’, that is, ordered according to the
‘symbolic’, ‘male’ mode of thinking which seeks to clarify, control, and master. It is
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2012).
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thereby repressive of creative materials culturally associated with ‘femininity’ and the
female body, which are characteristically pushed into the unconscious.”13
It would be both intellectually dishonest and morally culpable to dismiss these
critiques out of hand. Data corroborating them are not difficult to find. There is no
denying that certain strands of speculative theology proffer a univocal, self-caused God
whose esse is only first among many within a single entitative order. Other strands
foolishly attempt to take leave of creaturely concreteness in pursuit of a pure ratio, one
that rises above differences in subjectivity, assumes a universal perspective, and utters a
universal word. And a simple glance at any speculative bibliography exposes a tradition
composed almost entirely of male actors, who rarely reflect on the gendered quality of
speculation, even as they exclude female bodies.
Yet, there can be a “misremembering,” even a totalizing tendency to these forms
of resistance. The speculative tradition is not monolithic, and its exemplars are not so
easily targeted by these critiques. Even the criticisms themselves are not beyond
dispute.14 More to the point, only puritanical moralities are compelled to sideline thinkers
and ways of thinking whose all too human garments feature spots and wrinkles. If,
however, one’s moral imagination anticipates the wheat and tares of the past to grow up
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This is especially true of the philosophical form of resistance. Even Marion was eventually
compelled to retract his earlier charge, in God without Being, that Thomas Aquinas was an onto-theologian.
See Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theology,” in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, Michael Kessler and
Christian Sheppard, eds. (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 38–74. William
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Between (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 281-340 for his retrieval of the classical divine
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being to be overdetermined by Heidegger, and so containing an antagonism between being and agape.
While Marion opts for agape beyond being, Desmond advances an “agapeic being.” See Desmond, God
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together, one can approach a tradition with dialectical sensitivity, advancing what is good
and true, reversing what is evil and false within a received tradition, while risking the
intellectual and moral fallibility of those judgments, and trusting them to the care of
future inquirers.
But to appraise any tradition in this way requires an adequate memory of it. The
speculative tradition is no exception.15 It is, thus, the burden of this chapter to argue that a
full realization of John XXIII’s aggiornamento must include a ressourcement of the
speculative tradition. Speculative renewal first demands the recovery of an adequate
memory of speculative form. Such recovery involves a prior hermeneutical gamble. One
must decide how one wishes to remember, and so how one will understand and evaluate
the horizons of concern that animate and organize the intentions of a prior age. One must
elect whether to remain forever a pupil of the school of suspicion, or instead to bear its
lessons along in tutelage to the school of recovery, with the hope that ultimately “extreme
iconoclasm belongs to the restoration of meaning.”16
And while the reader is free to make this choice, so too is the author. What
follows, then, is an attempt to go beyond (not around) suspicions of the speculative
toward its critical recovery. It offers no apologia for the entire speculative tradition, and
it grants the legitimacy of many features of the modern forms of resistance. But it moves
through them toward the restoration of meaning by “remembering” the exemplarity of
that tradition, and letting that memory be the basis of recovery.
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The project of recovering speculative theology could be attempted using multiple
strategies on multiple fronts. Some of these efforts may be allied and complementary.17
Others may be simply at odds.18 But, individually, all are limited in scope. In this chapter,
I present two fragments of speculative recovery derived from the work of Bernard
Lonergan. The first concerns intelligence and time. It examines Lonergan’s theory of
speculative form and its developmental order in the history of theology as the unfolding
of theological understanding in history. The second element treats of theological
understanding itself, of speculative theology as the specification of human inquiry and
understanding to the questions of God and the revealed, doctrinal affirmations that
answer them.
These fragments are not intended as a full rebuttal of the modern forms of
resistance. Mere recovery of the past does not settle the pressing issues of the present.
But recovery can jog the memory of the best of the received tradition, and force
contemporary intellectual and moral intuitions to confront a classic instead of a
caricature. But because the recovery of the past is for the sake of renewal in the present,

What is attempted in this project has a clear dependence on Robert M. Doran’s What is
Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). Doran’s retrieval of Lonergan’s preMethod in Theology account of systematic/speculative theology focuses on the various forms of the first
chapter of his systematic text on the doctrine of the Trinity. On the way to writing What is Systematic
Theology? Doran wrote extensive commentaries on these texts, which are vital to recovering Lonergan’s
evolution. See, Robert M. Doran, “The First Chapter of De Deo Trino: The Issues,” Method: Journal of
Lonergan Studies 18.1 (2000): 27–48; idem, “Intelligentia Fidei in De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica: A
Commentary on the First Three Sections of Chapter One,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 19.1
(2001): 35–84; idem., “The Truth of Theological Understanding in Divinarum Personarum and De Deo
Trino, Pars Systematica,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 20.1 (2002): 33–76. Rather than rehearsing
Doran’s arguments, this chapter complements them by showing how his conclusions can be reached from
other texts in Lonergan’s corpus not central to Doran’s project.
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There is a generic resemblance between this project and the ressourcement Thomism advocated
by Reinhard Hütter, Thomas Joseph White, Romanus Cessario, and others. But such resemblance is
superficial. While this project is broadly “Thomist” in conviction, the sources of its Thomism and the
implications drawn out from them differ, at times starkly, from those of ressourcement Thomism.
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the chapter concludes with a provisional glance at the transformations in thought
emblematic of the modern situation that indicate the ways a recovered speculative
theology must be transformed if it is to be at the level of our time.

2. Recovering Speculation as Form

Thematic Overtures
“Speculation,” writes John Henry Newman, “is one of those words which, in the
vernacular, have so different a sense from what they bear in philosophy. It is commonly
taken to mean a conjecture, or a venture on chances; but its proper meaning is mental
sight, or the contemplation of mental operations and their results.”19 Quite apart from the
term’s common connotation, speculation’s theoretical or philosophical denotation, and
especially its theological gloss, developed over many centuries through a complex
exchange between different religious, cultural, and philosophical traditions. According to
Lewis Ayres, the emergence of theologia speculativa in the medieval writings of
Alexander of Hales, Siger of Brabant, and Thomas Aquinas transformed the ancient
Christian contemplative tradition (theoria) through the introduction of doctrines adapted
from the Aristotelian corpus, particularly those of the Posterior Analytics and the
Metaphysics, which had only recently completed their geographical and linguistic
migration into medieval Europe.20 And while this transformation did not leave unaltered
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John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Ascent (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 75.
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identifies Alexander of Hales, Summa pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 2, cap. 4. 4; Siger of Brabant, Quaest. in
Metaph. 6. Comm. 1; Thomas Aquinas, I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 3. In the sed contra to Summa theologiae I. 1.
4., Aquinas argues, against the objector’s application of Metaphysics Ia, I, that because sacra doctrina is
primarily concerned with God, not humanity, “it is not a practical but a speculative science.” And in the
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the prior contemplative tradition, the ancient and medieval forms of theoria share three
neuralgic features.
First, Ayres argues, Christian speculation is dialectical. It adapts and repurposes
the classical tradition to articulate the distinctions and definitions relevant to advancing
Christian self-understanding.21 Second, Christian speculation is “synthetic and
extensive.”22 It grasps an interior unity from among the diverse sources of Christian
doctrinal literature and teaching, while experimenting with manners of extending this
unity into the varied horizons of non-Christian thought. It assimilates what is discovered
within those horizons into its synthetic structure, as it did first with certain strands of the
Middle and Neoplatonist traditions and later with a reconstituted Aristotelian tradition.
Lastly, Ayres notes that Christian speculative thought has a “reconstructive impulse.”23 It
makes use of literary, philological, historical, but also metaphysical forms of analysis to
recreate the contextual constellations within which texts, teachings, and questions
emerge. For Ayres, these constitutive aspects of speculative theology indicate a
“tensional” relationship between the poles of intellectual exploration and dogmatic
submission, between “the darkness of faith” and the light of revelation. This tension

respondeo he insists that because sacra doctrina is one and extends to a consideration of the objects of all
sciences under the aspect of the knowledge granted by divine light, sacra doctrina includes both
speculative and practical scientiae, but “it is more speculative than practical, because it is more concerned
with divine things than with human acts.” Of course, the extent to which sacra doctrina can be considered
synonymous with theology is a matter of dispute. See Brian Davies, “Is Sacra Doctrina Theology?” New
Blackfriars 71 (1990): 141–147.
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consigns the speculative theologian to “an appropriate anxiety . . . inseparable from
prayer for grace.”24
However much maligned the speculative tradition is in the dominant discourses of
modern thought, Ayres’s identification of the characteristics broadly shared across that
tradition suggests that a “chastening” of intellectual desire always accompanies faith’s
“enkindling” of that desire.25 One need not assume that speculative theology is
ontotheological, hegemonic, or idolatrous from the root. But, while Ayres highlights the
thematic linkages common to various epochal expressions of speculative theology, one
can also take an allied, but distinct approach, one that examines speculation’s analytic
and developmental structure. It is this latter way that Bernard Lonergan explores in his
early study of Thomas Aquinas, Gratia operans.26

Intelligence, Time, and Order

In Gratia operans, Lonergan attempts an intervention into the debates concerning
the theology of operative grace that had vexed both the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas
and the interpretation of the Council of Trent. As the leading lights of the sixteenth
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century Protestant Reformation had criticized human freedom in order to safeguard
divine providence, the Council of Trent responded by reaffirming the doctrinal veracity
of both human free will and the gratuity of divine grace, but it declined to offer any
speculative reconciliation between these doctrines. This silence was not out of some
undue conciliar timidity. Rather, it recognized that the fault lines of the Reformation were
doctrinal, not speculative. They had to do with the truth or falsity of magisterial teaching,
and not with the distinct, sometimes contradictory manners in which that teaching was
understood.
Jaroslav Pelikan describes the situation of Catholic theology between Trent and
the end of the seventeenth century as comprised of two tasks. It had to consolidate “the
doctrinal achievements of the council as a reaffirmation, against the teachings of the
Protestant Reformers, of the authentic tradition of the church,” while also “clarifying,
within the household of faith, some of the theological inconsistencies that had been
inherited from the doctrinal pluralism of previous centuries but had been left unresolved
by the council.”27 While Trent limited itself to the first task, its silence on the second left
Catholic theology vulnerable to various, sometimes violent controversies within its own
ranks.
The de auxiliis dispute between Molinist Jesuits and Bannezian Dominicans grew
out of the Catholic Counter-Reformation’s need to work out the speculative theory of
grace and freedom demanded but not provided by the Tridentine formulations.28 And
while Molinists and Bannezians each labored toward such a theory, their respective
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routes eventually collided with one another, resulting in a bitter controversy that
eventually required papal intervention, and led not to a resolution of the speculative
question of grace and freedom, but only to a sanction against further debate.29 Yet, the
basic understandings of grace and freedom that Molina and Báñez articulated informed
centuries of subsequent scholastic interpretation of Thomas Aquinas among both Jesuits
and Dominicans.30 Jesuits read Thomas and found confirmation that he was a Molinist,
while Dominicans conducted the same exercise but discovered that he was, rather, a
Bannezian.31 But upon taking up his study of Thomas, Lonergan found “an attitude and
direction of thought distinct from the one resulting in the impasse of the controversy de
auxiliis.”32
Convinced that neither sixteenth century thinker, nor their partisan interpreters
had grasped Thomas’s thirteenth century achievement, Lonergan directed his attention to
the history of speculative development on the doctrines of grace and freedom in the
centuries prior to Thomas’s synthesis, and to the developments within Thomas’s own
understanding, as his thinking evolved through the gradual accumulation of insights over
the course of his career. Lonergan sought “a method that of itself tends to greater
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objectivity than those hitherto employed,” one that would grasp scientifically the form of
intelligence unfolding through the history of speculative development.33 For to amass the
relevant historical materials is not yet to understand them. And even careful curation does
not provide a theory that would grasp within the multiplicity of materials and sources an
intelligible (and even intelligent) developmental order. Such a theory would be a “form of
development,” a scientific explanation of “the unity and coherence of a vast body of
historical data,” “a matrix or system of thought that at once is as pertinent and as
indifferent to historical events as is the science of mathematics to quantitative
phenomena.”34
Gratia operans provides this theoretical structure, and deploys it to interpret the
multi-phased advance from doctrinal clarification in Augustine’s distinction between
divine operation and cooperation, to nascent speculative understanding in Anselm’s
theory of grace as the cause of rectitude. And from Peter Lombard’s presentation of the
four states of human freedom, to Philip the Chancellor’s theorem of the supernatural and
Albert the Great’s distinction between the form of grace as operative and the form of
merit as cooperative, culminating in Thomas Aquinas’s mature formulation of habitual
and actual grace as both operative and cooperative.35 Furthermore, as Lonergan shows,
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Aquinas’s achievement itself is the fruit of his own personal development of speculative
understanding from the Scriptum to the De veritate, and from the Summa contra Gentiles
toward his final, mature synthesis in the Summa theologiae.36
There is both a negative and a positive rationale for adopting a scientific,
theoretical mentality in inductive research. Negatively, theory “eliminates a host of
impertinent questions which otherwise would spontaneously be introduced into the
inquiry to give it a false bias and encourage a search—too often successful — to find in
an author what the author never dreamt of.”37 But in addition to guarding against such
anachronism, theoretical control has the positive effect of allowing “one who lives in a
later age to understand those whose thought belongs to almost a different world, and it
does so, not by the slow and incommunicable apprehension that comes to the specialist
after years of study, but logically through ideas that are defined, arguments that can be
tested, and conclusions that need only be verified.”38
Lonergan’s theory has four points. First, he defines speculative theology and its
content. Second, he enumerates the constitutive elements of speculative elaboration.
Third, he indicates the distinct manners in which those elements combine in the
outworking of the progressive stages of speculative thought. And fourth, he makes
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application to the specific speculative phases in western theological reflection on the
doctrines of grace and human freedom. Given the aims of the present study, attention to
the first three points will suffice for understanding Lonergan’s theory of speculative
form.

The Content
Central to Lonergan’s notion of theory is what he calls, “pure form.” Speculative
theology is not the cause of the objects within its intellectual field. Of itself, it neither
makes discoveries, nor produces knowledge. Without prior knowledge, there can be no
speculation. Theory grasps the relation between terms, but establishes neither the terms,
nor their relations. Theological theory, therefore, intends only the “unity and cohesion” of
the knowledge affirmed and communicated in Church doctrines. For Lonergan, this
means there can be no speculative theology sanitized from the historicity of revelation
and doctrinal formulation. Theory in theology can never have the clinical precision of
mathematics. Its work of relating, understanding, elaborating, defining, and clarifying
applies to data, not of the imagination, but rather of history.
Revelation, for the Christian tradition, occurs not through private, mystical
enlightenment, but rather through public histories. Speculative theology introduces into
revelation nothing other than an intellectual mentality. The speculative is the aspect of
theology that “penetrates the whole structure,” which “has brought to light and
formulated this organicity in revealed truth.”39 It is an enrichment and an enlargement of
the human grasp of the truth. The biological imagery of a living, growing “whole”
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discernible in the concrete developmental order is consonant with the conclusions of
earlier Catholic thinkers like John Henry Newman, Johann Sebastian Drey, Johann Adam
Möhler, and Maurice Blondel.40 Lonergan, though, in a way distinct from his forebears,
emphasizes that this organic whole is the fruit of intending intelligence grasping an
intelligible form. It is not “there” in a spatialized field of biological perception; it is not
some “thing” one “sees.” It is the content of the theologian’s act of understanding. And
while earlier theologians sought the nature of Catholic tradition and of the historically
unfolding character of Catholic doctrine, Lonergan’s concern is the systematic
understanding and expression of that unfolding.
This means that speculative understanding is not the object or product of an act,
but rather the quality of an act. “It is not something by itself,” Lonergan writes, “but the
intelligible arrangement of something else.”41 In theology, speculation “enters
everywhere,” but, “it is also true that everywhere its role is very subordinate. It provides
the technical terms with their definitions; it does not provide the objects that are
defined.”42 For Lonergan, speculative theology can be provisionally defined as the
arrangement of doctrinal affirmations that promotes a theoretical grasp of the coherence
of those affirmations and their conjunctions. Nowhere is this clearer than in Lonergan’s
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statement that speculative theology “is not systematic theology but the system in
systematic theology.”43

The Elements

While the content of speculative theology is the pure form of intelligence grasping
explanatory coherence, the distinct features of this form comprise speculative theology’s
basic elements. Lonergan identifies four classes of elements in speculative thought:
theorems, terms, dialectical positions, and techniques. The psychoanalytic and feminist
critic may object that systematic thought’s phallocentric drive to clarify, control, and
master has yet again surfaced. The procedures of natural science and mathematics seem
to be the overriding criterion for valid knowledge, such that there is an unreflective
disciplinary transgression occurring when a theologian imagines that they can generate
from within theological discourse notions like “theorems” and “techniques,” notions that
may have their place in a mathematics, but have no truck with the human sciences. And
while such suspicion is perhaps not unfounded, its anxiety in this case turns out to be
only an allergy to certain words.
The language of theorems and technique is not symptomatic of a symbolic
attempt to control or domesticate revelation by imposing the canons of scientific method.
It is not self-aggrandizement or the pretension of angelic knowledge. As features of
speculative form, theorems and techniques are accommodations of intelligence to its own
spatio-temporality, its historicity, its contingency—its incarnate nature. Absent the
constraints of bodily knowledge, historical mediation, and the disproportion of the natural
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to the supernatural, no speculative thought would be required, for all would see face-toface, and know even as they are fully known. The elements of speculative theology—the
emergence of theorems, the articulation of terms, dialectical positions, and specialized
techniques—are how a limited, finite, historical, incarnate theologian advances their
incarnate understanding toward the incomprehensible mystery of God, and even then,
never fully outside the mist of analogical dissimilarity.
By “theorem,” Lonergan means, “the scientific elaboration of a common
notion.”44 Theorems, like speculation itself, are not generative; they do not discover.
They enrich and expand the already generated and discovered. Their elaborations provide
generalizations that can transpose a common notion from one world to another, from the
world of common sense to the world of theory. Lonergan illustrates the dynamic between
commonsensical notions and their theoretical elaborations with the example of the
relationship between the differential equation for acceleration and the experience of
“going faster.” He writes,
the common notion of ‘going faster’ and the scientific concept of ‘acceleration’
partly coincide and partly differ. They coincide inasmuch as both apprehend one
and the same objective fact. They differ inasmuch as the common notion
apprehends no more than the fact, while the scientific concept elaborates it by
understanding it. First, ‘acceleration’ generalizes ‘going faster’ to include ‘going
more slowly.’ Second, it submits it to the subtle analysis of the calculus and
enriches it with the endless implications of d2s/d2t. Third, it gives it a significant,
indeed a fundamental, place in the general theory of natural phenomena.45
The differential equation d2s/d2t is not the experience of “going faster” in this instance or
in that. It is the scientific expression of experience made possible by grasping the
theoretical meaning immanent to the experience. It is what speculative explanation adds
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to descriptive notion. But this elaboration is not simply a translation from the common to
the recondite for complexity’s sake. It is instead what allows intellect to abstract from
this or that experience to the generalized context of the intelligible. In this sense,
speculation liberates thinking from the parochialism of experience, to the wider—in fact,
universal—context of understanding. But this liberation does not leave experience
behind. Without experience, there could be no understanding, but without understanding,
there could be no symbolization or expression of the intelligible contents of experience.
To live in a world of the merely experienced, of the nakedly es gibt, is to live in a world
not yet fully or adequately human. Theorems are the fruit of the intervention of one’s
intellect on one’s experiences. They are the result of intellect grasping the inner unity and
coherence of those experiences, and so the generalizable and universal meanings they
contain.
“Universality,” in this instance, does not imply a God’s eye view, enabling one to
observe from some remote vantage point the whole seen only as a changeable fragment
from the world below. It refers instead to what Jean Piaget calls “mobility.”46 The
theorem is a structure, but because it is an intellectual structure, it is not static or
unidirectional. It is reversible and mobile. It can be applied to this set of questions or
ambiguities in one instance, and that set in another with no diminution of its explanatory
power. A theorem’s universality or generality is demonstrated precisely through this
mobility of explanation. The differential equation for acceleration is universal because it

See Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence, 10: “To define intelligence in terms of the
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has the mobility to coordinate the explanation of any given instance of “going faster.”
Beyond that, though, a theorem’s universality also makes possible the elimination of
misapprehension and illusion that can easily affect experiential conjugates. “Going
faster,” as experienced, can be mimicked or simulated in the absence of actual
acceleration. But the theorem cuts through the ambiguity of the experiential conjugate,
and lays bare the elaborated intelligibility of the pure conjugate.47
But when one pivots from theorems generally conceived in mathematics or
physics to the theorems of a speculative theology, the analogical character of the
application comes into relief. In the example of acceleration, the theorem elaborates
scientifically the intelligibility immanent to the experience of “going faster” under the
formality of questions like “What is happening?” or “What is the relationship between
distance, motion, and time in this happening?” In a speculative theology, however,
theorems do not elaborate the intelligibility of experience; they articulate the meaning
and coherence of antecedent truths. The quiddity intended by the speculative deployment
of theorems is the answer to the question “What does this revealed truth or teaching
mean?” or “How do these truths relate to one another?” Answers will be hypothetical,
revisable, and imperfect.
In Gratia operans, Lonergan identifies two theorems that led to Thomas’s mature
articulation of the speculative coherence of human freedom and divine grace: the theorem
of the states of man, and the theorem of the supernatural. The first theorem emerged in
the thought of Peter Lombard, and the second in that of Philip the Chancellor, who
adapted and analogically applied Aristotle’s theory of habit, and disengaged through it
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the entitative disproportion between the human soul and the created communication of
the divine nature that is God’s grace. The theorematic elaboration of this disproportion
enabled Thomas Aquinas to conceive of grace as both sanans, healing the soul’s wounds,
and elevans, enriching the soul toward participation in the divine life, which is its proper
end. Such disproportion is not given in the data of sense or experience. It is the term of a
theory, and so a doctrine of speculative intelligence.
Forgetfulness of the abstractness of such distinctions, argues David Burrell, leads
to a forgetfulness of the contingency and gratuity of the natural order.48 Such forgetting
can result in a lapse back into the pagan cosmology of the eternality of the world, or even
the two-tiered universe of decadent scholasticism and its doctrine of pure nature. It is this
latter result that, according to Henri de Lubac, has proved the most harmful. Insofar as
theologians after Aquinas treated of the distinction between the natural and the
supernatural as a cartography of the concrete universe, they imagined that universe as
divided into two. One tier was the realm of “pure nature,” separable, sufficient, and
secular, supplying to human nature its own natural desire, authority, and end, each fully
realizable by natural powers. A second, supernatural tier was the realm of grace, the
domain of the sacred, which furnished a supernatural end to the human soul and supplied
the supernatural means for the soul’s attainment of that end. A concrete universe so
divided made possible, argues de Lubac, the genetic emergence of atheist humanism, its
elevation of the givenness of autonomous nature, and its rejection of transcendent

David Burrell, “Incarnation and Creation: The Hidden Dimension,” in Faith and Freedom, 235:
“. . . an unintended connotation of that distinction, which identified grace with the supernatural order, was
to imply that the natural order was not a grace, not a gift. And what is not a gift is a given. But taking the
world as a given is precisely the pagan outlook which the revelation to Moses explicitly countered in the
ancient world.”
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meaning.49 Whether one concurs with de Lubac’s genealogy, the episode dramatically
demonstrates the social and religious consequences of the forgetfulness of theorematic
function. And so, while the postmodern suspicion of theory as scientism is not
unwarranted, rejecting theory in favor of a ready-made practicality has long-term
deleterious effects for theology, and even for faith.
Speculative acts have effects, products, facta. Lonergan calls these “terms.”50 It is
important to note from the outset that, as products of speculative intelligence, the terms
are not a priori to understanding, but a posterori to the understood. They are not features
of a Kantian synthetic manifold of concepts always already backgrounded in
consciousness, nor are speculation’s productions merely the linguistic expressions of
prior concepts and present applications. Terms, rather, are the culminations of
movements in thought. “The analytic processes of speculative thought,” Lonergan writes,
“necessarily result in a complex transition from the latent to the evident, from the vague
to the definite, from the implicit to the explicit, from the naked fact to its scientific
elaboration.”51
Terms are the effects of this dynamic migration of intelligence toward explication.
In some instances, existing rhetorics or symbolizations are re-purposed, transformed,
adapted, and made to be adequate carriers of meaning for the terms resulting from
speculation (as is the case for the term “sacrament” in the history of theology), but in
other cases, no existing symbolizations are available, and so new terms are introduced

49

Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley, Anne Englund Nash,
and Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995).
50

Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1, 165: “Terms are the obvious product of speculation.”

51

Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1, 165.

31

(for example, “actual grace” as a term formalizing what is not yet explicit in Thomas’s
auxilium divinum).52 But unlike the differential equation for acceleration, which
symbolizes a scientific elaboration of any instance of “going faster,” the terms of
speculative theology will require the theologian to distinguish carefully theoretical from
dogmatic grammars, because the notions elaborated by the theorem both belong to the
common sense of another age, and are regarded as features of a divinely originated
deposit of revealed truth. The gap that opens between the scientific term and the
historically revealed reality indicates the need for a third element in the speculative form,
what Lonergan calls “the dialectical position.”
Dialectical positionality deals with the encounter of the known, the known
unknown, and the formally unknown in an analytical investigation. It is related
analogically to the natural scientist’s methodical position, which enables the affirmation
of multiple explanatory frameworks that, at least at the present stage of understanding,
are contradictory. For example, experimental data indicate light’s duality as, in the
general case, a wave, and, in a special case, a particle. Yet, the physicist operates with the
belief that the law of non-contradiction has not been violated, and that the present
appearance of contradiction already suggests the basic shape of a future explanation that
would account for both sets of experimental conclusions in a single theory. Investigation
can proceed because the unknown of the present is a known unknown, and so contains
the anticipatory promise that “in the future, as far removed as you please, [the scientist]
will possess the complete explanation of all phenomena.”53 Such methodical control can
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make progress toward a full solution to a present problem without getting bogged down
in anxiety over the incompleteness of current understanding—even if that incompleteness
is indistinguishable from contradiction at the present stage of discovery.
When one moves from the methodical position of the natural sciences to the
dialectical position of speculative theology, however, one discovers that the situation is
“at once more radical and more coherent.”54 For speculative theology, a dialectical
position confronts difficulties on multiple fronts. The contradictions it seeks to explain
are not the experiential data of experimental procedure, but rather the apparent
antinomies between the doctrines of faith and the conclusions of human reason. As
theology, speculation affirms that “Truth is one, and God is truth.”55 Thus, the “negative
coherence of non-contradiction” must be advanced. But because the God revealed in the
doctrines of faith is transcendent mystery, no speculative articulation of a doctrine can
attain—even methodologically—the “positive coherence of complete explanation.”
Speculative thought “may construct the terms and theorems apt to correlate and unify
dogmatic data; but the unification it attains cannot be explanatory in its entirety; the mind
attains a symmetry, but its apex, the ultimate moment and the basis of its intelligibility,
stands beyond the human intellect.”56
Speculation’s method is thus dialectical in its “yes” to non-contradiction, and its
“no” to complete explanation. The former “yes” mobilizes speculative theology toward
the unification and correlation of the nexus mysteriorum, but the latter “no” chastens the
theological mentality against the delusion of a finite instance of the infinite act of
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understanding. This “no” is not a false humility or an over-eager apophaticism, but a
recognition of the disproportion between the finite means deployed in acts of human
knowing and the infinite term those acts intend. At the same time, there exists a
temptation to invoke the final dialectical position of this disproportion and its “no”
anytime speculative difficulties arise. Some difficulties are merely philosophical; they
crop up due to an inadequate set of philosophical tools, and are overcome not through
apophatic silence, but through philosophic differentiation.
To advance the dialectical position, a speculative theology requires a technique to
generate the distinctions, terms, and methods that, when transposed to the speculative
context of theology, can tip the scales of probability in favor of resolving apparent
contradictions. For Lonergan, any such technique must be able to grasp and survey the
entire field of data on the problem; it must analyze accurately the natural element in the
problem; and it must deal with questions pertaining to the problem in the correct order.57
Philosophia ancilla theologiae is the traditional name designating the technique for
speculative theology that ably responds to this three-fold necessity.
There exists what Lonergan calls an “influence by analogy” between philosophy
and theology owing to the theophanic quality of both the natural and the supernatural
orders. If nature is a domain of divine appearing, then philosophical analysis—“the
natural” in rationality—is analogous to theology in a manner corresponding to the
relation between these orders of theophany, the natural order truly but dimly, and the
supernatural order in a disproportionate mode and with a brighter brilliance. As an
element in speculative theology, the philosophical technique provides methods,
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distinctions, and terms that can be augmented, adapted, transformed, and transposed into
a theology, specifically into the theological theorems that seek the unity and coherence of
dogmatic affirmation.
Absent the distinctions articulated in the natural order, the negative coherence of
the dialectical position is unable to be advanced, because the theologian is unlikely to
“make his first discovery of them in the supernatural.”58 Important speculative questions
in theology are thus left unasked, and so the insights that would answer the unasked
questions also fail to emerge. Without philosophical technique, “speculation is
defective,” making the theologian guilty not of the error of doctrinal negation, but rather
guilty of “ignorance or even of nescience.”59

The Phases

These four elements of the speculative: theorems, terms, the dialectical position,
and technique have various forms of interrelation, resulting in discrete phases of
speculative development in theological intelligence. These combinations occur within a
logical order of emergence, with some being “naturally prior” to others, resulting in a
phased succession of progressive interrelation. For Lonergan, a “phase” is not a temporal
designation, and so the succession of phases is not a diachronic series. Rather, a phase
indicates a complex function of elements, especially the primary variables of theorems
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and technique.60 Because the sequencing of phases is ordered by the natural functions of
various elemental combinations, the phases are not a priori to development.
Developmental order is not a logical formalism imposed upon historical unfolding. For
Lonergan, rather, the phases of development are the “sets of abstract categories that have
a special reference to historical process.”61
Lonergan identifies a preliminary phase of speculative development in which
theologians collect and classify the dogmatic data points relevant to their speculative
problems. “Since speculative theology is the systematic element in the presentation of
dogmatic truths,” he writes, “its preliminary phase will consist in the first movements
toward an explanatory unification of the data to be found in the dogmatic sources.”62
Concretely, these movements include those of pre-speculative genres of doctrinal
reflection (e.g. patristic commentaries on the Bible, Thomas’s Catena aurea, and the
Glossa ordinaria) to proto-speculative works (e.g. patristic polemical treatises and
medieval books of sentences).63 The emergence of organizational schemes for presenting
dogmatic materials makes possible the subsequent phases of speculation properly socalled because “one cannot speculate without having something to speculate about.”64
The intermediate stages of development arise from two sources: 1) the external
circumstances of philosophic advancements, clarifications, and analogies that drive the
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on-going growth of speculative technique; and 2) the attainment of internal coherence
through developing theorems. Of the four elements of speculative form, technique
increases (owing to external philosophic developments), theorems and their terms change
(leading to and flowing from internal coherence), but, Lonergan argues, the dialectical
position remains stable throughout the developmental progression. It is “the constant
element,” that which “constitutes the identity of any particular development in
speculative theology.”65
Lonergan demonstrates how the constancy of the dialectical position entails a
migration from initial apprehension to final articulation. What is grasped first is the coexistence of two apparently opposed truths that, because each is affirmed in the dogmatic
context, must be the case. The opposition has both philosophical and theological
valences, and so technique is employed and theorems are utilized to resolve or remove all
but the essence of the mystery intended in the doctrines. This essence, as divine mystery,
is beyond technique; it is beyond the encompassing capacity of human understanding,
and so the final “no” of the dialectical position receives its utterance. Speculation must
resist invoking the final dialectical position as a cloak for ignorance that appeals to the
super-rationality of divine mystery to avoid the complexities of merely philosophical
challenges. The dialectical “no” is a response to the disproportion between human reason
and divine life, not a “no” to reason itself.
While the formal principle of the dialectical position remains constant throughout
its process of elaboration, the phased development of speculative technique drives the
migration. In both the classical tradition and in its appropriation in different forms of
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Christian thought, there is a simultaneous affirmation of both philosophic development
and of philosophia perennis, of “man’s apprehension of the eternal and immutable.”66
This apprehension, as Aristotle argued, has the love of wisdom as its potency, and this
potency comes into act through “the triumph of reason systematically revealing the light
of the eternal in the light of common day.”67 And despite the seeming divergences
between philosophers or philosophies, the developmental trajectory of the philosophia
perennis is a straight line from potentiality to achievement, dynamis to energeia, potency
to act.68 The “rectilinear” shape of this movement “can embrace differences as wide as
those that exist between the pagan from Stagira and the Christian saint of Aquino; yet,
however great such differences may appear outwardly, it remains that they emerge only
to make more systematically certain and secure a position that is unique because it is
central.”69
Lonergan’s analysis of philosophia perennis considers philosophy not as the
achievement of any single philosopher or age, but as the formality of philosophical
activity, as the systematic disclosure of the eternal term of wonder in and through the
mutability of creatureliness and its history. Divergences from this formality are not only
the dead ends of a philosophy, but betrayals of the eternal that accrue as the philosopher
redirects his or her gaze to the problems of the age and crises of a cultural moment. This
rerouting of reason can yield “the flux of philosophies,” but this flux only confirms the
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formality of philosophia perennis.70 But if one looks ahead to Lonergan’s later thought,
perhaps his greatest revision of this early analysis of speculative form is the legitimacy he
accords philosophia perennis. As his sensibility increasingly turns to the operational, the
empirical, and the historical, he comes to regard even the formality of philosophia
perennis with increasing suspicion, viewing it as a residue of a world that no longer
exists. And so, attention to the unique transformations in technique that these philosophic
revolutions occasion will prove vital to transitioning from a speculative retrieval that
mediates from the past to a speculative renewal that is mediated in the future. For the
Lonergan of Grace and Freedom, the linear development of technique that drives the
migration of the dialectic from initial apprehension to final position has an “essential
moment” for speculative theology, in which emerges “a systematic distinction between
faith and reason.”71 When the general distinction emerges, it can be specified to discrete
speculative questions (such as the relationship between grace and freedom), acting to
isolate incomprehension before the divine mysteries grasped loosely in faith from
difficulties belonging to the operation of reason.
These elements and phases of speculative form are, for Lonergan, the a priori of
theory to specific histories of dogmatic definitions, the relations between them, and the
drive to understand those definitions coherently, synthetically, and theoretically.
Speculative form as a developmental order in history interrelates the historical mediation
of divine revelation, the magisterial proclamation of the church, and the diachronic series
of efforts to disengage the synchronic meaningfulness of belief. But in addition to the
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historical unfolding of the speculative, there is the operation of speculation itself. And so
beyond thematizing the structure of development, Lonergan outlines the conscious
operations of intelligence by which the coherence and unity of dogmatic truth is attained.

3. Recovering Speculation as Activity

Theology always suffers the disproportion between its operator and its object.
Theologians are human beings. They are bounded by a world, a history, a horizon, the
natural limitations of their creatureliness. But their words intend God, who is unbounded,
eternal, and unconditioned. Medieval theologians not only dared to utter words about
God, but even organized their utterances with the notion of scientia. They strived not
merely to speak of God, but to do so systematically. As a scientia, theology is a
specification of human inquiry to the data of divine disclosure. It is a structured nexus of
operations performed by the theologian effecting the emergence of theological
understanding. But even the most robust account of theology still faces the basic
disproportion between the natural and the supernatural, which leads to several questions.
What is human inquiry in general? What is scientific inquiry? And how and to what
degree do these notions apply to theological inquiry? Answers to these questions are
plentiful, and often contradictory. And so, a brief account of the tradition of these
disputed answers will serve as a pivot between speculative form as a developmental order
in history, and speculative operation as a specialized mode of human inquiry.
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Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding: A Disputed Tradition

The elusive relation between faith, understanding, and scientific elaboration has
been a disputed one throughout the development of speculative theology. In Gratia
operans, Lonergan articulates the form of speculative thought. He shows how various
combinations of its constitutive elements comprise a phased developmental order of
cumulative and progressive understanding. Implicit in his analysis of formal order is the
operational order of human knowing. There is a tacit distinction in that early text between
an act of judgment that gives its “yes” to doctrine, and an act of understanding that
elaborates that judgment scientifically, theoretically, and speculatively to promote an
intellectual grasp of the truth affirmed. And while this cognitional distinction operates
implicitly in the background of Gratia operans, it is the dominant focus of Lonergan’s
subsequent efforts. His Verbum articles of the 1940s and his Latin theological works of
the 1950s and 60s such as The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, and
The Triune God: Systematics, as well as various essays over the same period, analyze the
structure of cognitional operations within the consciousness of the theologian engaged in
speculative theology.
Of singular importance is the role understanding (intelligere, intellectus) plays in
interrogating dogmatic data, an importance only fully grasped against the backdrop of
Lonergan’s entire career.72 But bound up in this emphasis is a dispute about the meaning
and implications of Vatican I’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, Dei filius,
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and its articulation of the relationship between faith, science, and understanding. In his
1954 essay, “Theology and Understanding,” Lonergan reaches into the debate through
engaging the work of the Jesuit theologian, Johannes Beumer, noted for his critique of
neo-scholasticism’s “Konklusionstheologie”73
According to Beumer, Dei filius’s account of the intelligentia mysteriorum is the
culmination of a centuries-long tradition of conceiving of theology as the understanding
of faith (Glaubensverständnis). The genesis of this tradition is the Christian
transformation of gnosis in second and third century Alexandria with Clement and
Origen.74 The Augustinian and Anselmian crede ut intelligas builds off that earlier phase
and leads to the subsequent medieval development of the intellectus fidei in William of
Auxerre and Henry of Ghent.75 Between the intellectus fidei of the middle ages and the
intelligentia mysteriorum of Vatican I stands Josephus a Spiritu Sancto and the noetic
connection between theology and contemplation.76
Conspicuously absent from Beumer’s genealogy, or at least Lonergan’s summary
of it, is Thomas Aquinas. For while Beumer does treat of Thomas, his account is not
flattering. The patristic, scholastic, and mystical theologians he surveys affirm theology
as Glaubensverständnis and represent distinct phases of development toward Vatican I’s
synthesis, but Thomas’s position, for Beumer, is ambiguous, even potentially deleterious.
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Beumer is suspicious that Thomas’s Theologie als Glaubenswissenschaft is a regrettable
departure from the Augustinian Theologie als Glaubensverständnis that had been the
western approach since the patristic period.77 The latter is theology’s goal, while the
former is the method by which that goal is attained.78 And while a steady balance
between scientia and intellectus is necessary, individual theologians may make
disproportionate contributions to the development of one area over another. Thomas’s
methodological advances in speculative theology, for instance, occasioned through the
application of Aristotelian theory, are major achievements in the history of theology. Yet,
for Beumer, Thomas (especially the Thomas of the Summa theologiae) over-emphasizes
theology as scientia to the neglect of theology as intellectus.79 Beumer concludes that
whatever merit accrues to Thomas for his method, he represents a regrettable loss of the
clear expression of the mysteries of faith that were so ably expounded in Augustine and
in earlier scholasticism.80
Lonergan finds in this analysis much with which to sympathize. Like Beumer,
Lonergan critiques theology’s inattention to the act of understanding, its “oversight of
insight.” Beumer’s reconstruction lionizes Matthias Scheeben as the proper exponent of
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Vatican I’s teaching, arguing that if more theologians would have follow Scheeben’s
approach, mid-century Catholic theology would be less fragmentary and far closer to a
methodical speculative theology.81 Lonergan too sought the controls of meaning that
would make a modern methodical theology possible, and insisted that such a theology
would be a mediation rather than a fragmentation. But while Beumer finds his exemplar
in Scheeben, Lonergan finds his in Thomas. And so, it is with Beumer’s interpretation of
Thomas that Lonergan takes issue.82
Retrieving Thomas’s theory of understanding was the principal task that Lonergan
gave himself in the early phase of his career, resulting in Verbum: Word and Idea in
Aquinas, in which he painstakingly reconstructs Aquinas’s cognitional theory, its
Aristotelian origins, and its Trinitarian applications. But in “Theology and
Understanding,” Lonergan’s account of Aquinas is streamlined. He presents Thomas’s
position in only six points. And he does so with the conviction that an accurate account of
Thomas’s notion of theology and understanding will significantly bolster Beumer’s larger
thesis concerning Theologie als Glaubensverständnis.
First, Thomas conceives of theology neither as a scientia nor an intellectus in any
univocal sense. It intends neither axiomatic propositions, nor indubitable truths.
Theology’s subject is the reality of God, and so its methods and modes of understanding
resemble those of other sciences (those with proportionate objects) only analogically—
that is, truly, but with ever greater dissimilarity. And while this exegetical objection is

81

Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” CWL4, 115.

82
Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” CWL 4, 115: “Considerable misgivings will be felt
over his views of St Thomas and on the relations between Thomist thought and Glaubensverständnis.”

44

important, Lonergan’s principal line of refutation runs through Aquinas’s own account of
the act of understanding itself.
Second, while Beumer treats of Aquinas’s use of Aristotelian syllogism as grist
for the mill of his thesis that Thomas privileges method over understanding, Lonergan
shows that the syllogism does more than identify the grounds for judgments; it is an
instrument of mind deployed to develop understanding.83 It “is a vehicle for expressing
an insight.”84 Logic is thus subordinated to intelligence.85 The syllogism organizes the
dynamism of intelligence as it moves “from principles to conclusions in order to grasp
both principles and conclusions in a single view.”86 And that single view is the act of
organizing intelligence—understanding.
Third, science is understanding in process. And so, parallel to the possibility of an
understanding of God is the possibility of a science of God. For Aquinas, though,
understanding is quo est omnia fieri, and so its term is the total and unrestricted context
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of being.87 The unrestrictedness of the natural desire to know being manifests itself in the
unrestrictedness of questions that provoke understanding. The desire to understand being
unrestrictedly can only be fulfilled by an unrestricted act of understanding. For
understanding to be fully in act, therefore, it must understand everything about everything
in a single view. But an unrestricted act of understanding is beyond the capacity of
human intellectual craft. It is God’s knowledge of himself and all things through himself.
And so there arises what Lonergan calls the “apparent antimony” that created intelligence
naturally desires to know God by his essence, but cannot attain to such knowledge by its
natural powers.88
Fourth, because in via there can be no natural attainment of the natural desire, any
understanding of divine quiddity is negative understanding. It can refute objections and it
can grasp the absence of inner contradiction, but it cannot know what God is.89 But this
incapacity to understand God’s essence positively does not preclude a revelatory
disclosure that mediates through itself a positive understanding. Human intelligence can,
in this life and through faith, understand that disclosure, but not the reality it mediates.90
Fifth, as positive knowledge of revelation is the expression of a reality not itself
understood, there are three distinct manners by which that understanding can be effected.
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One can conceive of understanding as a donum intellectus flowing from sanctifying
grace.91 One can make the non-technical, conciliar assertion that though positive
understanding will inevitably be imperfect, it will also be fruitful. And one can specify
that theology is a scientia subalternata, a science that is subalternated to the reality of
God. As such, theology’s subject is a reality, not a set of propositions (as Thomas already
showed in ST I. q. 1. a. 7). As scientia, theology is understanding in process. As
subalternata, theological understanding is not of God himself, but of God as God reveals
himself. But because the God who reveals is not understood, even the understanding of
God as revealed will be imperfect.92
Sixth, though Thomas claims that theological science deduces from the
conclusions of the articles of faith, Lonergan argues that such a claim has to be
interpreted “in light of both Aristotle’s theory of science and of Thomas’s own
theological practice.”93 Aristotelian syllogism has both explanatory and factual forms.
But, Aristotle makes finer distinctions within the explanatory syllogistic structure. He
distinguishes between those middle terms that fix the cause of existence (causa essendi)
of any particular thing and those that fix the cause of one’s knowledge (causa
cognoscendi) of that thing’s way of existing.94 The cause of being “is some being that is a
source of existence for another being, either extrinsically as final cause or efficient cause,
or intrinsically as a constitutive principle of that which is caused.”95 The cause of
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knowing, meanwhile, “is not a being but a truth that is the reason grounding another
truth.”96
The phases of the moon (as middle term between “moon” and “sphere”), for
example, are the cause of our knowing that the moon is a sphere, but the moon’s
sphericity (as middle term between “moon” and “phases”) causes its phases to exist in the
way that they do.97 Our knowledge of the phases is the principle of our knowledge of the
sphericity, but the existence of the phases depends upon the existence of the sphericity.
The cause of knowledge considers what is “first for us” (priora quoad nos) in our
analytic investigation (via inventionis). But once knowledge of the moon’s sphericity is
discovered, knowledge of that discovery can be passed on synthetically. A student can
begin with knowledge of the moon’s sphericity, rather than having to make that discovery
all over again. The priority shifts to the causa essendi, to what is first in itself (priora
quoad se) and to what comes first in the via doctrinae.98
Thomas’s task was to transpose these distinctions into theology in order to speak
of theology as a science. For a theological investigator, the conclusions of the articles of
faith are the causa cognoscendi of theological truth. These truths are the priora quoad
nos, and they are first in the via inventionis. Thus, the analytic terms of Aristotelian
science can be imported into theology without significant augmentation. But since the
reality of God is the subject of theology, the synthetic terms (causa essendi, priora quoad
se, and via doctrinae) present a much more difficult transpositional challenge. Theology
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considers God as the universal causa essendi, that upon which all things depend but
which depends upon nothing. God himself has no causa essendi, and so theological
science cannot understand God through understanding God’s causes. Thus, theological
science properly speaking considers only the causes of human knowledge of God.99
Neither can theological science determine God’s constitutive relations according
to the priora quoad se, “for in the Blessed Trinity there is nihil prius aut posterius.”100
This does not mean, however, that the priora quoad se has no utility for theology, but
only that its application is limited to the causes of human knowledge of the divine
relations. As Lonergan writes,
there are in theology some causes of knowing that are more evident with respect
to us, namely those from which we begin when faith is enlightening reason by
way of theological discovery, and there are other causes of knowledge that are
more evident with respect to themselves, namely, those from which we begin
when reason enlightened by faith acquires some understanding of the mysteries of
faith by way of theological teaching.101
But if theological science has no causa essendi, and only has a priora quoad se as applied
to the causa cognoscendi, can there be a synthetic via doctrinae or via disciplinae for
theology?
The Summa theologiae, Thomas tells us in the prooemium to the work, was
written for the benefit of beginners, those not yet entrenched in the polemics, disputes,
and arguments of the schools, those who “have been considerably hampered by what
various authors have written.”102 The problem lies not with the students, but with the
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texts and teachers meant to instruct them. These failures, Thomas insists, owe to a
defective pedagogy, one that subordinates the intellectual ordo of teaching and learning
to the expository and polemical demands of so many books and disputations. In the
Summa, Thomas charts a different path. Proper theological pedagogy, he argues, should
proceed not according to expositional or polemical ordines, but according to the ordo
disciplinae.103 In the ordo doctrinae/disciplinae, the dogmatic discoveries that conclude
the ordo inventionis are the starting points for systematic understanding. No longer
needing to establish those dogmatic truths, this alternative ordo sets itself instead “to a
systematic presentation of the truths that have been revealed.”104
For Lonergan, Thomas walks the via doctrinae most clearly in his presentation of
the doctrine of the Trinity in questions 27–43 of the Summa’s Prima pars. In the
prooemium to question 27, Thomas states that the ordo doctrinae treats first of the
processions, then of the relations, and concludes to the divine persons. This approach
cannot prove that God is one nature existing eternally in three divine persons and it
cannot establish that the church’s understanding of the revelation of the divine persons is
correct. It assumes the revelation, and it assumes the doctrinal formulation of what has
been revealed. But that is all it assumes. And from these givens, Thomas labors “to the
synthetic or constitutive procedure in which human intelligence forms and develops
concepts.”105
Thus, the notion of God elaborated in QQ. 2–26 do not demand of students a
detailed understanding of Trinity; they do not ask Trinitarian questions at all. In question
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27, Thomas asks, in light of the notion of God previously outlined, whether in such a God
there is procession. Having imperfectly but fruitfully understood the meaning of
procession in an eternal, simple God through an analogy of intelligible emanation,
Thomas considers the two processions in God as four mutually opposed relations of
origin (Q.28). Further reflection on the four real relations yields the understanding that
three of the relations are intellectual and subsistent, and so can be understood as persons
(Q.29). Thus, what in a dogmatic via inventionis treatise on the trinity is first (the divine
persons) is, in the systematic ordo doctrinae of the Summa, last. But since there is no
priora quoad se in the Trinity, the Trinitarian questions evince “the order of the genesis
in our minds of our imperfect intelligentia mysteriorum; and by identity it is the order of
Aquinas’s scientia subalternata presented in the ordo doctrinae.”106
For Lonergan, Thomas’s theological method corroborates rather than contradicts
Beumer’s basic contention that Glaubensverständnis is the fundamental task of
speculative theology. And beyond mere corroboration, a Thomistic Glaubensverständnis
has distinct advantages over the patristic frame Beumer champions. But if the goal of
speculative theology is an “imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing,
synthetic, and fruitful theological understanding” of the nexus mysteriorum, then mere
recovery of Thomas is not sufficient. Having established that the understanding of faith is
the central activity and goal of speculation, Lonergan provides an incisive examination of
understanding itself, as well as understanding’s specification to theology.
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Explanatory Understanding and Theological Speculation

Through his engagements with Aristotle, Aquinas, and the history of their
contested interpretation, Lonergan demonstrates how the classical idea of science, so
rigorously expressed in the Posterior Analytics has, at best, an analogical application to
the unique context of theology. Theological science is a limit case to the universality of
Aristotle’s definition. For Lonergan, the central purpose of Aristotelian science, and even
Aquinas’s adaptation of it, is obscured by an oversight of insight, an inattention to
understanding as both the purpose of syllogistic structure and the goal of theological
exploration. And, further, the inexactness of the analogy of science itself is a source of
that inattention. Beyond his dialectical efforts at interpreting Aristotle and Aquinas,
Lonergan articulates a philosophical account of understanding and understanding’s
relation to judgment that, though compatible with the classical tradition, aims to make
explicit the structured activities of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness
operative but only implicit in that tradition’s leading lights.
Insofar as they are brought out of the context of logical procedure and placed into
that of conscious intentionality, the basic terms of Aristotle’s science are transformed.
Intellectual consciousness embraces not only what is included in Aristotelian theoria, but
expands its range to embrace all intelligible domains of terms and relations. The priora
quoad nos becomes descriptive understanding (a grasp of the intelligible relations
between the term of inquiry and the inquirer), while the priora quoad se becomes
explanatory understanding (a grasp of the nexus of intelligible relations obtaining among
the terms of inquiry themselves). Science defined as certain knowledge of things through
their causes is redefined as a revisable, methodically controlled inquiry aiming at
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complete explanation, where explanation means the grasp of the relational nexus in a
given domain of inquiry, and complete explanation means the grasp of all relational
nexuses in all intellectual domains. But even in the transformed context, the application
of science to theology is analogous, and so a generalized form of the operational structure
needs clarification before its specialized, theological meaning can be expressed.
In his 1959 lecture, “Method in Catholic Theology,” Lonergan summarizes the
basic position regarding the generalized form of understanding and understanding’s
theological specification under five imperatives: 1) understand; 2) understand
systematically; 3) reverse counter-positions; 4) advance positions; and 5) accept the
responsibility of judgment.107 In the pivot from the generalized form of these imperatives
to their theological application, the specific analogical valence of science to theology
comes into relief.
No single issue dominates Lonergan’s thinking more than the recovery of the act
of understanding in philosophical and theological discourses.108 “[J]ust as man does not
live on bread alone,” Lonergan writes, “so knowledge does not live on certitude
alone.”109 Between the experience that elicits philosophical wonder and the certitude that
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follows upon true judgments of fact is the act of understanding, the operation of
organizing intelligence that grasps from within data an intelligible form, a quiddity, an
essence. And as there exists a real distinction between essence and existence, so too is
there a real distinction between the noetic operations that intend them. There is an act of
direct understanding that grasps essences, and the act of reflective understanding and
judgment that affirms or denies whether those essences exist.110
The essences or intelligibilities grasped in understanding are “no more than ideas,
definitions, hypotheses, theories. They may prove to be correct; far more commonly they
prove to be incorrect; but in themselves they are neither true nor false.”111 The intelligent
grasp of the intelligible in sense or in consciousness is not merely certitude by another
name; it is a distinct activity with a distinct criterion: coherence. It does not answer the
question of whether some state of affairs exists or is the case, but only what that state of
affairs is, what it means, and why its meaning is what it is. The product of understanding,
in the Aristotelian language, is an intelligible species. It falls to the higher court of
reflective understanding and judgment to determine whether or not the conditions of
existence of any particular intelligible species have, in fact, been fulfilled such that an
essence can rightly be said to exist.
Significantly, because the act of understanding is a grasp of the intelligible in the
data of sense or of consciousness, it is a grasp of concrete intelligibility. Against a
nominalism in which understanding is the grasp or intuition of abstract universals and the
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classification of concrete particulars under the banner of those universals, Lonergan
writes, “When we are able to abstract, it is because we understand.”112 Abstraction relates
“to the sensible only as the universal to the particular,” but “ it is in the sensible, in the
concrete, that understanding grasps intelligibility.”113 And although similars are similarly
understood, and so understanding can be said to grasp universals, “It remains that
understanding may or may not exploit its capacity for generalization.”114
To pursue the generalizations of abstractness is to move from understanding in a
generic sense to systematic understanding in a specific one. Such pursuits intend
intelligibilities beyond those grasped in descriptive understanding. Beyond the utility of
common sense, human intelligence “heads for complete explanation of all phenomena; it
would understand the universe.”115 This systematic pursuit of complete intelligibility,
intelligibility that includes relational nexuses between terms, is what Lonergan means by
explanatory understanding or science. “It distinguishes endlessly,” he writes, “but it does
so only to relate intelligibly; and ideally the network of relations is to embrace
everything. It is this complete network of relations, making intelligible every aspect of
the concrete universe, that is to be thought of when I say that understanding is to be
systematic.”116 And against the suggestion that explanatory understanding is the
proprietary ground of the hard sciences, he insists that “it is relevant not only to the
natural sciences but also to the human sciences, to philosophy, and to theology. I base
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this relevance on the fact that such a technique merely makes explicit what already is
implicit in all intelligent and reasonable knowing.”117
As the distinction between understanding and understanding systematically
implicitly suggests, intellectual conscious is polymorphic. There exists a plurality of
patterns to human experience, evincing a plurality of intelligibilities, and demanding
different nuances of intellectual operation proportionate to those intelligibilities. In
Insight, Lonergan distinguishes between the biological, aesthetic, intellectual, and
dramatic patterns of experience.118 Some experiential flows pertain to survival
(biological), others to symbolic liberation (aesthetic), some to theoretical mastery
(intellectual), and still others to human social living (dramatic).
In a concrete subject, however, the patterns are often not well-ordered. They
“alternate; they blend or mix; they can interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down.”119
As they do, counter-positional thinking interferes with explanatory understanding.
Biological, aesthetic, and dramatic constraints threaten to undermine the difficult work of
system or theory. And often they do so under the guise of philosophical or scientific
opinion, and, in the history of ideas, these interferences sometimes yield entire traditions
of philosophy. They may be erudite, accomplished, and widely successful in gathering
adherents and advocates, but they have within them a rotten core, an erroneous—
ultimately deleterious—interference of insights proper to biological, aesthetic, or
dramatic patterns of experience misapplied to philosophical inquiries. These counterpositions are opportunities for transformations, but transformations that occur not only in

117

Lonergan, “Method in Catholic Theology,” CWL 6, 36.

118

Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3, 204–212.

119

Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3, 410.

56

the doctrine of a philosophical school, but in the basic intellectual horizon of the
philosopher. As Lonergan writes,
the root of the problem, I believe, its really baffling element, lies within the
subject, within each one of us. For the problem is not solved merely by assenting
to the propositions that are true and by rejecting the propositions that are false. It
is a matter of intellectual conversion, of appropriating one’s own rational selfconsciousness, of finding one’s way behind the natura naturata, the pensée
pensée, of words and books, of propositions and proofs, of concepts and
judgments, to their origin and their source, to the natura naturans, the pensée
pensante, that is oneself as intelligent and as reasonable.120
The enactment of this intellectual transformation results in both the reversal of counterpositions and the advancing of positions.
If the recovery of understanding is the central element in Lonergan’s philosophy,
his doctrine of judgment is perhaps his greatest positive philosophical contribution. The
grasp of essences, Lonergan demonstrates, is not a matter of seeing, intuiting, or
imagining. It is an act of understanding, of intelligence. Similarly, knowledge of
existence is not passive perception, but active rationality, or judgment. As Lonergan
writes, “Minds reach knowledge only through judgment. And there is no recipe for
producing men of good judgment.”121 In judgment, one has already understood some
essence, grasped what the conditions of its existence are, reasoned that those conditions
have been fulfilled, and so said “yes” to the question of an essence’s existence. As
Lonergan puts it, “. . . judgment demands more than adequately developed understanding.
It supposes a transformation of consciousness, and ascent from the eros of intellectual
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curiosity to the reflective and critical rationality that is the distinguishing mark of
man.”122
It is this distinguishing mark that Augustine referred to as the contemplation of
eternal reasons, and Aquinas named a created participation in uncreated light. For
Lonergan, this distinguishing mark is termed rational consciousness.123 In rational
consciousness, “there emerges the proper content of what we mean by truth, reality,
knowledge, objectivity; and by the movement we ourselves in our reasonableness are
involved, for every judgment is at once a personal commitment, an endeavor to determine
what is true, and a component in one’s apprehension of reality.”124
In the ordinary course of the development of a science, these imperatives succeed
one another in an upward moving dynamism, from the first rudiments of intellectual
comprehension, to theoretical grasp, to dialectical transformation of horizons, to rational
adjudication between the formality of intellectual coherence and the actuality of rational
existence. But like the application to theology of the Aristotelian priora quoad se, causa
essendi, and via doctrinae, the theological application of Lonergan’s scheme has an
analogical valence. Yet, the manner of its analogical difference illuminates the relation
between theological speculation and doctrinal affirmation with greater clarity and
explanatory force than that of the Aristotelian framework.
As Lonergan demonstrates in his engagements with Beumer, the notion of
intellectus is central to the Catholic theological tradition, and the development of that
tradition is in many respects the development of its intellectus from implicit to explicit,
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from common sense to theory, from the negotiation of doctrinal appositions and aporias
to the breakthrough to the distinction between faith and reason. Like other sciences,
theology’s historical development is one of migration toward elaborated systematic
understanding. And like other scientists, the development of an individual theologian is
the maturation of intellectual habits and powers in response to the systematic exigence.
For Lonergan, it was the thirteenth century theoretical distinction between the natural and
supernatural orders that made possible the systematic breakthrough to a formally
theological domain of systematic understanding, to a “total viewpoint” that distinguished
in order to relate theology, philosophy, and other disciplines of inquiry. As Lonergan
writes, “Things are ordered when they are intelligibly related, and so there is order
inasmuch as there is a domain of intelligible relations. The discovery of a supernatural
order was the discovery of a domain of intelligible relations proper to theology.”125 And
in discovering its proper domain of intelligible relations, theology discovered its essential
relation to all other departments of knowledge.126
But if, for Beumer, the loss of theological intellectus begins in Aquinas, for
Lonergan, this disappearance is the scandal of the late middle ages. The condemnations
of Aristotle in the generation after Aquinas was “an acceptance of Aristotelian logic but a
rejection of the ancient pagan’s views on science and philosophy. Theology was to be
pure. In the hands of Duns Scotus and of William of Ockham it quickly became very
purely logical, and while logic is a valid systematic ideal, its atmosphere is too thin to
support life.”127 Theology as logic evinces the counter-position that speculation intends
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certainty, and it disguises its flight from understanding behind deductive rigorism. But as
Lonergan argues, the process of coming to understand, especially the unique, analogical
form of understanding that is speculative theology is haphazard and full of
uncertainties.128
It has become commonplace in contemporary theology to critique late medieval
Franciscan theology, assigning to it blame for the negative effects of the Reformation,
modernity, capitalism, secularism, nihilism, and even liturgical decline. Lonergan’s
claim, though, is different. And his prescription for reversing this counter-position also
runs contrary to the impulses of many critiques of the late middle ages. Rather than trying
to get back behind the Scotist conception of theology to a more viable high medieval
frame, Lonergan argues, “The achievement of the thirteenth century is not a goal but a
starting point.”129 Lonergan’s own theological and philosophical project was not simply
to excavate and recapitulate the Thomistic synthesis as a panacea for modern
philosophical and theological impasses, but to incarnate Thomas’s achievement by doing
in the present age what Thomas did in his. And while the position Aquinas advanced
required the breakthrough to the notion of the supernatural order and the consequent line
of reference termed nature, making possible the theoretical distinction between nature
and grace, and between reason and faith, “it lacked what we call the historical sense,
namely, an awareness that concepts are functions of time, that they change and develop
with every advance of understanding, that they become platitudinous and insignificant by
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passing through minds that do not understand, and that such changes take place in a
determinate manner that can be the object of a science.”130
By taking cognizance of the ways concepts are temporally (and, implicitly,
geographically) textured, of how intelligence develops within histories, Lonergan
indicates both a path back to the unity of positive and speculative theology, but also a
path forward to a more critical reconciliation of systematic and historical knowledge. The
precepts of theological method, “serve to unite historical and speculative theology as past
process and present term. Historical or positive theology is concerned with the becoming
of the speculative; and speculative theology is the term of historical process.”131 The
reciprocity and inner unity between the positive and the speculative secures the
legitimacy of both theological tasks. And to forget that unity is also to undermine them.
Without an integral relation to the speculative task, positive theology “becomes lost in the
wilderness of universal history; it ceases to be a distinct discipline with a proper field and
competence of its own; for it is only from speculative theology that history can learn just
what its precise field is and what are the inner laws of that field in their enduring
manifestations.”132 But the dependence of the positive on the speculative is mutual.
Without positive theology,
speculative theology withers away; for its proper task is, not just understanding,
but understanding the faith; its positive basis is historical, and without that basis it
may retire into an ivory tower to feed itself with subtle memories, it may merge
with the general stream of philosophic thought, or it may attempt to take over,
modestly or despotically, the teaching office of the church, but the one thing
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necessary it cannot do: continue today the process begun so long ago of adding to
living faith the dimension of systematic understanding.133
Speculative recovery, therefore, involves the recovery of the inner unity between the
history of divine self-disclosure in time and the explanatory understanding of the nexus
between the terms of that disclosure. And as the emergence of modern historical
consciousness complicates the notion of history in positive theology, so too it demands a
renewed formulation of the inner unity between the positive and the speculative, between
history and system. To deliver upon this demand is, for Lonergan, to advance the position
achieved in Thomas by integrally expanding the tradition he represents to encompass
what it as yet does not.
The last of Lonergan’s methodological precepts strains the analogical influence
between science, philosophy, and theology. Judgment, evaluation, the rational ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to an understanding is “the supreme rule in any and every science.”134 Scientific
inquiry interrogates some circumscribed range of data, seeking to understand what is to
be understood, postulating possible answers, testing them through controlled procedures,
before discovering at the conclusion of those procedures whether what is understood is,
in fact, the case. Judgment, therefore, stands to truth as understanding to coherence. And
so, to refuse the responsibility of judgment is to reject the possibility of truth, a prospect
that Lonergan calls “sub-human.”135 But while in all mundane sciences intelligence
interrogates data, theological science interrogates truths; it seeks to understand faith.
Speculative theology “begins from revealed truth: it does not move towards them through
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an understanding of data. The truth is had right from the beginning.”136 These truths are
secured in the mystery of God, revealed in history, known in faith, expressed in doctrine,
and understood through the explanatory nexus between the terms. And yet, the
speculative theologian cannot avoid making their own judgments. “Theology is not
exercise in repetition,” Lonergan writes, “it is an understanding that grows with the
passage of time.”137
For an understanding to grow, one must evaluate it, either ratifying its veracity, or
deeming it defective, and leading to a new quest for understanding. The theological
responsibility of judgment is the theologian’s willingness to reflect critically upon the
hypothetical postulations of his or her speculations. Such critical reflection is not simply
a repetition of the act of understanding. It is something different. It is a new operation in
the consciousness of the theologian, and “the only way by which a fuller understanding
can for the first time pass into the realm of truth.”138 The success of this transition from
intelligence to reason, from understanding to judgment happens “in accordance with a
certain wisdom.”139 And while wisdom makes adequate all true judgments, only the
wisdom of God can fully judge the adequacy of the understanding of faith. But although
lacking divine wisdom, the theologian must nevertheless judge. A speculative theologian
must “make a judgment according to their own considered opinion,” and if the wisdom
underwriting the judgment is discovered to be defective, they “readily submit their
judgment to that of the church, because they know that the church’s teaching authority is
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guided by the Holy Spirit.”140 The responsibility of judgment subordinates the theologian
both to the wisdom of God and to the teaching authority of the church. Such
subordination means that “theologians will refrain from rendering a definitive value
judgment upon their understanding, but will humbly state their opinion and accept the
judgments of the church.”141

4. Conclusion

This chapter began with the recognition that a once commonplace division of
labor in theology—between the positive and the speculative—has fallen out of fashion,
and that this fall has resulted from multiple causes. The rise and maturation of the human
sciences, especially the study of history, demanded an ecclesial transformation of positive
theology. This transformation commanded much of the intellectual energy of continental
theologians during the first half of the twentieth century, and contributed to the various
reforms of the Second Vatican Council. An unhappy result of this overwhelmingly
fortunate development was the relative neglect that speculative theology suffered over the
same period.
The twentieth century saw not only the ecclesial transformations leading to and
following Vatican II, but also major transformations in philosophy, especially on the
continent. The rise of deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and various forms of Marxist
political theory leveled critiques not just against the speculative systems of theologians,
but of philosophers, political economists, and scientists too. All systems, precisely as
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systems, occlude a will to power, an unjust set of social relations, and a psycho-sexual
symbolic perversity. And as such, they deserve to be razed.
These two sources of speculative decline could not differ from one another more
starkly. Yet, they have both contributed to the loss of the speculative tradition in much of
modern theology. This chapter argued that the first step toward an honest re-evaluation of
the speculative tradition is to recover a memory of its form and operations in their
exemplarity. Theologians cannot ignore the moral and intellectual urgency of postmodern
suspicion toward speculative thought, but they need not let the legitimacy of suspicious
questions prevent them from seeking answers.
Through a detailed examination of several early texts of Bernard Lonergan, this
chapter has tried to make clear what exactly speculative theology is, how it develops, and
the nature of the conscious operations by which its work is accomplished. In so doing, the
argument does not seek direct confrontation with the modern forms of resistance to the
speculative tradition. Rather, it has tried to let that tradition, at least insofar as it is
reflected in Lonergan’s early work, speak for itself. Yet, while this foregrounding reveals
the superficiality of several features of the critics’ case, it leaves unaddressed their more
central claims. To pass through the modern forms of resistance, recovery is only the first
phase. A subsequent renewal of the speculative tradition is required, one that does more
than rehearse the broad lines of the past, but that invites the development of the tradition
in light of the series of transformations in the cultural and intellectual situation that
distinguish the present stage of theological reflection from that of the bulk of speculative
tradition’s main currents.
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Hints of these transformations are scattered throughout this chapter’s analyses,
and indeed throughout much of Lonergan’s early writings. Lonergan identified three
revolutions in western consciousness that together establish the new context of theology,
and with which any theological aggiornamento must contend. First, based especially on
his reading of Herbert Butterfield, Lonergan calls attention to the revolution in science
that overturned the Aristotelian worldview. The transition from a conception of science
as the sure knowledge of things through their causes to science as the heuristic
procedures aiming toward complete explanation of all phenomena demands, he argues, a
re-examination of the scientific nature of theology.
Second, following Hans Georg Gadamer, Christopher Dawson, and Carl Becker,
Lonergan highlights the challenge that the rise of historical consciousness and the
empirical notion of culture represent for a global religion, and a theology that elaborates
the faith of that religion. The notion of culture as the social objectification of human
nature, an immutable and universal achievement crumbles with the discovery of the
multiplicity of cultures. The theological task must broaden to be able to effect a
mediation of revealed meaning within this multiplicity.
And third, Lonergan’s own work aims toward a revolution in philosophy, one in
which cognitional theory overturns metaphysics as first philosophy, as the critical ground
for epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of God. Such reorganization
results in a new emphasis on method, and a greatly reduced, decentered role for logic.
Philosophy grounded in cognitional theory and method yields a new notion of theology
as the mediation of religious meanings to a cultural matrix. The next chapter integrates
these revolutions into a synthetic account of the structure of a renewed speculative
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theology. It highlights especially the revolutions in history and philosophy in the
development of such a theology. And it presents an experimental account of that in which
a renewed speculative theology consists.
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III) TOWARD SPECULATIVE RENEWAL

1. Introduction

Speculative theology was never a ready-made achievement. Its emergence in
scholastic craft was not inevitable. Its successes were never guaranteed. Speculative
theology arose as the term of a series of distinct, but interrelated developments in
western, Christian consciousness. And so the story of speculative theology was a chapter
in the story of that consciousness—of its birth, its growth, and its maturation. The early
conciliar struggles against heresy led theologians to safeguard the deposit of faith through
the introduction of metaphysical terms—substance, nature, person, union—to
communicate an understanding of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ that maintained
the coherence of Christian practice, worship, and devotion.
1

But the exegetical, homiletical, and polemical achievements of the patristic and

conciliar age did more than rebuff heresy. They also contributed to a growing, diverse,
sometimes contradictory tradition of self-understanding handed on to and expanded by
later generations of Christians.
So diverse were these contributions that it fell to the early medieval schoolmen to
bring systematic order and intellectual reconciliation to a steadily expanding doctrinal
pluralism. Peter Abelard identified and collected from the tradition’s many sources and
texts the affirming sic and the negating non for numerous theological theses. But such
dialectical collision only codified the ambiguities embedded in the theological patrimony.
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It could not resolve them. The subsequent development of the scholastic quaestio proved
to be the subtler stratagem, and with it “Abelard’s non became videtur quod non and his
sic became sed contra est.”2 Peter Lombard’s Sentences further amassed the vast and
varied opinions, expositions, and postulations of the Christian textual heritage, and the
Sentences’ commentary tradition applied the quaestio to communicate the unity and
coherence contained within the manifold of that heritage. But it was not until scholastic
thinkers, most famously Thomas Aquinas, encountered, adapted, and integrated elements
of Aristotelian theory into their quest for coherence that speculative theology possessed a
philosophical technique adequate to move beyond collection, collation, and nascent
intellectum to a comprehensive synthesis, a systematic understanding of the doctrinal
nexus, and an intellectual resolution to long-standing theological debates.3
This integration was not simply an elegant eclecticism, “a term that should only
be applied to syntheses that have been insufficiently thought through.”4 Instead, as Hans
Urs von Balthasar notes, “It is humanity, thinking symphonically, polyphonically. And it
is characteristic of its greatest thinkers that the intuitions at the heart of their systems
always assimilate scattered elements they find to hand.”5 By Balthasar’s lights, Thomas
Aquinas is “perhaps the most extreme” example of polyphonic thinking, a theologian
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whose “originality lies, not exclusively but substantially, in his lucid arrangement of the
vast and confused volume of thought that had preceded him.”6 The lucidity of Thomas’s
synthesis and its explanatory range represent major intellectual achievements in the
history of the west. And yet, for all his considerable talents, Thomas’s accomplishments
rested upon more than the force of his genius and the dint of his labor. They required an
entire apparatus of material, social, intellectual, and cultural conditions without which
their emergence would have been improbable.
The Thomistic speculative resolution of the twelfth century’s “tortured” pluralism
required the gradual deployment of Aristotelian logical method to organize varied
doctrinal sources.7 It demanded the material and linguistic transmission of Aristotle’s
non-logical works to furnish an adequate philosophical technique. It necessitated the
practical intellectual infrastructure of the medieval university to house and support the
intellectual vocation. It involved the westward migration of Byzantine learning after the
Fourth Crusade to make available vital philosophical and theological sources. It entailed
the philosophical labors of Islamic and Jewish interpreters of Aristotle to bring
philosophy into an Abrahamic horizon. And it needed the trailblazing thought of Albert
the Great to provide a model for the integration of these various elements.8 There was, in
other words, a sequence of related, but independent historical developments that resulted
in a unified intellectual and practical cultural matrix, a matrix that formed a foundation
for the medieval synthesis that resolved the doctrinal pluralism of earlier theologies. And
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while the intellectual residues of that synthesis have imperfectly but truly endured from
the thirteenth century to the twenty-first, the unified cultural matrix that formed its
foundation has been razed.
The church and its institutions are no longer central actors in the Western sociopolitical order. Theology’s philosophical handmaid has resigned her theological
commission, and has redirected her critical powers away from metaphysical theory and
toward the interrogation of her own via inventionis. Natural philosophy has gained
autonomy from metaphysics, rebranded itself as “natural science,” and has lifted
creation’s explanatory veil through the emergence, application, and refinement of the
canons of empirical method. Furthermore, the very notions of society and culture have
undergone a radical change. Culture is no longer viewed in classicist terms, as the
immutable social manifestation of the human soul—the physis beyond nomoi. It is rather
the historical, specific, contingent, and concrete set of meanings and values by which
people organize their common life. And as there are many discrete sets of such meanings,
so are there many distinct cultures.
These scientific, philosophical, and cultural revolutions have led to what Bernard
Lonergan calls “the passing of Thomism,” and thereby to a pluralism of a sort quite
distinct from that of the twelfth century.9 The older doctrinal pluralism was the
consequence of diverging, competing, and often inadequate philosophical strategies for
expressing or even securing church doctrines. The new pluralism has its origins in
distinct patterns and traditions of cultural making and ecclesial inculturation, in the varied
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and imperfect personal attainments of intellectual, moral, and religious authenticity, and
in the conflicts that result from the complexities of the polymorphism of consciousness
and the methods of analysis determined by distinct abstractive viewpoints.10 And so it is
right to ask, absent the intellectual and cultural unity of the high middle ages, is
speculative theology still possible?
Both conservative and revisionist answers have denied its possibility. But the
implications of that denial pull in opposite directions. Conservative opinion has tried to
secure speculative theology by rebuilding the cultural and social unity of the world that
gave it birth.11 This tendency is evinced in many conciliar, curial, and papal statements
from the mid-nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth.12 And while the conservative
response to the decline of speculative theology in modernity has often been a rigorous
anti-modernism and a robust effort of classicist cultural repristination, the revisionist
responses, such as those Sarah Coakley identifies as the “modern forms of resistance” to
speculative or systematic thinking, so closely associate speculation with hegemonic
cultural classicism that they rule it out as a legitimate feature of religious expression.
Instead of speculation, revisionist theologies prize contextual, practical, and critical
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projects. They seek grassroots theologies that make use of modern methods of analysis
and that comport with their specific, concrete cultural and moral situations.13
But while both conservative and revisionist theologies have denied the possibility
of speculative theology under current intellectual and cultural conditions, this chapter
argues that there can and should be a post-classicist speculative theology. While the
previous chapter drew from Lonergan’s early theology to recover a particular vision of
the speculative, a memory of its development and unfolding in the history of theology
that could pass through postmodernism’s critical gaze with its integrity intact, this
chapter draws from his later work on meaning, culture, and the methods of human inquiry
to propose a heuristic account of the elements of a renewed speculative theology, a
renewal provisionally termed “speculative pluralism.” It is speculative insofar is it
identifies that form of theological inquiry, which intends an imperfect, but highly fruitful
understanding of the mysteries of faith in a way that is hypothetical, analogical, and
revisable. It is a pluralism insofar as it anticipates a dynamic multiplicity of such
speculative understandings correlated with a dynamic multiplicity of concrete cultural,
intellectual, and moral exigencies. And it presents a basic heuristic structure to coordinate
the material, formal, and dialectical elements of these multiplicities. The result, rather
than new theological contents, is a contribution to what Robert Doran calls “a systematic
theology of theologies,” one that moves from the mere fact of theological pluralism to the
methodical grounds of speculative collaboration.14 Doran’s account of the theology of
theologies envisions a genetic sequence of advancing intelligence through shifts in
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historical stages of meaning, and so considers systematic theological pluralism in
diachronic terms. This chapter seeks to complement Doran’s analysis by drawing out the
correlated synchronic pluralism suggested by the empirical notion of culture.

2. The Classicist Worldview and Its Breakdown

To say that the sun has set on the cultural world of Aquinas is not simply to
recognize the collapse of one scheme of civilizational circumstances and the emergence
of another. It is not a matter of adding new metallurgical layers to the statue of
Nebuchadnezzar’s imperial dream.15 It is rather to claim something far more radical, that
what has ended is not only the practical order of Thomas’s milieu, but also the very
notion of culture as he, his contemporaries, and his predecessors understood it. For them,
culture was absolute, normative, and invariant. As classical philosophy abstracted from
the material individuations of human living in order to posit its residues as the formal
contents of human nature, so too the classical, normative notion of culture was the
abstract social substance beneath and beyond all the concrete varieties of vital and
political convention. Culture was the social embodiment of the human soul. And as the
soul’s formality does not suffer change from the empirical vicissitudes of time and place,
neither does human culture.
This view, what Christopher Dawson calls “the old unitary conception” of culture,
held that “. . . men may be more cultured or less cultured, but in so far as they are
cultured, they are walking along the same high road which leads to the same goal.”16 And
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because the goal was fixed, progress toward its realization could be measured by the
standards “of Greek paideia and Roman doctrinae studium atque humanitatis,” of
education, cultivation, and Bildung.17 Becoming cultured was “a matter of acquiring and
assimilating the tastes and skills, the ideals, virtues, and ideas that were pressed upon one
in a good home and through a curriculum in the liberal arts,” while culture itself was “a
matter of models to be imitated, of ideal characters to be emulated, of eternal verities and
universally valid laws.”18 Such were the aristocratic values that organized classicism’s
normative notion of the good life and the good society. So potent was the psychic
momentum of the classicist worldview that it did not fall with the rest of the antique
world. Its basic norms and ideals were taken up, modified, sometimes criticized, but
largely maintained in the Christian West. As Lonergan describes Christian classicism,
“Though there did exist the simple faithful, the people, the natives, the barbarians, still
career was open to talent. One entered upon it by diligent study of the ancient Latin and
Greek authors. One pursued it by learning Scholastic philosophy and theology and canon
law. One exercised it by one’s fluent teaching or conduct of affairs in the Latin tongue.”19
The accumulated wisdom of the ancient and medieval worlds was the normative course
toward the cultivation of the self.
Classicism’s great intellectual achievement is what Bruno Snell calls the
discovery of mind.20 By it, mentality and technique intervened upon the homogenous
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world of myth, magic, and practical intelligence. It objectified and distinguished between
“feeling and doing, knowing and deciding,” and it “clarified just what it is to know. . .
.”21 The discovery of mind was the discovery that when the intellect knows, it knows a
meaning—a form, an intelligibility, a quiddity. And that clarification laid bare an
additional discovery, that the range of meanings vulnerable to inquiry and knowledge
includes two distinct classes. There are meanings whose terms have their intelligibility in
their relation to the inquirer, and there are those whose intelligibility is the formality of
the terms and the relations that obtain between and among them. The former are the
meanings that populate the world of common sense, that are known through practical
intellectual inquiry, that lead to language, economy, technology, politics, and—after a
long time and with some epochal luck—the great civilizational orders of the ancient
world.22 But the latter are those meanings that belong to the distinct realm of theory, a
realm discovered when inquirers ask questions whose answers lay outside the
competence of common sense.
Such questions are those that Socrates posed and his interlocutors failed
adequately to answer. They are questions that intend definitions of specific and universal
applicability—soli et onmia. Theoretical inquiry asks not merely “Is this city just?” but
also, “What is justice?” By clarifying that to know is to know a meaning, and that the
world mediated by meaning includes both commonsensical and theoretical forms of
mediation, the scientific, philosophical, and theological disciplines of the ancient and
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medieval worlds had their charter and their method. As such, notions like “justice” were
taken out of the practical contexts that struggled to proffer stable definitions and set
within a normative, universal moral psychology.
By distinguishing theory from homogeneous common sense, the discovery of
mind clarified that the world human beings labor to know is mediated by meaning,
explored through inquiry, and grasped by the intelligent apprehension of the intelligible.
Knowing, in other words, is distinct from sensation, the intelligible from the sensible, and
the known from the merely given. And while the mediation of meaning can take
commonsensical or theoretical forms, it is only by making explicit the difference between
them that one comes to thematize the world as mediated by meaning at all. For inasmuch
as the discovery of mind is in part the discovery of the abstract realm of theory, it is also,
by contrast, the discovery of the concrete realm of common sense as something distinct,
circumscribed, and worthy of investigation because it has a discernible character all its
own.
The classicist breakthrough to theory made possible by the discovery of mind
allowed for the development of specialized, theoretical disciplines of inquiry: a perennial
philosophy distinct from proverb, a universal science distinct from tacit understanding,
and—in the Christian context—a speculative theology distinct from catechetical
instruction. In the theoretical orientation, philosophy was, formally, a metaphysics. Its
basic terms and relations were the general categories not just for philosophy, but for
natural and even (albeit imperfectly) theological science as well. In the theoretical realm,
logic, especially the explanatory syllogism, was the primary control of meaning for every
science. And because the conclusion of a syllogism is contained implicitly in the
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premises from which it proceeds, science could be conceived as the certain knowledge of
things through their causes. Thus, theology, as the science of God and all things in
relation to God, took its place atop the scientific hierarchy as regina scientiarum, for its
object was the idea of being and its knowledge was effected with a certainty secured by
divine revelation. Theory’s universality, certainty, and logical control were fruits of the
classicist worldview, a notion of order in which fixity, eternality, and generality were the
ideals and norms of knowledge.
But as the medieval world gradually gave way to the modern, the notions and
practices of science and philosophy underwent a sequence of dramatic revolutions that
fractured the hierarchical unity of knowledge as it was imagined in the classicist scheme.
That classical unity, argues Lonergan, “habituat[ed] the human mind to theoretical
pursuits,” but it “could be no more than a transitional phase.”23 The Aristotelian logical
ideals that organized the “construction both of the nature of science and of the relations
between sciences turned out to be a procrustean bed on which science cannot lie.”24 The
transition from the medieval to the modern is marked by a series of revolutionary
migrations in which theory moves from the generic to the specific, the abstract to the
concrete, the certain to the probable, the normative to the historical, and from the
objective context of truth to the subjective conditions of its constitutive judgments. The
cumulative effects of these migrations contributed to the passing away of the classicist
worldview. Though word of its passing has only slowly spread and only reluctantly been
received.
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The specialized disciplines of philosophy, science, and theology that developed
through the differentiation of sensibility from intellect, and common sense from theory
turned, one after another, from the verities and certitudes of universal definitions and
axioms to the empirical contexts of inquiry and thought. The first migration of theory
occurred in the development of modern science and its break with the Aristotelian
method. Late medieval and early modern science had embarked on a gradual, cumulative
process “to develop its own proper basic concepts and thereby achieve its autonomy.”25
The result is a notion of science quite at odds with that of the Posterior Analytics. “The
content of modern scientific doctrine” Lonergan writes, “is not an intelligibility that is
necessary but an intelligibility that is (1) possible and (2) probably verified.”26 Modern
science advances from the empirical analysis of phenomena toward its ideal of complete
explanation through a refined methodical process by which the scientist selects a field of
sensible data within which he or she observes, experiments, and makes applications in
order to understand the immanent intelligibility of that sensible field in accord with
classical and statistical laws.27 The laws themselves are true not because they are
necessary, but only insofar as they are verified. And the understanding resulting from
empirical analysis is not a certainty secured in logical control, but is rather the best of
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current opinion anchored to successful, recurrent methodical performance, and open to
potentially radical future revision.28
The modern notion of science promoted, as a consequence, the emergence of a
modern philosophy. Where the metaphysical formulations of classical thought furnished
the universal definitions, categories, and relations basic to various subordinated inquiries,
modern science’s methodical independence from metaphysical doctrines and its
usurpation of the theoretical mantle led to a second migration. Having ceded the
responsibility for theory to the natural scientists, philosophers nevertheless followed their
lead. They turned increasingly to the actual contexts of philosophy and philosophical
data, to the manifold ways in which inquiry is embedded in existence, history, and
community. “[P]hilosophy,” writes Lonergan, “has invaded the concrete, the particular,
and the contingent, of the existential subject’s decisions and of the history of peoples,
societies, and cultures. . . .”29 Philosophy’s criterion of validity moved from the rigorous
deduction of conclusions from basic axioms to the critique of the philosopher’s method.
As a result, no philosophic doctrine or product can be affirmed without demonstrating the
validity of the concrete process of discovery by which the doctrine came about. The
antinomies between knowledge and opinion, the theoretical and the practical, wisdom
and prudence, the ideal and real, the res cogitans and the res extensa thus yielded to
Kant’s Copernican revolution.30 In its wake, “Hegel turned from substance to the subject.
Historians and philologists worked out their autonomous methods for human studies.
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Will and decision, actions and results, came up for emphasis in Kierkegaard,
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Blondel, the pragmatists. Brentano inspired Husserl, and
intentionality analysis routed faculty psychology.31”
As the empirical turn in natural science rules out the possibility of realizing the
ideal of certain knowledge, so the existential turn from substance to subject so radically
multiplies the field of data relevant to philosophical inquiry that the classicist expectation
of an objective, universal, and formal doctrine of human being invulnerable to the
ambiguities of human living proves impossible. “The study of the subject,” writes
Lonergan, “is the study of oneself inasmuch as one is conscious. It prescinds from the
soul, its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these is given in consciousness. It
attends to operations and their center and source, which is the self.”32 If philosophy’s
object of study is the subject in his or her operative, active performance in the world
mediated by meaning, then there are no mere opinions to be discarded, no accidents to be
bracketed, and no contexts from which to flee through abstraction without intellectual
cost. The subject is a subject in conscious operation, in existence, history, and
community. The subject is incarnate. And the data on the subject are empirical.
But the philosophical migration of theory from the abstract to the concrete does
more than expand the horizonal range of the world mediated by meaning. It also clarifies
that the meaningfulness of the world of human phenomena is distinct from that of the
world that natural science selects for its investigations. The human world has a history—a
past, a present, and a future—and that history unfolds in accord not with the verified laws
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of physical-chemical emergence, but rather with the admixture of the authenticity and
inauthenticity of human freedom, human decision, and human responsibility. The human
world “does not come into being or survive without deliberation, evaluation, decision,
action, without the exercise of freedom and responsibility. It is a world of existential
subjects, and it objectifies the values that they originate in their creativity and their
freedom.”33 Not only is the human world mediated by the cognitive contents of common
sense and theory, it is also constituted by those meanings and the conscious acts by which
they come about.
The human world is a human production, an effect of acts of meaning. Absent
those acts, there is no human world. Such world-making, moreover, “is not restricted to
the transformation of nature, for there is also the transformation of man himself.”34 That
transformation, be it individual, cultural, or social, artistic, linguistic, or historical, “is in
its essence a change in meaning: a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or
evaluation, a change in the order of request.”35 Human worlds, and, by extension, the data
of philosophy, are not only intelligible, but are also intelligent.
Critically, the assertion of meaning’s constitutive function in world-making is not
to deny the reality of what is made, but merely to specify its provenance. Cultural
constructivism, in other words, need not come at the cost of critical realism. Because
such realism insists that the real is known intelligently, rationally, and deliberately, the
meanings made through acts of understanding, judging, and deciding also have their
reality in and through those acts. “[H]uman reality,” Lonergan writes, “the very stuff of
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human living, is not merely meant but in a large measure constituted through acts of
meaning.”36 The dwellings in which humans live, the clothes they wear, the social
institutions to which they belong, the ideals and values to which they aspire, and even the
explanatory constructions of theory have their origins not in some realm of pure nature or
a higher world of forms, but in the intentions, executions, and effects of intellectual,
rational, and existential consciousness.
One could be forgiven for expecting that this pattern of migration, in which
science and philosophy moved to the concrete and discovered their own methodical
practices of investigation, would also have led to an empirical turn in theology. Given the
historical relationship between theology, philosophy, and science, it is not unreasonable
to expect that so dramatic a change in the methods of two fields of this triad would
occasion a corresponding change in the third. And yet, as Lonergan notes, “When modern
science began, when the Enlightenment began, then the theologians began to reassure one
another about their certainties.”37 As the other domains of inquiry took aim at the
contingent and verifiable, the daring speculative theologies of the Middle Ages were
abandoned in favor of dogmatic theology, a method conceived “in opposition to
Scholasticism,” which “demoted the quest of faith for understanding to a desirable but
secondary and, indeed, optional goal.”38 Instead of theology as fides quarens intellectum
and the open-ended perspective of the quaestio, the dogmatic approach prized the
certainty of the thesis, and worked to unfold the consequences that derive from that
certainty. Lonergan notes that this form of theological practice was normative in Catholic
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contexts even into the twentieth century, but that for seventy years before Vatican II and
in the decades since, theology has been slowly coming to terms with the post-deductive,
empirical, and historical contexts of the modern world and of the transformations of its
own methods demanded by those contexts.39 As Lonergan writes, “Just as theology in the
thirteenth century followed its age by assimilating Aristotle, just as theology in the
seventeenth century resisted its age by retiring into a dogmatic corner, so theology today
is locked in an encounter with its age. Whether it will grow and triumph, or whether it
will wither to insignificance, depends in no small measure on the clarity and the accuracy
of its grasp of the external cultural factors that undermine its past achievements and
challenge it to new endeavors.”40
These external cultural factors include the migrations of scientific and
philosophical theory from the abstract to the concrete, migrations that represent decisive
breaks with the dominant mentality of the classicist worldview. Where classicism sought
cultural universality and scientific certainty, and deployed its theoretical instruments in
pursuit of that universality, the concrete contexts of modern science and philosophy have
rejected those deployments. Without leaving theory behind, they have become empirical
disciplines; they seek to explain the data of sense and the data of consciousness as they
are given in the specific worlds of nature and human culture. And as the methodical
selection of the phenomena of the natural world led to the development of a new science
of nature independent from borrowed metaphysical doctrines, so a practiced attention to
the varied phenomena of distinct human worlds invites the development of a new science
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of culture distinct from that of classicist expectation.41 But, as we will see, that
development has been uneven. Classicism promotes blind spots in even very earnest
investigators. And those blind spots often obscure the data relevant for insights into the
concrete situations of human culture, and can yield a reflexive turn back to the
unexamined pretension of classicist universality. Thus, before treating of the empirical
context of a modern speculative theology, we must first address the development of the
science of human meaning, the emergence of a new notion of culture, and the
implications for speculative theory that follow upon them.

3. The New Science of Culture Between Philosophy and Theology

The Empirical Notion of Culture
In his 1948 work, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, T. S. Eliot writes, “Just
as a doctrine only needs to be defined after the appearance of some heresy, so a word
does not need to receive this attention until it has come to be misused.”42 The misuse of
the term culture, which provokes Eliot’s protracted effort to elaborate a precise definition,
is a consequence of its long, complex history, a history that Raymond Williams famously
calls “one of the two or three most complicated in the English language.”43 For Eliot,
such complexity, as a practical consequence, incentivizes the employment of the term in
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speech and writing, but not the careful examination of its meaning.44 In a more
metaphorical voice, F. R. Cowell notes that “Culture has something of the elusive,
attractive quality of the rainbow. When it appears it is generally welcomed and admired,
and all the more so by those who find its composition, nature and essence, like its
beginning and end, something of a mystery.”45 The classicist notion of culture, precisely
because of its undifferentiated and normative perspective, has the advantage of clarity
and simplicity. But, as H. L. Mencken remarked, “there is always a well-known solution
to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”46 A new notion of culture has
emerged. One that rejects classicism’s neatness and plausibility, and that hopefully
overcomes its error.
As natural philosophy and metaphysical psychology could not resist the migration
to the concrete, neither can the classical notion of culture abstract indefinitely from the
material peculiarities, the conventions, the social biographies and artifacts of distinct
expressions of human living. Those particulars, once set aside as mere nomoi, have
become the data for a new science, a science which inquires into the immanent
intelligibility of distinct patterns of convention. The result is what Lonergan calls the
empirical notion of culture in which culture is defined as “a set of meanings and values
informing a common way of life,” and which entails the further recognition that there are
as many cultures as there are distinct sets of such meanings and values.47
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In an empirical frame, as Christopher Dawson notes, culture is not “. . . the
cultivation of the individual mind, which was the usual sense of the word in the past, but
of a common social way of life—a way of life with a tradition behind it, which has
embodied itself in institutions and which involves moral standards and principles.”48 Yet,
if the empirical notion of culture clarifies the fields of data on human living relevant to a
post-classicist theory of culture, a mentality coordinated and habituated to the empirical
view has only unevenly come into being. As Dawson recognizes, “The idea that there are
a number of different roads leading, perhaps, in opposite directions, still remains a
difficult idea to assimilate.”49 And as Christian classicism was the heir of Greek and
Roman classicism, so Modernity’s displacement of Christian culture entailed its own
classicist view. “Humanism, the Enlightenment and the modern conceptions of ‘the
democratic way of life’ and the ‘one world,’” argues Dawson, “all suppose the same idea
of a single universal ideal of civilization toward which all men and peoples must
move.”50 But unlike ancient and medieval classicism, these ideologies of more recent
invention are not insulated from the unsparing facts of culture’s multiplicity and
empirical variety. And so, despite the Western soul’s imperfect purgation of its classicist
spirit, the reality of the concrete fields of data on human living have led to a protracted
effort to disengage a method of inquiry proper to the contours of those fields capable of
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grasping the constitutive meanings within specific patterns of human life. And in the
actual courses of that effort, there emerge different and sometimes competing answers to
vital questions: where do the relevant data on culture lie? What relationship obtains
between culture and civilization? By what means should culture be interpreted?
As the new natural sciences discovered the universal classical laws that explain
mass and its motion, so also did nascent inquiry into the empirical situation of culture
search for a unified set of universal norms or laws of culture analogous to the universal
physical laws of nature. The early practitioners of the new cultural sciences conceived of
their disciplinary standpoint as neutral, rational, and value-free, thereby bringing to bear
upon human societies the procedures of analysis canonized in the Baconian ideals of
science. Like the Newtonian physicist, early anthropologists idealized universality of
application. They sought something like an equation that would unite various local
expressions into a universal theory of human culture. Such a theory would relax modern
anxieties about cultural and historical relativism that accompany the recognition of
seemingly endless human variety, each with its own animating vision of truth, goodness,
and beauty.
These so-called consensus gentium theories tried to derive from their empirical
studies a grand explanatory paradigm, a set of generalizations verifiable in all cultural
situations and eras. But cultural meanings are not the same kind of data as physical
motion. And to the extent that early anthropologists investigated cultural meanings within
the methodical framework of natural science, they failed to let their objects of inquiry
determine their methods of analysis. Despite a turn to the empirical, consensus gentium
theories remained thoroughly classicist in outlook, still borrowing the basic terms and
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relations of another, higher science (albeit modern physics rather than classical
metaphysics) instead of generating those terms and relations themselves. This classicism
was evidenced by the fact that the specific cultures from which anthropologists
themselves came were left unexamined. And this omission was not accidental. The
cultural particularities of Western, European modernity were not countenanced as
particularities. They were tacitly or even explicitly assumed to be normative, or at least
neutral, and certainly not demanding of investigative scrutiny. Accordingly, as Bruno
Latour writes, “For traditional anthropologists, there is not—there cannot be, there should
not be—an anthropology of the modern world. . . . It is even because they remain
incapable of studying themselves in this way that ethnographers are so critical, and so
distant, when they go off to the tropics to study others.”51
One of the great exponents of consensus gentium theory, Clyde Kluckhohn,
required at least eleven different definitions of culture to enlarge the concept sufficiently
to encompass the immense diversity of the empirical features he observed among distinct
cultures.52 This Enlightenment strategy for solving the problem of plurality leads to
anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s question, “Can this halfway house between the
eighteenth and twentieth centuries really stand?”53 Geertz answers in the negative. “My
point,” he argues, “is that such generalizations are not to be discovered through a
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Baconian search for cultural universals, a kind of public-opinion polling of the world’s
peoples in search of a consensus gentium that does not in fact exist, and, further, that the
attempt to do so leads to precisely the sort of relativism the whole approach was
expressly designed to avoid.”54
In contrast to an experimental model aimed at discovering universal cultural laws,
Geertz proposes a semiotic or interpretive model of inquiry.55 For Geertz, culture is “an
historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate,
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.”56 Geertz
conceives of culture metaphorically as ensembles of texts. These ensembles are webs of
self-spun signification (as Charles Taylor might call them) that require the straining
anthropologist or ethnographer “. . . to read over the shoulders of those to whom they
properly belong.”57 The task of the cultural scientist is not to interpret the meaning of
cultures through the imposition of a universal hermeneutics, but is rather to patiently
internalize, albeit secondarily and artificially, the patterns of interpretation embedded
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within cultures themselves. As Geertz writes, “societies, like lives, contain their own
interpretations. One has only to learn how to gain access to them.”58
With a semiotic approach similar to Geertz, but articulated in a more
philosophical key, Susanne Langer argues that “A culture is the symbolic expression of
developed habitual ways of feeling,” where feeling refers to “rhythms of attention,” “the
strain of thought,” “attitudes of mind,” the “activity of imagination,” “confidence in the
goodness of life,” but also “annoyance, boredom, cynicism,” and “the countless modes of
humor.”59 For Langer, feeling means “everything that can be felt.”60 Culture is not just
feeling, but also feeling’s pattern of direction, its way, or “the degree to which feelings
are apt to go, their persistence or transience, the quickness of various responses, and their
directness to certain events rather than others.”61 And if culture is the expression of this
concrete pattern of feeling, then distinctions among expressions reveal distinctions in
ways of feeling and thereby distinctions among cultures.
Echoing Erich Rothacker’s distinction between the social and the cultural, Langer
contrasts culture as the symbolic directedness of feeling with civilization as the “pattern
of the practical implementation of life” that organizes human networks of association
through the mechanisms of monetized commerce, statute law, transportation and
communication infrastructure, and networks for the flow and distribution of goods.62
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Civilization, Langer argues, arises from advanced cultures, but also floats free of them. It
can be “transplanted and live apart from its cultural roots. It can be grafted onto other
cultures and thrive on them.”63 But civilization, Langer claims, is also a threat to culture.
It can reduce human association to raw economic exchange, to productivity, to “nothing
but usefulness.”64
The distinction between the social and the cultural, while common to many
approaches, is not definitive among modern theories of culture. The psychoanalytic
theory of culture, flowing from the thought of Sigmund Freud, explicitly rejects any
distinction of culture and civilization. According to Paul Ricoeur, there are three models
of cultural interpretation in Freud’s thought. There is an “economic model,” which
considers culture “from the viewpoint of a balance sheet of libidinal cathexes and anticathexes.”65 There is a “genetic model,” which looks for the origins of these economic
functions “in childhood and phylogenesis.”66 And there is a “topographic” model, which
considers culture in terms of the dynamic interactions of the Id, Ego, and Superego.67
From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, “There is almost no distinction between the utilitarian
enterprise of dominating the forces of nature (civilization) and the disinterested, idealist
task of realizing values (culture).”68 These models each locate the meaning and
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interpretation of culture in the psychic contexts of originating violence, be it the
foundational murder of the father by his son or the internal war between and among
competing appetites and principles of psychic order.
But while Freud conceived of the psychoanalytic interpretation of culture as
definitive of a modern mentality, Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud stresses that the
importance of the psychoanalytic interpretation lies not in the accuracy of its explanatory
diagnoses, but rather as a sign of a shift in cultural self-constitution toward explicit
cultural interpretation. He writes, “. . . psychoanalysis takes part in the contemporary
cultural movement by acting as a hermeneutics of culture. In other words, psychoanalysis
marks a change of culture because its interpretation of man bears in a central and direct
way on culture as a whole. It makes interpretation into a moment of culture: it changes
culture by interpreting it.”69
The anthropological, semiotic, and psychoanalytic responses to the challenge of
the empirical, modern notion of culture bear witness to the immense challenge of
adequately attending to the data of human living and of understanding those data in a
comprehensive, systematic way. As such, the shift to a modern, empirical, historical, and
pluralist notion of culture remains a precarious and incomplete achievement. The
differentiations, skills, and orientations necessary to sustain and develop both the human
subject and human culture are present, to invoke Thomas Aquinas, only in a few, only
after much work, and accompanied by many errors. As Lonergan writes,
Classical culture has given way to a modern culture, and, I would submit, the
crisis of our age is in no small measure the fact that modern culture has not yet
reached its maturity. The classical mediation of meaning has broken down; the
breakdown has been effected by a whole array of new and more effective
69
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techniques; but their very multiplicity and complexity leave us bewildered,
disoriented, confused, preyed upon by anxiety, dreading lest we fall victims to the
up-to-date myth of ideology and the hypnotic, highly effective magic of thought
control.70
Even this brief survey of various modern attempts to understand culture in its
concreteness and variety indicates the residual classicism that often attaches itself to any
would-be modern science of culture. And while a truly post-classicist cultural science is
per se possible in terms of the metaphysical symmetry between the known unknown of
cultural intelligibility and the intellectual powers of human understanding qua human, it
remains that the emergence of such a science is de facto improbable, at least in a form
purified from the egoist and classicist biases that undermine understanding and mobilize
misunderstanding. A truly post-classicist, historically-minded cultural mentality may be a
proportionate effect of natural reason, but, in the concrete, the natural intellectual means
to achieve that proportionate effect prove rare, precarious, and diluted with various
biases, errors, and oversights.
It is not unreasonable to hypothesize, then, that historical-mindedness or the
empirical notion of culture is a natural knowledge, a formal effect of human intelligence,
but that, in the concrete order and on a civilizational scale, a supernatural effective means
will be required to secure it.71 According to such a hypothesis, stabilized historicalmindedness has its origins in world-transcendent value and in that value’s self-
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communication to the world of human meaning. As such, historical mindedness is a
theological category. And if historical-mindedness is, at root and in the concrete,
theological, then any would-be post-classicist speculative theology has a responsibility to
organize itself around that mentality.
The Empirical Notion of Culture as Theological
The foregoing analysis is controlled by what Maurice Blondel calls a method of
immanence.72 It treats of the objectification of the historical constitution of the human
world as a “from below” phenomenon characteristic of a diverse array of disciplinary
procedures and viewpoints that have proliferated since the nineteenth century. Whether
one speaks with Dilthey and Gadamer of historical consciousness (historischem
Bewusstsein), with Carl Becker, Alan Richardson, and Lonergan of historicalmindedness, or with Dawson, Langer, and Geertz of culture as anthropological, semiotic,
or empirical, one is searching for and selecting a rhetoric adequate to denote the multidisciplinary convergence of scholarly inquiry upon the nexus of human meaning, history,
and plurality. The discovery at the heart of this convergence, according to Gadamer, “is
very likely the most important revolution among those we have undergone since the
beginning of the modern epoch. . . . The historical consciousness which characterizes
contemporary man is a privilege, perhaps even a burden, the likes of which has never
been imposed on any previous generation.”73 For Gadamer, to be historically conscious is

72
See Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics & History and Dogma, trans. Alexander Dru
and Illtyd Trethowan (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 178–179.

Hans Georg Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” in Paul Rabinow and
William M. Sullivan, eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look (Berkley, Los Angeles, and London:
University of California Press, 1987), 89.
73

94

to possess the “. . . full awareness of the historicity of everything and the relativity of all
opinions,”74 and to recognize “the possibility of a multiplicity of relative viewpoints.”75
But, as Gadamer himself recognizes, jealous traditions tend to reassert their own
normativity. And so even these new methods of cultural analysis can slouch toward
classicism and its de jure singularity.
The “from below” methodologies of the sciences of empirical culture, while
proportionate to their objects and thereby capable in principle of understanding them in a
historically-minded way, are vulnerable to the restrictedness of individual and group
biases. What is more, they suffer from the immaturities of youth. The human sciences are
newcomers on the scene, and so their practices are bound to be unrefined and incomplete.
But a “from below” approach to historical-mindedness is not the only possibility for
cultivating a post-classicist cultural mentality.
In his massive work, Theology and the Dialectics of History (1990), Robert Doran
dialogues with Eric Voegelin and his account of classical philosophy’s discovery of the
anthropological principle and its erotic, classicist, and aristocratic vision of the worldtranscendent Good. For Voegelin, Philosophy exercises its resistance to social disorder
and the processes of decline by “evoking a more integral order of existence” and by
“constituting that order as the substantive center of a new community emergent by force
of the resistant movement of the philosophizing spirit in the midst of the pressures of
corruption.”76 The anthropological principle, according to Voegelin, governs this
resistance such that “the integrity of the psyche measures the integrity of society, and
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God measures the integrity of the psyche.”77 There is a circularity of conditioning
between psyche and society, within which the growth or decay of one order leads to the
growth or decay of the other and back again. But “the circle is broken with the
recognition of the inclinations in the psyche toward attunement with the worldtranscendent measure of its integrity.”78 In Voegelin’s account of the Platonic tradition,
attunement to world-transcendent Agathon, evidenced by the philosopher’s erotic
anticipations, is the principle of transformation in both the psychic and public orders. The
authentic psyche is attuned to and measured by world-transcendent Agathon, and, in turn,
the authentic psyche resists the disordered orientations of the public order and offers itself
as the measure for social integrity. The philosophical psyche, in other words, mediates
transcendent value to the public sphere.
In Doran’s analysis, this Platonic anthropological principle is true as far as it goes,
but it suffers from a series of horizonal circumscriptions that must be transcended if it is
to be transposed into a modern, global, pluralistic context. For the Platonic tradition, the
notion of the world-transcendent Agathon that measures the integrity of the psyche is
erotic in orientation, classicist in outlook, and aristocratic in values. For Doran, these
circumscriptions are a consequence of the “from below” directionality of psychic
dynamism toward transcendence. The responsibility for achieving psychic integrity lies
solely with the philosophizing spirit. The philosopher must both resist public disorder and
transcend his or her own limitations in the erotic striving for the world-transcendent
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measure. As a result, only the philosopher can realize the good, and thereby achieve
psychic integrity. Erotic elitism births aristocratic values and cultural classicism.
But if cultural normativity and aristocratic reductions of value are entailments of
philosophical erotic striving, then a different order of desire and attainment is required,
one in which the directionality of transcendence and psychic dynamism are reversed, one
in which the world-transcendent measure is not only the term of erotic anticipation, but is
itself communicated to the psyche through its own initiative. An analysis of that shift in
directionality requires a corresponding shift in abstractive viewpoint, a shift from
philosophy and its erotic orientations to theology and its agapic testimony. As Doran
writes, “The Christian soteriological differentiation of consciousness renders possible the
transformation of a classicist, aristocratic, and psychic-erotic notion of the human good
into one that is historical, universalist, and agapic.”79
As eros is transformed into agape, it becomes the source of a consequent
transformation of attitudes toward culture and value embedded in the philosophical
anthropological principle. This transformation is not merely a dilation of the
philosopher’s native horizon, but is rather the radical and disproportionate reception of a
new horizon, one beyond that of any natural love, any particular cultural achievement, or
any parochial value. Whereas philosophy objectifies the dynamism of eros toward
Agathon, theology objectifies “the gift of an antecedent and ultimately universal
willingness as the ground of the integral resistance to social and personal disorder and
decline.”80 This gift is what theologians call the grace of charity, “and it is offered by the
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divine ground to the eros of the psyche.”81 Through the divine initiative, the transcendent
measure is given to the psyche and, through the psyche, to the community. The concrete
form of agapic integrity, “the revelation of attunement with the divine ground,” is “a
visitation of humanity by soteriological truth.”82 In Christian theology, the truth of agapic
attunement is revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of the Son of God incarnate in
Jesus of Nazareth. The psychic integrity that measures the integrity of the community is,
accordingly, the just and mysterious law of the cross, the love that returns good for evil,
that transforms evil into good, that would lay its life down not only for one’s friends, but
also for one’s enemies.
Theology’s testimony to soteriological revelation is also a “twofold agapic
invitation,” in which one is invited both “to receive the divine agape” and “to embody it
in one’s own existence.”83 In receiving divine agape, one receives that which eros can
only desire. In embodying divine agape, one offers to the public order the fullness of its
measure of authenticity, and the means of resisting the forces of decline and for renewing
those of progress. But because the psychic measure is the agapic law of the cross,
soteriological revelation “Pass(es) judgment on even the noblest achievements of
thought, law, and religion. Thus the noetic truth disengaged by philosophy is no license to
regard the cultural order that derives at least in part from this disengagement as either
normative for genuine humanity or permanent.”84
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In this way, the reconfiguration of eros into agape “grounds the movement from
classicism to historical mindedness and from aristocracy to universalism.”85 Because that
reconfiguration is given freely by the divine ground, its realization in the psyche cannot
be said to be an achievement of the human spirit. And since the realization of psychic
integrity and its public mediation is not accomplished by the initiative of philosophy, then
any claim to personal or cultural normativity is undermined at its root. A theological
transformation of the anthropological principle holds that while the integrity of the
psyche may be measured by God, it is God’s gift of God’s self to the psyche that both
completes the psyche’s native transcendental erotic orientation, and elevates the psyche
itself such that “Integrity becomes cooperation with God, in any cultural order, as God
effects the redemption of humanity from every consequence of sin by making the divine
life the innermost constitutive element of human life.”86 Divine constitutive meaning
rejects the normative claims of classicism, and liberates the psyche from the narrowness
of its vision to a historically minded perspective, capable of bearing witness to the
soteriological vector operative in the law of the cross at work in every culture and every
age.
4. Speculative Theology after Classicism
This chapter has, so far, attempted to indicate the major trend lines of the shift
from the medieval context in which speculative theology arose to the modern context that
has witnessed its decline. Speculative theology was a project built upon a unified,
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classicist cultural matrix. The material and intellectual fruits of classicism, most notably
the discovery of mind, gifted to theology the materials and techniques for the adoption of
a formally theoretical viewpoint, and thereby made possible a mediation between the
doctrinal context of the received tradition and the intellectual horizon of the medieval
world.
Classicism’s genius was its disengagement of theory and its pursuit of the
universal. But that genius also proved tragic. For theory’s ideal of universal applicability
has, in Robert Doran’s terms, a “psychic-erotic” imaginary that underwrites its projects.
Theory does not objectify and so does not know its own concreteness, its contingency, its
location in the historical dialectic of progress and decline, and so it universalizes,
normalizes, and makes abstract what is, in fact, local, empirical, and concrete. Classicism
grasped the significance of theory as a realm of meaning in excess of common sense, but
that achievement obscured the fact that theory is a product of acts of meaning, and, as
such, has its origins and exigencies in the concrete moral, cultural, intellectual, and
historical contexts of the theorizer and his or her interrogative horizon. Theoretical
meanings, like all meanings, are answers to questions. As such, the horizons and
orientations of inquirers are essential constraints on possible terms of inquiry, even if
those terms intend a universal scope.87
The breakdown of the classicist worldview brings with it the suspicion that all the
achievements of classicism are so many fruits of a poisoned tree. But while that suspicion
is perhaps well-earned, it need not be the last word on the matter. The argument of the
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remainder of this chapter is that speculative theology can be disentangled from the
classicist context in which it arose, and situated within the post-classicist perspective that
characterizes the modern mentality. Where classicism’s discovery of mind brought with it
the recognition that the human world is mediated by meaning, modern historical
mindedness recognizes that meaning not only mediates but also constitutes that human
world, and so distinct situations of constitutive meanings reveal distinct human worlds.
Thus, a theology that aspires to theoretical meaning in a post-classicist context must take
cognizance of those distinct worlds. It must recognize its own situatedness within a
particular world. And, it must systematically confront the challenge of the pluralism of
human worlds, the unity of doctrines, and the intellectual mediation from one to the other.
As Lonergan argues in the opening paragraph of Method in Theology, a postclassicist theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a
religion in that matrix. But because a post-classicist perspective recognizes a pluralism of
cultural matrices, it must recognize, as a consequence, a pluralism of theological
mediations. And if such mediations are the goal of the whole of theology, then
speculative theology has the more exact task of mediating between the concrete religious,
moral, and intellectual questions that occasion the speculative exigence’s emergence in a
particular pattern of culture and the trans-cultural permanence, validity, and personal
enactments of religious doctrines.
The result will be a pluralism of speculative theologies, wherein the multiplicity
of concrete cultural matrices and the various occasions of their speculative exigence
demand a multiplicity of speculative mediations, within which the trans-cultural elements
of the unified dogmatic-theological context and the normative human subject both are a
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bulwark against radical relativism and make possible an analogical and methodical
cooperation among distinct speculative theologies. Such a speculative pluralism has four
principal heuristic elements: a material element that pertains to the concrete pluralism
that becomes explicit in the shift from classicism to historical mindedness; a subjective
formal element that is the pluralism of theologians engaged in the enterprise of mediation
between religion and their respective cultural matrices; an objective formal element that
is the pluralism of understandings effected through the subjective formal acts of
theologians; and a dialectical element that attempts to diagnose the complementary,
genetic, contrary, and contradictory relationships between theologies with the goal of
coordinating constructive collaboration among them.
The Material Element
Material pluralism is the human situation of the meaningfulness of social living as
understood according to the empirical notion of culture. The concrete variety of distinct
intellectual, moral, and historical contexts in various states of development or decay,
flowering or decadence, progress or decline set the conditions for distinct trajectories of
speculative thought. This pluralism has both synchronic and diachronic aspects that
correlate with the spatial-geographic multiplicity of cultural matrices at a given time, and
a temporal-historical multiplicity that results from the development or decline of the
organizing meanings and values of particular matrices. And because development or
decay both involve a change in the meanings and values (or indeed disvalues) that
animate a culture’s living, they also indicate a change in the moral and intellectual

102

conditions to which a speculative theology mediates the meaningfulness of the doctrinal
confessions of the Christian religion.
While many historical examples of speculative intervention pertain principally to
problems in the order of understanding that vexed the medieval mind (e.g., the challenge
of reconciling divine simplicity with eternal procession, or human freedom with the
gratuity of divine grace), there are also speculative interventions that respond to problems
in the order of understanding that result from moral disvalues in a culture and the
dissonance they create for grasping the meaningfulness or value of religion. Moral
disvalue can create the conditions for distinct forms of speculative exigence, which in
turn commits the resulting speculative theology to mediate the meaning and value of the
self-revealing God within the circumstances of moral decay that call the significance of
such a God—and even more so the community that confesses him—into question. These
situations in which the social surd of objective meaninglessness and the patterned
experience of oppression, subjugation, alienation, and the collective suffering it promotes
condition the speculative exigence no less than those formal intellectual ambigua that
weighed upon the religious imagination of medieval schoolmen. Thus, synchronic and
diachronic variances in the conditions of speculative exigence anticipate synchronic and
diachronic variations of speculative understanding.
For example, M. Shawn Copeland’s Enfleshing Freedom argues that in an
American culture partially constituted by the meanings and values of white supremacy
and its long history, the embodied experience of poor black women becomes the locus of
the question of the theological understanding of human personhood as reflective of divine
dignity, and of incarnation as the union of God with the really existing experience of
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being human.88 Her speculative reconstruction of theological anthropology mediates the
doctrinal affirmations of creation and incarnation into a cultural matrix organized around
the de-humanization and abuse of poor black women. And while some may be tempted to
classify Copeland’s efforts as no more than an instance of so-called “contextual theology”
at a praxiological remove from the labors of an Aquinas or a Lonergan, it is far more true
to say that hers is a fully post-classicist speculative theology, which eschews the chasm
between knowing and doing, responds to the unique ways in which the speculative
exigence arises in a cultural matrix constituted by the de-humanization of poor black
women, utilizes the symbols, images, ideas, and organizing meanings of that matrix, and
makes use of theoretical technique to render visible the meaning of Christian doctrines
through the icon of the experience of poor black women themselves.89 And while
Copeland’s work exemplifies the speculative theological task of mediating the truth of
Christian doctrines to the intellectual and moral horizon of a particular culture, it remains
that there exists a plurality of cultures and, with it, an exigence for additional speculative
mediations. And so, correlative with the material pluralism of cultural situations that
follows upon the shift to historical mindedness, there is a formal pluralism that responds
to that shift, both a subjective formal element that is the various theologians in their
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speculative operations, and an objective formal element that is the resulting plurality of
speculative theologies.
The Subjective Formal Element
The previous chapter presented Lonergan’s early theory of speculative form and
operation. It indicated the generic shape of speculative theology as a modality of
theological practice distinct from positive and moral theology, with a unique charter and a
specialized technique. By speculative form, Lonergan means a generic orientation of
intellectual mentality that is ordered to the pursuit of intellectum from within the horizon
of fides. But such a generic orientation only becomes actualized within specific lines of
speculative inquiry that emerge from specific patterns of attention to specific problems in
the order of understanding in specific constellations of meaning and value. As a
consequence, the generic form of speculation will be specified differently in distinct lines
of inquiry, as those inquiries interrogate distinct problems of understanding. And while
those problems emerge spontaneously in the process of living, the coordination of
activities and practices that meet those problems require what Sarah Coakley calls
contemplation or “an attentive openness of the whole self (intellect, will, memory,
imagination, feeling, bodiliness) to the reality of God and creation.”90 Specific
speculative inquiries, then, even of the most assiduously theoretical nature, emerge from
concrete circumstances and respond to those circumstances through the operation of
theoretical understanding.
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What Thomas Kuhn notes of scientific theory is no less true of speculative
theology. He writes, “An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and
historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given
scientific community at a given time.”91 Theoretical understanding, even as it abstracts
from the concreteness of common sense in the pursuit of the soli et omni, remains a
human enterprise. And as a human enterprise, it remains tethered to the contexts of the
minds engaged in the abstraction. Thus, the cultural, intellectual, moral, and religious
orientations of theorizers play an essential role not only in the emergence of the
speculative exigence, but also in any speculative response. A theory’s mobility across the
borders of contexts lies in the correspondence between the meaning expressed in the
theory and the specific questions of abstractive intelligence posed from within a different
context. If a concrete situation of inquiry does not lead to the formulation of the question
to which a given theory purports to be an answer, then the theory itself cannot become
enacted in that context until the relevant question emerges.
Such orientations, the historical accidents of concrete circumstances, belong to the
ordinary constitution of the human subject and the human world. And because there
exists a material plurality of such worlds, there will also exist many distinct formal
species of speculative theological inquiries that respond to those circumstances by
deploying the specialized mentality of theory so as to mediate an understanding of faith
back to those circumstances in a way that resolves the ambiguities embedded in them.
Further, because all specific speculative inquiries and their answers bear an analogical
relationship to the genus of speculative form, they also obtain an analogical relationship
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to one another. Thus, speculative understandings reached in one context may prove to
possess adequate mobility to be re-situated within another. As analogous classes of
speculative questions are asked in different ways at different times and in different places,
analogous speculative theories may prove cross-cultural, cross-temporal, and crossspatial in their significance.
The theologian as subject, in terms borrowed from Michael Novak, “is both
social gift and personal achievement: dove and mountain.”92 The cultural situation of the
theologians is had in the givenness of their histories, but theologians as originating values
also contribute to the maintenance and transformation of cultural situations themselves. A
commerce obtains between the material context of a cultural matrix and the speculative
insights that both arise from it and mediate new meanings and values back into it,
transforming the common meanings of the cultural matrix through the process of
mediation. The material element and the subjective formal element of speculative
pluralism thus exercise a reciprocally conditioning influence on one another that unfolds
dynamically in the process of theologizing.
The Objective Formal Element
The commerce that obtains between the material element of speculative pluralism
and its subjective formal element includes the formal effects of the subjective acts. These
effects are the objective speculative theological mediations between the dogmatic context
of a religion and the concrete circumstances of speculative exigence within a cultural
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matrix. Thus, co-extensive with the subjective formal element of speculative pluralism
that is the multiplicity of theological operators, there is the objective formal element that
is the multiplicity of theological objects or understandings that result from the theological
operations. As Elizabeth Johnson notes, “words about God are cultural creatures,
entwined with the mores and adventures of the faith community that uses them. As
cultures shift, so too does the specificity of God-talk.”93 Such words are cultural, but they
emerge from the intellectual practices of theologians within those cultures. For example,
Johnson argues, “Feminist theology results when women’s faith seeks understanding in
the matrix of historical struggle for life in the face of oppressive and alienating forces.”94
As such, the formal functions at work in the emergence of a feminist speculative
theology, then, are the same functions at work in, for example, the seven-century-long
effort of western theologians to reconcile intellectually competing vectors of their
Augustinian theological heritage with their own philosophical culture. In a speculative
theology, one seeks “a complete vision of Christian doctrine,” and such visions “have
taken many forms—appropriate to the philosophical, cultural, and political ethos of their
times, or sometimes in conscious reaction to the same.”95 This formal diversity, as has
already been argued, includes both synchronic and diachronic forms, and as such, “One
cannot therefore speak of systematic theology as a fixed or unchanging entity in Christian
tradition.”96
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Furthermore, theological objects or productions that result from theological
operations enter into the nexus of common meanings and values that organize cultural
existence. And when they do, they can lead to transformations and reorientations of
cultural circumstances themselves. As Elizabeth Johnson argues regarding the emergence
of feminist symbolic speculative discourse, “The symbol of God functions. Language
about God in female images not only challenges the literal mindedness that has clung to
male images in inherited God talk; it not only questions their dominance in discourse
about holy mystery. But insofar as ‘the symbol gives rise to thought,’ such speech calls
into question prevailing structures of patriarchy.”97 In other words, the accumulation of
new and transformational meanings and values—even those of a rigorously theoretical
nature— can lead to a transformation of culture, for culture itself is but a relatively
stabilized nexus of meanings and values.
Taken together, the material, subjective formal, and objective formal elements
comprise a situation in which both at any given moment and across time and place, there
will be not a single normative speculative theology mediating the Christian faith to a
single normative culture, but rather a descriptive, empirical plurality of speculative
theologians, speculative theologies, and cultural matrices. The analogical relationship
between genus and species suggests a consequent analogical relationship between species
themselves. Thus, one can expect a kind of “family resemblance” between distinct
speculative theologians and their speculative theologies. But the character of that
resemblance, because it is analogical and so has difference encoded within it, invites
analyses of a more dialectical character. Differences between cultures, differences
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between theologians, and differences between theologies may be complementary, genetic,
contrary, or contradictory. And so, an adequate heuristic structure for speculative
pluralism must include a dialectical element beyond the material and formal elements.
The Dialectical Element
In his 1974 essay, “Dialectic of Authority,” Lonergan proposes a heuristic
structure for understanding the dynamic relationship between authority, power, and
legitimacy.98 Without rehearsing his entire argument, one can say that 1) authority is
legitimate power; 2) power is the result of past cooperation; 3) cooperation occurs both
diachronically through time and synchronically in the here and now; 4) community
carries power along through time; 5) community entrusts power to authorities; 6) the
legitimacy of communal power is measured by the authenticity or inauthenticity of the
meanings and values that the community holds in common; and 7) the authenticity of
meanings and values is a matter of a cumulative process of communal attentiveness,
intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. Analytically, the diagnosis of authenticity
or inauthenticity is fraught and often inconclusive, but synthetically, one can judge the
authenticity of authority by its fruits: collective progress indicates authenticity, while
collective decline reveals inauthenticity. On its own, the dialectic of authority is a
valuable tool for analyzing the state of a culture. But its invocation here is for a different
purpose. The basic form of the dialectic of authority can be repurposed as a heuristic
structure for understanding the dialectical element of speculative pluralism.

98

Lonergan, “Dialectic of Authority,” Third Collection, CWL 16, 3–9.

110

In the dialectic of authority, communal cooperation over time yields power, the
community mediates that power as authority and entrusts it to particular authorities, and
the dialectic of authenticity or inauthenticity measures the legitimacy of the meanings and
values expressed in community, authorities, and those under authorities. In the case of
speculative theology, communal cooperation both in and over time consists in what
Lonergan calls a functionally specialized method that coordinates the efforts of
theologians into a dynamic and intelligible whole of operations, relations, and effects.
Embedded within and enabling that methodical collaboration is the anterior gift of God’s
love and human cooperation with that love in the pursuit of theological truth. Coordinated
theological collaboration is the source of theological achievements, of an ongoing series
of theological judgments that populate and expand into a tradition and, with it, a
dogmatic-theological context. Particular cultures carry the meaning of the tradition
forward into the realm of speculative understanding. The theologian is the agent of
speculative understanding, who, through his or her acts, effects objects or theological
meanings. Culture, agent, and object form a circle of mutually conditioning relationships
in which culture contextualizes the agent in communal meaning, the agent effects objects,
and the objects mediate new understanding or meaning back into the common context of
a culture.
The dialectic of authenticity measures the legitimacy of this ongoing process. It
looks to the progress or decline of the cultural situation as an indication of the
authenticity or inauthenticity of the meanings and values that constitute it. It poses itself
to the agent in terms of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, and the presence or
absence of distinct differentiations of consciousness. And it addresses the objects or
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effects of speculative operations, the particular understandings or meanings grasped by
the agent. But diagnosing the legitimacy of theological objects requires a distinct
criteriological strategy. The speculative understandings that result from the speculative
operation of the theologian as agent must be judged in terms of their adequacy to the
horizon of meaning and value of the cultural matrix, to the interrogative determinations
of theologian’s questions, and to the dogmatic-theological judgments whose meaning
they are to communicate. But while the dialectic of authenticity can work out the
legitimacy of a set of meanings and values in accord with an analysis of progress or
decline, and it can measure the completeness or incompleteness of the theologian’s act of
understanding through recourse to the trans-cultural unity of the normative human
subject, reaching a judgment about the adequacy of the achieved understanding to the
revealed mystery requires a confrontation with the trans-cultural unity of revealed truth
itself. The hypothesis pursued here and in the next chapter is that this confrontation is
best executed theorematically.
Analogous to the medieval function of theorems in which they serve to establish a
framework of mental perspectives that allow relevant theological data to be distinguished
from the irrelevant, investigated with rigor, and arranged in thought such that resolutions
to received problems become possible, a post-classicist speculative theology invites a
theorematic intervention into the dialectical multiplicity of perspectives and realized
understandings. Such an intervention has two principal functions. First, it discloses the
analogous congruities between complementary, genetic, and contrary theologies. Second,
it aids in identifying contradictory viewpoints, and exercises a criteriological operation
whereby the positional element of the dialectic of contradictories is distinguished from
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the counter-positional element.99 But if the perspective of speculative pluralism is truly
post-classicist, and thereby rejects any source of normativity in the contents of a specific
cultural matrix, where does the normativity operating in the theorems come from?
While the normativity of the formal element of speculative pluralism lies in the
trans-cultural structure of the human subject as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and
responsible, the normativity of the dialectal theorems is secured in the dogmatictheological context itself. Theological doctrines disclosed in the narrative universe of
biblical revelation, refined through the intellectual and rhetorical process of creedal
expression, can also be elaborated as theorems, that is, as systematic articulations that can
organize whole networks of thinking, that can take on a mobility of application, and so
both direct consequent theologizing, and pass judgment on its results.
For any speculative theology, the via analogica will be the principal path in which
theological insight travels. But speculative pluralism anticipates viae analogicae. Thus, a
main function of the dialectical element regards discerning legitimate from illegitimate
analogiae, coordinating the legitimate toward collaborative plurality, while unburdening
that collaborative effort from the need to integrate the illegitimate. The structure of this
dialectical heuristic is open-ended, and, as such, invites the development of additional
theorems in the ongoing process of discernment and collaboration. But it is the argument
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of the next chapter that the first dialectical theorem to be deployed in organizing that
process is a re-purposing of a traditional one: the theorem of the supernatural.
5. Conclusion

This chapter began with an assertion. It argued that the speculative theological
practice of the medieval synthesis, while not per se reducible to its socio-cultural
location, was de facto an achievement built upon the historical and intellectual
scaffolding of the classicist conception of culture. Its deployment of theory, of universal
definitions, of the hierarchical unity of inquiry and knowledge was secured by a vision of
the social order, the cultural matrix, and the human soul that was fixed, normative, and
invariant. And while the doctrines and directives of that synthesis have survived the
emergence of the modern world, the classicist worldview that nurtured them has not.
The demise of classicism brings with it the question of speculative theology’s
continued possibility. This chapter has attempted to chart a course between and beyond
two forms of that possibility’s denial. It rejects the anti-modernist impulse that would
secure speculative theology’s survival by rebuilding and imposing a classicist cultural
order, and it resists the revisionist conclusion that the intimacy of the relationship
between speculative theology and a rightly-despised classicism disqualifies speculation’s
ongoing legitimacy.
In the course of pursing a via media between these two modern tendencies, I have
traced the emergence and decline of the classicist worldview and the notions of science,
philosophy, culture, and theology it furnished. Further I have explained the new science
of culture as it has emerged in philosophy, semiotics, anthropology, and psychoanalysis.
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In the course of that explanation, I have shown that there exists a residual classicism that
floats to the surface of many of the would-be modern sciences of culture, a tendency that,
while adverting to culture’s empirical context, smuggles in normativity under the guise of
the scientist’s imagined neutrality, or the philosopher’s heroic resistance. Following
Robert Doran’s theological reconfiguration of Voegelin’s anthropological principle, I
have argued that a fully universalist and historical science of culture has its more durable
root in a theology. As the divine ground of world-transcendent meaning is communicated
to the various matrices of human culture through the incarnate proclamation of the law of
the cross, all forms of cultural pretention, universality, normativity, and permanence are
invalidated and undone.
And since a fully theological account of the modern science of culture rules out
any retreat to classicism, a renewed speculative theology must be consciously postclassicist. But a post-classicist speculative theology is not characterized primarily by its
contents, but rather by its method. In a modern methodical frame, speculative practice—
the intellectual mediation between fides and intellectum—pluralizes in accord with the
varied contexts of cultural making and the unique emergences of speculative exigence
within those contexts. A principal task, then, of a methodical, post-classicist speculative
theology is to work out the means of negotiating that pluralism.
Toward that end, this chapter has put forward a basic heuristic structure for
analyzing, interpreting, and evaluating speculative pluralism. It has identified the
material, subjective formal, and objective formal elements of speculative pluralism that
owe to the empirical plurality of cultures, theologians, and theologies. It has, furthermore,
identified the evaluative structure of speculative pluralism’s dialectical element, and with
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it the means of coordinating collaboration among complementary, genetic, and contrary
theologies, and of rejecting contradictory theologies.
The dialectical element of speculative pluralism calls for—to borrow a term from
Robert Doran—a “world-cultural network” of speculative theologies, a matrix of
cooperation and collaboration in the pursuit of the intellectual mediation of Christian
constitutive meanings to the varied and dynamic contexts of human living. And while any
particular mediation within that collaborative matrix has a definite shelf-life owing to the
dynamism of human cultural making, the methodical structure of speculative pluralism
and its collaborative potential remains, even when particular theologies either pass away
or reach the limits of their mediating potential. The next chapter will present the initial
theorematic criterion for both rejecting speculations that run afoul of the doctrinal context
and coordinating the authentic pluralism that is grounded in the twin poles of church
doctrine and the eros of the human spirit.
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IV) REPURPOSING THE THEOREM OF THE SUPERNATURAL

1. Introduction

The previous chapter concluded with a conceptual ellipsis. It presented a heuristic
structure for clarifying the theological pluralisms that become visible in the shift from
classicism to historical consciousness. It anticipated the generation of the synthetic and
dialectical perspectives required for understanding the interlocking relationships between
different kinds of pluralisms, and for making judgments about the authenticity or
inauthenticity of theological subjects, theological products, and cultural worlds. That
structure has four basic elements —the material, the subjective formal, the objective
formal, and the dialectical. The first three structural elements pertain to the bare
givenness of theological speculative pluralism, that is, the empirical multiplicity of
theologians, their theologies, and the varied and various cultural matrices out of which
and for which theologians deploy theoretical and speculative techniques to promote
Glaubensverständnis. But while the concreteness of history, culture, and subjectivity
have the material and formal elements of speculative pluralism as their basic entailments,
the dialectical element of the structure pertains to the explicit theological and
methodological tasks of identifying the complementary, genetic, contrary, and
contradictory relationships among synchronic and diachronic pluralities of theologies, of
promoting and coordinating collaboration between complementary, genetic, and contrary
theological products, and of developing the means of discriminating between
contradictory speculative theologies by which to venture an affirmative judgement to one
and not the other.
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Lonerganian dialectic orders the plurality of cultures and of theologians in terms
of progress and decline, conversion, the polymorphism of consciousness, and the
transcendental imperatives—be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.1
But a dialectic of authenticity is not sufficient for the adjudication of speculative
theological products. For, as Lonergan notes, “. . . there is a real difference between the
continuity of the history of dogma and the succession of theses and antitheses which
characterize the human effort of fides quarens intellectum; and precisely because there is
a real difference, speculative failure is not the same as heresy.”2 If speculative failure is
not heresy, neither is it inauthenticity—indeed, it is an attempt to be intelligent with
respect to a set of doctrinal judgments and the questions for understanding they elicit.
Conversely, assiduous devotion to the transcendental precepts is no guarantee of
speculative success. Canonical recognition of one’s sanctity, surely, is at least a
recognition of one’s authenticity. Yet, the sainthood of an Augustine or an Anselm did
not, in itself, secure theories fully adequate to either theologian’s speculative questions
and basic doctrinal commitments.3 The transcendental precepts order the moral élan of
the human subject’s conscious and intentional operations, but they do not of themselves
vouchsafe the sufficiency of those operations’ noematic effects.
Some other dialectical means, then, is required to discriminate among the results
of distinct speculative labors. Such means, if they are to have ongoing viability, must be
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genius; its almost complete unsatisfactoriness is an illuminating instance of the difficulty there was in
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coordinated both with the dynamic succession of speculative contexts and viewpoints that
unfold in the course of a speculative tradition, and with the analogical coexistence of
speculative traditions within a single age.
The dialectical element of speculative pluralism will thus be an open-ended
context of theorematic perspectives, that is, a series of theoretically elaborated
articulations of the religious, moral, and intellectual conditions out of which speculative
questions emerge and by which speculative answers are judged. The previous chapter
outlined the dialectical element as a feature of speculative pluralism, but it did not
articulate the theorematic content that the heuristic structure anticipates. It is the task of
the present chapter to provide such an articulation, to move from the conceptual ellipsis
of the heuristic to the initial methodical frame it anticipates.
Any open-ended frame must begin somewhere. Precedent and prudence suggest
that one should look to the vetera for clues—and even capital—that might illuminate and
fund the nova and be conscripted into their service. This chapter proposes a repurposing
of what Bernard Lonergan calls the theorem of the supernatural, a synthetic insight that
emerged in the thirteenth century that made possible an incisive breakthrough in the
speculative theology of Thomas Aquinas. What began as a medieval theoretical means of
clarifying properly theological domains of terms from “the line of reference termed
nature”4 can be re-purposed in a modern context in which its basic function is to organize
the plurality of speculative analogies and entitative orders of analogs such that the
complementary, genetic, and contrary relationships between analogies are brought into
focus and made the subject of methodical interrogation, while the negative pole of
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dialectically contradictory analogies may be set aside as a perhaps coherent, but
ultimately inapt hypothesis.
First, this chapter provides an overview of Lonergan’s historical reconstruction of
the theorem of the supernatural, and explains the role of theorematic operation in
speculative theology through the example of grace and freedom. Second, it argues that
the theorem itself can be transposed from the specific medieval context and its many
disputata surrounding the doctrine of grace, and situated within a generalized context
wherein that same synthetic insight can organize systematic thinking concerning every
speculative question. But as the pathway from the medieval to the modern passes through
classicism to historical consciousness, so the transposition of the theorem of the
supernatural requires an analysis of the intellectual nexus between religion, culture, and
philosophy. While the medieval form of the theorem pertains principally to the task of
understanding the coherence of doctrines, the modern form enlarges the problematic to
include the theological coherence of the plurality of such understandings. I will show that
the theorem of the supernatural, or what, in a more generalized scheme, Robert
Sokolowski calls “the distinction” between God and the world, emerges concretely
through a complex commerce between the religious doctrines, orientations, and traditions
of a culture, the questions engendered by that commerce, and the philosophical
mentalities and insights that are forged in the course of navigating such questions.
Following the work of Sokolowski and David Burrell, I argue that, in cultures
informed by Christianity, the doctrines of creation and incarnation constitute a basic
religious context for understanding the relationship between God and the world. The
theorem of the supernatural is a speculative correlate to these doctrines capable of
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expressing that relationship in systematic, philosophical terms. There is, thus, a generic
form of the theorem which speculatively renders the relationship between God and the
world as understood according to the doctrine of free creation in general, and there is a
specific form of the theorem which expresses God’s relationship to the world as disclosed
in the special case of the doctrine of the incarnation.
Both creation and incarnation are supernatural with respect to human
understanding, but are so in different ways. Creation is supernatural to a human nature
with regard to the cause of that nature’s first act. Human beings, like all beings whose
esse is not also their essentia, are not proportionate to the cause of the act of existence
itself. Their existence is a dependent existence, and thereby one insufficient to establish,
sustain, or explain itself apart from that upon which it depends. All natures which subsist
as dependent relations are proportionate to human intelligence, for human intelligence
intends and anticipates the complete intelligibility of proportionate being.
Incarnation, though, is not only supernatural with respect to the cause of created
esse’s first act, it is also supernatural with respect to the contents of its communication.
Christ’s human nature participates existentially in the eternal and uncreated esse of the
Son of God who eternally proceeds from the Father. Neither this communication nor this
participation are proportionate to any human esse. Thus, as Eric Mabry argues, what is
dogmatically called the hypostatic union, systematically called the grace of union, and
existentially called the esse secundarium is absolutely supernatural to human
understanding, and is itself a communication of the divine nature to the created order.5 If

This is the systematic thesis of Eric Mabry’s historical reconstruction and interpretation of
Thomas Aquinas’s existential Christology. See Mabry, “Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo factum:
Background, Reception, Meaning, and Relevance of the Hypothesis of esse secundarium in the Christology
of Thomas Aquinas,” Ph.D dissertation, University of St. Michael’s College, 2018.
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Christ’s human existence is a communication of the divine nature, then one should
anticipate that that existence itself should be a source of analogs for the divine life that,
though in themselves not proportionate to human understanding, are in fact
communicated to human understanding through the mysterium salutis.
Finally, the chapter proposes that this generalization of the theorem of the
supernatural can serve as an initial dialectical theorem and a basic systematic term for
speculative pluralism. The generic and specific forms of the theorem correspond to the
double consequence of the synthetic insight the theorem expresses. The theorem of the
supernatural clarifies both the uniquely theological elements of an inquiry (that which is
beyond the proportion of a created intellect and thereby could not be known apart from a
revelation that comes both ex auditu and ex infusione) and the validity of the line of
reference termed nature (that which is proportionate to created intellect and thereby
capable in principle of being known by it).
By distinguishing the supernatural from the natural, the theorem of the
supernatural gives warrant for theology to make use of both the supernatural and the
natural in its speculative endeavors. Thus, the generic theorem, which speculatively
corresponds to the doctrine of creation, suggests that nature itself possesses analogs by
which faith might seek understanding. And, furthermore, the specific theorem, which
expresses the disproportion between God and the world supernaturally communicated in
the doctrine of the incarnation, indicates that the supernatural order revealed through
Christ can itself be a source of analogical terms of which a speculative theology might
make use. Because, intellectually, both orders of analogs are controlled by the same
theorematic relation, and, theologically, grace is not contrary to nature, there is potential
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for cooperation and collaboration between speculative theologies that deploy analogs
from either order. As an initial dialectical theorem for speculative pluralism, the theorem
of the supernatural has a further, regulative function, as well. By clarifying distinct
entitative orders of analogs, the theorem can go beyond enkindling and coordinating
speculative collaboration. It can also chasten, criticize, and exclude speculative
theologies that either obscure entitative orders and relations, or explode them altogether.
The chapter concludes by indicating how the methodical elements of the first three
chapters of this study may be applied to specific nexuses of speculative pluralism, and
takes the coincidence of both natural and supernatural analogs for the trinitarian
processions in contemporary trinitarian theology as a testing ground for the dialectical
repurposing of the theorem of the supernatural.
2. Lonergan’s Reconstruction of the Medieval Breakthrough

Augustinian Origins
The term “theorem of the supernatural” has its origins in Bernard Lonergan’s
doctoral dissertation, Gratia Operans. With it, Lonergan names a synthetic insight and an
intellectual orientation that emerged in the writings of the thirteenth century theologian,
Philip the Chancellor. Philip’s discovery enabled Thomas Aquinas to clarify the
objectives of inquiry unique to theology, and thereby to make of theology a scientia.
What Philip posited was a way of understanding the data of faith and reason in terms of
an entitative disproportion between the absolutely supernatural self-communication of the
divine nature that is grace, and the “nature” to which that communication addresses itself.
But like all theoretical breakthroughs, the theorem of the supernatural was discovered as
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a solution to concrete and long-standing problems in a tradition of thought. Those
problems accumulated in the intellectual climate birthed in the aftermath of Augustine’s
contestation with Pelagius and the exigence it established for clarifying the doctrinal
positions on divine grace and human freedom.6
Against the Pelagian teaching, which maintained the sufficiency of human agency
to the realization of the divine command (given that human will is free and that human
intellect grasps that in which the divine command consists), Augustine argued that the
noetic and volitional effects of sin were such that a marred human will could not fulfill
the divine command absent the gratuitous, healing operation of divine grace. The
Pelagian position, though organized around the self-sufficiency of the will, was variable.
That variability meant that “If grace existed, then it was not necessary. If necessary, then
it was the law, or knowledge of the law, or nature, or free will, or the remission of sins. If
none of these would do, then it was given man according to his merits. If forced to admit
that the merit of good deeds presupposes the gift of grace, there were those who would
reply that the grace that causes good deeds is meted out according to the previous merit
of good will.”7 To counter these Pelagian “evasions,” Augustine set forth a distinction
between gratia operans and gratia cooperans. Through operative grace, God works in us
without us (Deus sine nobis operatur), changing a heart of stone into a heart of flesh,
establishing a good will where once there had been a bad will. But the good will that
operative grace effects remains “weak and imperfect” in its own mode of operation.8

As Lonergan summarizes the matter, “The division of grace into operative and cooperative arose
not from a detached love of systematization but to meet the exigencies of a controversy.” See Lonergan,
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Thus, to move from good desire to good action requires a further, cooperative grace in
which God’s action works alongside our own to bring our operation to perfection, which
is to say, to fulfill the good will with its coordinated act.9
For Augustine, the distinction of gratia operans et cooperans is a distinction
within the totality of grace, while grace itself is simply “any gratuitous gift of God.”10
The resulting view is one in which the utter gratuity of divine grace raises a question
about even the possibility—let alone the actuality—of human free will and free
operation. While the Pelagians so stressed human freedom as to posit its self-sufficiency
to good action and merit, the monks at Hadrumetum took the opposed position, and “so
extolled the grace of God as to deny human liberty.”11 So total was sin’s corruption of the
will, they argued, that human freedom itself was illusory.12 Augustine responded to
reports of this teaching by asserting, not as a philosophic opinion but as a dogmatic truth,
that the testimony of Holy Scripture clearly affirmed the reality of human freedom. As
Lonergan writes of Augustine’s Letter 214, “It was addressed not to their understanding
but to their faith; and if they failed to understand what they were to believe, they were not
to dispute but to pray for light.”13 The result of this two-front battle over basic elements
of the doctrinal tradition is what Lonergan calls “the celebrated paradox,” which asserts
that “the will of man is always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and
then it is evil; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good.”14 This paradox effectively
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settled the doctrinal questions of grace’s gratuity and the will’s freedom with normalized
dogmatic answers. But in successfully consolidating these doctrinal matters (at least in
the Latin church), Augustine opened the door for new questions to be asked, questions
not of the truths of grace’s gratuity and the human will’s freedom, but rather questions
about the coherence of their mutual affirmation. Thus, the dogmatic solution to these fifth
century controversies inaugurated a centuries-long effort to discover the speculative
means of resolving the ambiguities of Augustine’s paradox.

Anselmian Rectitude
In Lonergan’s account of the development of speculative method in postAugustinian theology, Anselm of Canterbury took the first major step beyond doctrine
and toward system. Anselm, in a manner distinct from his beloved Augustine, did not
write against those who denied either grace or freedom. For, as Michael Stebbins notes,
“The affirmation that grace is a gratuitously bestowed divine gift instead of a reward
measured out on the basis of any human work or merit runs like a guiding thread
throughout the labyrinthine wanderings of early scholastic speculation on the doctrine of
grace.”15 Instead, Anselm sought to address “the deep problem of reconciliation.”16
Anselm “was driven by the imperious impulse of fides quarens intellectum to try and
construct a mode of conception that would lend coherence to the mystery.”17 That drive
led Anselm to the notion of rectitude, which enabled him to integrally relate four
contested terms: truth, justice, freedom, and grace. Truth, he argued, is rectitude
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perceived in the mind. Justice, further, is the will’s maintenance of rectitude. Freedom is
the capacity of the will for justice. And grace is the cause of the rectitude that the will
justly maintains. Grace has a prevenient character regarding rectitude’s emergence in the
will, and a consequent character as the “main cause” of rectitude’s ongoing perseverance.
Thus, within this scheme of relation, “grace and freedom are the causes of justice, and
justice is the ground of salvation.”18
By using rectitude as an organizing notion for relating grace, freedom, and their
correlated terms, Anselm went beyond doctrinal clarification to speculative articulation.
He did not seek to add new elements to dogmatic data, but attempted instead to arrange
the received data according to a theoretical principle so as to resolve ambiguities entailed
in their affirmation. As Lonergan recognizes, “Not only are the questions St Anselm
treated the most difficult; they are also the most obviously problems, the most apt to
excite wonder and impose the necessity of speculative thought in the medieval re-creation
of culture and civilization.”19 And so, irrespective of the sufficiency of Anselm’s solution
to the speculative problem of grace and freedom, he affirmatively settled what is in fact
the prior and more basic question, “Is speculation possible and is it worthwhile?”20 If one
affirms with him the possibility and desirability of speculation and proceeds toward its
actuality, the “problem of its method” moves to the center of theological rationality. But
if he succeeded in foregrounding the problem of speculative method, Lonergan insists
that “St. Anselm in no way solved it.”21
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According to Lonergan, the imperative enjoining one to believe in order to
understand (crede ut intelligas), which serves as the Augustinian basis for Anselm’s
speculative method, “fails to point out that there are two standards for understanding:
natural truths can be reduced eventually to perfect coherence, but the truths of faith have
the apex of their intelligibility hidden in the transcendence of God.”22 This twofold
structure of understanding is what the first Vatican council controversially termed the
duplex ordo cognitionis, a teaching that asserts a distinction between possible terms of
inquiry and their corresponding cognitional acts on the basis of the grounding distinction
between divine mystery (knowable solely on the basis of revelation) and the
proportionate created order (knowable by natural reason per se).
The duplex ordo cognitionis, despite the objections leveled against it in the
twentieth century, serves a vital methodical function in speculative theology.23 It
regulates the activity of thinking so as to avoid two potential errors. First, absent a
methodical distinction between natural truths and divine mystery, one risks reducing
divine mystery to the status of merely natural truth. Such is the practice of the rationalist.
But the second and opposite error is no less serious. One can encounter difficulties in
understanding the natural elements of a matter and conclude that the terms of the inquiry
must be mysteries hidden away in divine life. According to Lonergan, Anselm tended
toward the latter error. In developing the speculative notion of rectitude to reconcile the
existence of grace and freedom, Anselm elevates human liberty into the order of divine
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mystery. By conceiving of justice as a state of the will that grace effects, Anselm could
not conceive of justification in terms other than the will’s operation. Thus, because an
infant does not exercise its will in the baptismal sacrament, it receives forgiveness of
original sin, but does not receive justification as a state of its will. Its salvation, therefore,
is a secondary effect of the justice of Christ and the church.24 This “strange, explicitly
speculative position,” Lonergan argues, is a consequence of “the unformulated problem
of speculative method.”25 But it would be another century before an adequate method of
speculative analysis was made possible. “As a result,” Stebbins observes, “a number of
crucial issues touching on the definition of grace, the distinction between naturalia and
gratuita, the efficacy of infant baptism, the ground of merit, and the relation of grace and
freedom remained unsolved puzzles.”26

The Lombard on the States of Man
In terms of speculative boldness and intellectual acuity, the Lombard’s Sentences
retreats from the Anselmian frontier. Its “quite solid” achievements in collecting and
organizing the theological patrimony were, according to Lonergan, “not very brilliant.”27
Anselm “tried to make grace and freedom coherent by force of subtlety,” while “the
Lombard innocently lays bare the incoherence” by bringing together in one place various
and seemingly contradictory strands of authoritative teaching. For Lonergan, however,
the recession from the speculative challenges of the Anselmian phase of development
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evinced by the Sentences nevertheless “unconsciously suggests the lines along which
deliverance was to be found.”28 Those lines of suggestion are organized around four
states of human liberty. For the Lombard, these states follow the dynamics of creation
and salvation. They conceive of liberty in relation to prelapsarian freedom, the Fall, the
redemption, and the consummation, and they offer the first approximation of a
theorematic perspective beyond the medicinal, psychological concept of grace.
The first state, the earthly paradise, is one in which liberty is ordered such that the
human being has “no difficulty doing good” and “no impulsion to evil.”29 In the second
state, that of liberty under the constrictions of the Fall, one is not able not to sin (“non
posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter”).30 But through the economy of salvation, a third
state of liberty is made possible, one in which a redeemed human being “can avoid mortal
sin but also can commit it.”31 And while the third state of liberty characterizes the
Christian life in via, it has its fulfillment in a fourth and final state of liberty, the life of
the saints in patria, wherein there is “confirmation in grace” that “gives impeccability” to
the redeemed.32
Grace, then, is located principally in the transition from the second to the third
state. It is operative “inasmuch as it causes this efficacious good will, making what was
already a will into a good and right will.”33 Operative grace, in other words, transforms
non posse into posse. It alters the capacity and range of the will’s possibility. But while
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this expansion includes the possibility of good actions, it does not itself secure their
enactments. Cooperative grace, then, “aids the good will to execute good intentions.”34
This division of grace follows the established Augustinian pattern, but sets it
within a broader analytic scheme. It does not begin with non posse non peccare, but with
the liberty of a created nature that is subsequently corrupted by sin. Though sin binds
human freedom, it does not reduce freedom to illusion or elevate it to mystery, because,
as the first state indicates, liberty belongs to the nature of created humanity. Furthermore,
its conception of grace in the transition between the third and fourth states of liberty
connects grace to merit, and ultimately to salvation.
This nascent distinction between the nature of liberty and the grace of merit
represents “an entirely new conception of the issue.”35 This new conception establishes
“a direction of thought that only has to be pushed to its logical conclusion” in order for
the theorem of the supernatural to emerge.36 The Lombard, though, did not himself
realize its emergence. Despite his coordination of liberty with nature and of merit with
grace, his work “represents no more than an effort, a direction. Ultimately, a very real
antinomy remains.”37

Philip the Chancellor, Supernatural Habit, and the Discovery of the Theorem

The basic difficulty at the root of twelfth century speculations about grace and its
relationship to liberty, according to Lonergan, can be summed up in the following
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question: since every created order and entity is a gratuitous, freely given gift, why is not
everything grace?38 The answer, he argues, lies ultimately not in some fresh exegetical
insight or in the discovery of a cache of dogmatic teaching heretofore unavailable, but in
a re-patterning of the entire speculative tradition according to a new principle, a theorem.
By “theorem,” Lonergan means “a mental perspective” or “basic coordinates” that
intervene upon a set of data in order to grasp from within it an explanatory pattern or
nexus, one that can be generalized, transposed across contexts, and applied to any
corresponding set of data.
His analogy, as discussed previously, is mathematical. The differential equation
for acceleration adds nothing to the data of “going faster.” But by applying it to any
particular experience of going faster, one can explain just what is going on. One can
eliminate the experiential ambiguities that make one vulnerable to illusion. And one can
generalize from any particular experience of going faster to any and every such
experience. But, as Lonergan writes, “just as one can apprehend the going faster without
understanding the calculus, so also the theologians of the twelfth century and earlier
could apprehend globally the supernatural character of grace without suspecting the
theorem that regards the relationship between nature and grace.”39 Absent the requisite
theorematic perspective, the antinomies of post-Augustinian speculative efforts could be
shuffled around, but they could not be resolved. In service of grace’s gratuity, theologians
shifted liberty, reason, virtue, and love into the realm of divine mystery, and in so doing
compounded the ambiguities of grace and freedom by leaving undefined and opaque
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what, in fact, a human being is. But in the thirteenth century, Philip the Chancellor
discovered what proved to be the decisive tool for understanding grace and freedom in a
more coherent way.
As Stebbins observes, “before Philip came on the scene, no theologian had
articulated with sufficient precision what it is that constitutes human being as human, and
how grace supervenes on and perfects those constitutive elements; as the history of the
early scholastics shows, until one knows what human nature is, one cannot say exactly
why grace is an utterly gratuitous gift.”40 Philip’s goal was to explain the relationship
between excellencies that belong to the human person by virtue of their created integrity
and those higher, “supernatural” excellencies possessed by human persons solely by
means of grace. Where earlier theologians tended to deny the possibility of virtue among
the unregenerate, and, with it, the possibility of a natural love of God, Philip argued that
such a love, “a natural amor amicitiae erga Deum quite distinct from charity” exists as a
natural human virtue.41 For Philip, this affirmation is the appetitive corollary to the
traditional assertion that natural reason can know the existence of God as highest good.
Because any appetitus sequens cognitionem does so according to the mode of knowledge
that informs it, natural knowledge of God as highest good motivates a corresponding
natural love of God as highest good.
Furthermore, because in addition to reason’s natural knowledge there is also
faith’s supernatural knowledge, “there must be a corresponding duality in our love of
God.”42 Natural knowledge motivates natural love. But faith, because it is a supernatural
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knowledge, motivates a supernatural love, or charity. For Philip, then, the relationship
governing “the familiar series of grace, faith, charity, and merit” and “nature, reason, and
the natural love of God” is a theory of entitative disproportion between the order of
nature and the order of supernature.43
This allowed for a different dimension of grace to come into focus. Because the
natural love of God was an entailment of the natural knowledge of God, it is a love that
belongs to the human being by nature. Because participation in divine life is not an end
owed to nature, then natural operations—even if they are executed without the noetic and
volitional effects of sin—cannot merit eternal life. For human operation to be
meritorious, it must have a supernatural principle under the aspect of which its operation
results not merely in a good life, but in the life of the blessed. “The theorem of the
supernatural,” writes Stebbins, “expresses an incapacity of human nature that is due not
to sin but to our nature's intrinsic limitations. Even if we were in the state of innocence,
we would need to be elevated by grace in order to attain the knowledge of faith and the
love of charity.”44 By showing how grace has both a healing and an elevating function
with respect to a human being, “Philip the Chancellor's notion of a grace that is explicitly
supernatural represents a decisive advance beyond the traditional position that saw grace
as performing only a psychological function.”45
This breakthrough “set in motion a transformation of the entire speculative
enterprise with respect to the doctrine of grace. The seemingly intractable difficulties of
the earlier period began to give way, and within just a few decades Aquinas was able to
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propose the elegant and comprehensive synthesis of his Prima secundae.”46 But there is a
further significance to the theorem of the supernatural. It represents “not just a plausible
explanation of the gratuity of grace but also the foundation of a new and powerful
methodological orientation.”47 By positing “the validity of a line of reference termed
nature,” Philip clarified that theological and philosophical methods of inquiry can be
distinguished according to their respective domains of terms.48 But those domains, like
the “line of reference” itself, are abstract. They lie in human thinking, and thus, against
any “two-tiered” ontologizing of speculative method. As Lonergan writes, “In the long
term and in the concrete the real alternatives remain charity and cupidity, the elect and
the massa damnata.”49 According to Lonergan,
the fallacy in earlier thought had been an unconscious confusion of the
metaphysical abstraction ‘nature’ with the concrete data which do not quite
correspond; Philip’s achievement was the creation of a mental perspective, the
introduction of a set of coordinates, that eliminated the basic fallacy and its
attendant host of anomalies.50
The theorem of the supernatural, then, does more than express the specific speculative
nexus between the terms pertaining to grace and freedom, it also makes explicit a method
of analysis adequate for speculative theology in general.
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3. Generalizing the Theorem of the Supernatural

The Notion of Transcendence

The intellectual viability of the theorematic lies in the mobility of its scheme of
explanatory relations to diverse sets of concrete data. That physical force, for example, is
said to be the product of mass and its rate of acceleration would be a thin insight if it
applied only to Harley Davidsons, only on Wednesdays, and only in Milwaukee. Like the
theorem of force, the theorem of the supernatural has a generalized domain of applicative
mobility. Though its emergence owes to the speculative pursuit of specific questions
concerning the doctrines of grace and freedom, its significance outstrips the exigencies of
that originating context. As an explanation of relation between distinct and
disproportionate entitative orders, the theorem of the supernatural has its most
generalized form of application in the notion of transcendence itself. To that notion we
now turn.
Transcendence is the relation between terms when those terms are organized
according to a proportional hierarchy of formal intelligibilities. Any higher term can be
said to transcend the lower inasmuch as its intelligibility exceeds the formal proportion of
the lower term. Biology transcends chemistry insofar as it treats of the higher integration
of chemical compounds that is vital process, and thereby anticipates an intelligibility
quite distinct from what is intended when those compounds are interrogated and
explained solely in terms of their lower chemical elements and the physical laws that
govern elemental interaction. Biology thus relatively transcends chemistry. However,
while the whole of proportionate being can be understood in terms of the interactions of
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different levels of intelligibility relatively transcendent to one another, there is a further,
fuller, and more definitive notion of transcendence that anticipates not merely the relative
disproportion of some spheres of intelligibility to others within a given hierarchical
frame, but the absolute transcendence of the infinite to the finite.
Because the infinite absolutely transcends the finite, “it follows that the divine
order is beyond the proportion of any possible creature and so is absolutely
supernatural.”51 And in like manner to the way the meaning of the supernaturality of
grace is controlled by the theorematic elaboration of its transcendental exceeding of the
natural, so the absolute transcendence of divine supernaturality can be expressed in terms
controlled by the same theorem of disproportionate entitative relation. Thus, analogous to
the manner in which charity is absolutely transcendent of natural amor, God can be said
to absolutely transcend the world.
Yet, clarifying that in which “the distinction” between God and the world
consists—and, just as importantly, that in which it does not consist—is a fraught task.52
Too often and too easily extroverted imagination proffers images of absolute
transcendence couched in spatial and temporal terms. God, we like to say, is “beyond” or
“outside” the world. But any Hegelian worth their salt knows that to recognize a limit is
already to have transgressed it. God is not a thing that exists at the boundary of some
extension or in the happening of some duration. God’s transcendence cannot be measured
by degrees of proximity and remove or by counting links in a Great Chain of Being.
Instead, God is said to transcend the world in terms best understood by the interplay of
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discrete, disproportionate manners of relation between essence and existence—and so
ultimately in a non-dualist manner.

From Substance to Existence: A Gilsonian Trajectory

To conceive of being in terms derived from asymmetrical modalities of relation
between essence and existence is to involve oneself in a tradition of thought that stretches
back to fourth century Athens, and to Aristotle’s criticism of his teacher’s doctrine.
Though sharing Plato’s desire for a philosophical explanation of identity in the midst of
change, Aristotle denied that that explanation must ultimately have recourse to the realm
of Ideas and its corresponding doctrine of participation. He argued instead that a nature is
an immanent principle of operation, while an essence is that same formality grasped “as a
possible object of intelligible definition.”53 And because form is an operative principle
and an object of intellect only through the individuation accomplished by its union with
matter, forms indwell the determinate data of the sensible world, while knowledge of the
form is the presence of the known in the knower. This isomorphism between knowing
and known is the ground of philosophical realism. Understanding is the act of organizing
intelligence that grasps essence inasmuch as that essence subsists in the data that provoke
intelligent inquiry. Forms, then, can be said to reside both in things (as a principle of
operation) and in minds (as the content of an act of understanding).
Such an approach to ontology, however, does not resolve the ambiguity that is
Aristotle’s notion of substance. Aristotle’s basic assertion is that reality is substantial:
individual natures are substances that subsist inasmuch as they inform matter. Absent the
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union of form and matter, natures do not subsist at all. Yet, this assertion proves a
difficult one to maintain. Gilson recognizes a seemingly inexorable pull back to the
Platonic scheme of eternal ideas and participating natures. If first philosophy is a matter
of possible intelligibilities or essences, then knowledge of essences is the philosopher’s
aim. The concrete world the philosopher thus investigates “remains the substantial world
of Aristotle,” but it “can be safely dealt with as if it were the ideal world of Plato.”54
Gilson argues that this reversion to the Platonic mean is evidenced in Avicenna’s
postulation of the in se neutrality of essences vis-a-vis universality and existence. “The
essences of Avicenna,” he charges, “are so many ghosts of Plato’s Ideas.”55 Because of
the neutrality of essence, it cannot be said to prefer actuality to potency, for in both it is
the selfsame, neutral essence, and by being one or the other it undergoes no change in
what it is or even in the manner of its being what it is. A conception of being which
foregrounds essence is thus a conception of being that cannot be said to include existence
as part of its immanent intelligibility, a conception of being in which the act of existence
is merely accidental, in which existence is something that happens to essence.
This sets up a zero-sum relation between essence and existence. As Gilson notes
of Avicenna’s view, “Actual being can no more be without its existence than it can be
without its unity. Yet, since actual being is primarily its essence, even while a being
actually is it has its existence, it is not it. It is not it because, were it its existence, then it
could have no essence.”56 For this reason, the God of Avicenna is a God who is his
existence at the cost of being a God who has no essence. For Avicenna, “The First, the
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Necessary Being, that is, God Himself, is the pure act of existence, and nothing can be
superior to it.”57 Because God exists necessarily, God is identical with God’s existence.
As pure and necessary existence, God can have no quiddity logically prior to his act of
existing. Existence cannot be “something attributed to the necessary existent.”58 And so
while Avicenna’s express concern is to foreground the identity of God with God’s
existence, his essentialist approach to the ordo of metaphysics leaves him open to
Averroes’s charge that he conceives of existence as accidental, as something that “‘comes
to’ (advenit, accidit) the essence (or quiddity).”59 Though Averroes mischaracterizes
Avicenna’s intention, the doctrine of essences proves itself to be an unstable ground as
the first and basic element of a realist metaphysics, and so insufficient for a fully
generalized theory of transcendence.
Despite this difficulty, Avicenna is the first to conceive of the real distinction
between essences and their existence. He observes that the “nature which is proper to
each thing (haqiqa: lit., its truth) is other than [its] existence (al-wujud), which is
synonymous with affirming it to be the case (al-ithbat).”60 And it is this distinction that
illuminates the path toward a fully generalized theory of transcendence. Walking that
path, though, requires re-posing the question of metaphysics not as a formal question
about essences (quid sit?), but rather as an existential question about what, in fact, is the
case (an sit?). Furthermore, it is not enough that those questions and the answers they
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intend be disaggregated in philosophical analysis, they must also be reordered in
significance. But this reordering requires a focused consideration of a basic question:
“how can one hope to formulate what our ordinary ways of knowing must take for
granted—the fact of existence?”61 Since existence is not a predicate, the distinction
between existence and non-existence is not a distinction between different kinds or
classes of things. Yet the distinction between existence and non-existence is one
manifestly observable in the world, even though it is not a distinction among entities
within it. As Burrell notes, it is precisely this kind of distinction—one that appears in the
world but does not obtain among beings within it—that one needs in order to distinguish
God from the world.62
One need only shift the metaphysical accent from essence to existence for
Avicenna’s distinction to at last reach its explanatory potential. And it is precisely this
shift that Aquinas achieved in his account of being in terms of the actus essendi. In his
early philosophical work, De ente et essentia, Aquinas proposes an analogy by which to
relate and order the terms relevant to metaphysical inquiry. Matter, he argues, bears a
relationship to form analogous to that obtaining between essence and existence. And,
furthermore, essence has a relationship to existence like that between potency and act.
Following the Aristotelian contention that, for composite creatures, an essence is a form’s
subsistence in matter, “Aquinas could indicate—via the next couplet—that esse would
bear an intelligibility with respect to essence analogous to that which form conveys to
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matter.”63 The dissimilarity that makes the analogy analogous, however, is that while
matter is in se unintelligible, essence is “the commensurate object of human
understanding.”64 Aquinas thus qualifies the analogy with a third couplet—the relation
between potency and act. Unlike that of accident to substance, the relation between
potency and act is not one between entities. Matter and form constitute an essence, but an
essence is only a possible intelligibility whose actuality is determined by esse. It is in this
respect that esse stands to essence as form to matter. This delicate analogical dance is
required because, for Aquinas, intelligibility always pertains to essence, meaning that
esse is not directly intelligible, but is rather the act of existence of some intelligibility. As
Burrell notes, “The intelligibility proper to esse must remain metaphorical, as a sign of
the transcendence of the relation which it helps to formulate: that of creator to
creature.”65
The metaphorical intelligibility of esse is expressed as the actus essendi and as
participation. Burrell writes, “The being which is subsistent in divinity is to be construed
then, as though it were in act, and furthermore an act in which created things—even
spiritual creatures—participate as ‘having esse rather than being their own to-be.’”66 And
in this we have the means of articulating in just what the general notion of transcendence
consists.
God can be said to absolutely transcend the world insofar as God is that unity of
identity whose essence is to be. The divine essence is not in potency to divine actuality.
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The divine essence simply is divine actuality. This modality of relation between essence
and existence transcends that mode of relation in which essence is a possible
intelligibility related to existence as potency to act. This means that God transcends the
world not because he is bigger, older, or more powerful, but because his essence is to
exist. The world, on the other hand, has its existence not by its own essence, but as
borrowed, gifted, and created. It is thus that the theorem of the supernatural’s positing of
an entitative disproportion between orders of existence is fully articulated.
In God there is no real distinction between essence and existence (nor between
understanding and judgment). God’s act of existing is not contingent; his essence not in
potency. So disproportionate is this modality of relation to that of the kind with which we
are more familiar (namely, our own), that it requires no special philosophical acumen to
assert that between these modalities of relation there is a qualitative, not merely a
quantitative, distinction. But because the distinction is qualitative, it can—and indeed
must—be expressed in terms purified from the imagistic dualism that accompanies
intramundane comparatives. Created esse, insofar as it is not its own principle, bears a
relationship to uncreated esse that Sara Grant describes as a “non-reciprocal dependence
relation.”67 According to Grant, this technical phrase denotes in broadly Thomistic terms
what the Hindu philosophical theologian Adi Shankara understands to be the meaning of
advaita or non-duality. If this is correct, then we should interpret the theorem of the
supernatural not as an equator dividing up territories respectively called nature and
supernature, but rather as the structural insight into the non-duality entailed by divine
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transcendence. Yet, this entire approach to the generalization of the theorem of the
supernatural is predicated on theology in ways not yet acknowledged. Created esse more
than suggests a creation. But creation is a theological, not a philosophical doctrine.

Creation and Transcendence

What Avicenna (and Moses Maimonides) began and Aquinas completed was a
theological transfiguration of Aristotelian substance. For all three thinkers, the doctrine of
creation—shared in common by all three Abrahamic faiths—exercises a governance over
the adequacy of any metaphysical scheme. It is not enough that the first mover be
unmoved. That mover must also be free. The necessity of that freedom is neither
syllogistic nor axiomatic. It is the teaching of Holy Writ. And yet, the strangeness such
teaching imposes upon traditional philosophy leaves many matters opaque. “The very
notion of creation,” Burrell writes, “is notoriously difficult to clarify, for it contains
scriptural as well as metaphysical elements and does so in a fashion in which they are
quite impossible to disentangle.”68 Even for Aquinas, creation exercises a kind of
subterranean influence over his account of philosophic rationality, so much so that Josef
Pieper famously referred to creation as “the hidden key” in Thomas’s philosophy.69
But it is not only the complexity of the commerce between scripture and
metaphysics that pushes the doctrine of creation underground in Christian reflection. In
the Christian tradition, in a manner distinct from Jewish and Islamic traditions, creation is
often decentered, even crowded out by other doctrines. “For despite the fact that
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Christians confess their faith in ‘one God, creator of heaven and earth,’ a set of factors
have worked in a cumulative fashion over time to eclipse that faith in creation as the
initial gift of God in favor of the divine self-gift in Jesus. Redemption, in short, has so
overshadowed creation in the Christian sensibility that Christians generally have little
difficulty adopting a naturalistic attitude toward the universe. Rather than approaching it
and responding to it as gift, they can easily treat it simply as given.”70 Among this “set of
factors,” Burrell identifies at least three principal perpetrators. First, the Christian
transfiguration of the Sabbath gave liturgical primacy to the Day of the Lord and the
redemption of Easter morning over the creative rest of the seventh day.71 Second,
inheritors of the theorem of the supernatural misunderstood and misused its central
insight. Instead of following Philip and Thomas in asserting the analytic utility of
“nature” as a line of reference in speculative thinking, lesser minds imagined a clean and
concrete metaphysical separation between the natural and the supernatural, which they
identified with nature and grace, the secular and the sacred. The result was “to imply that
the natural order was not a grace, not a gift.”72 Finally, Burrell notes that in the nineteenth
century’s distinction of nature from history, the ad extra agency of God was located
exclusively in the historical—Heilsgeschichte. This left nature wholly within the ambit of
natural science, with the result that “our belief in creation as a divine gift is largely
‘notional’ in character.”73 These tendencies not only led to a devaluation and so a
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forgetting of the doctrine of creation among Christians, but also a misremembering of
creation’s irreducible significance in the Christian theological imagination.
But the theological question at the heart of so much medieval philosophical
speculation remains: why is there something rather than nothing? Any adequate answer
must square itself soberly to the “arresting note” entailed in that question, that of
“absolute beginning.”74 But how can or ought one think of an absolute beginning? In
medieval philosophy, two strategies predominated. There was a broadly Neoplatonist
impulse that imagined creation as an eternal emanation from the One, existing
dependently, but also existing necessarily according to the determinations of the One’s
own nature. Others saw the emanation scheme as incompatible with divine freedom, and
insisted on a conception of creation that viewed it as the temporal effect of a divine act,
something that has a determinate beginning in time. Moses Maimonides championed this
latter view, arguing that it seemed to be the plain meaning of the biblical creation
narratives, though he was quick to qualify that if Aristotle had succeeded in giving a
philosophical demonstration of the eternality of the world, such a cosmology could
nevertheless be integrated with the metaphysical implications of divine freedom
suggested by the biblical text. But since this demonstration did not exist and was not
forthcoming, Maimonides insisted on the plain sense of the bereshith bara elohim.75
With these words, the Priestly author provides scriptural scaffolding for the doctrine of
creatio ex nihilo, an interpretation that directly informs Robert Sokolowski’s notion that
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part of the positive content of the term “creation” is the understanding that the world
possesses no formal necessity, and therefore might possibly not have existed at all.76
Yet, while the biblical text unambiguously affirms a creatio or bara, it does not
necessarily affirm a nihilo. This ambiguity leads some scholars to interpret Genesis less
in accord with medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic understandings of creatio ex
nihilo, and more in line with ancient near eastern creation myths, especially the
Babylonian Enûma Eliš. In his celebrated book, Creation and the Persistence of Evil,
Hebrew Bible scholar, Jon D. Levenson argues that, for all the Christian enthusiasm for
the creatio ex nihilo interpretation of Genesis, the text is, in fact, a story of Elohim’s
ongoing contestation with chaos, even chaos conceived of as a monster.77 This primordial
combat, on Levenson’s reading, is the Genesis depiction of creation. The sacerdotal and
liturgical performances of ancient Israel, especially Sabbath observance and the holiness
codes, established boundaries and maintained order, and thus were human participations
in the divine bulwark keeping at bay the primordial chaos and its monsters.78
As Burrell plainly admits, “Recent discussions of Genesis 1, in particular, have
challenged those who would find there a forthright assertion of creatio ex nihilo.”79 But
he is quick to qualify that the patterns of sacred reading informing and being informed by
the later, more metaphysically-oriented questions of the patristic and medieval worlds
cannot be so easily set aside as non-literal, foreign accretions. “In short,” he argues,
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“creatio ex nihilo, in the dual sense of presupposing nothing at all and of the universe
enjoying a beginning point, may be acknowledged to be the developed content of biblical
faith without having to find the lineaments of that faith in the very text of Genesis 1.”80
Indeed, as Levinson’s work has shown, “if the Genesis story cannot be counted on to
render a teaching as ontological as creatio ex nihilo, it can nevertheless offer a clear
depiction of divine sovereignty over the powers of darkness and do so in such a way as to
offer humanity—in the form of God’s own people—a way of sharing in that power over
the forces of destruction. . . .”81 For Burrell, the cosmic-liturgical primacy of covenant
and obedience as integral, participatory elements of human communal existence
embedded in the creation story suggest a metaphysics beyond the dualism of autonomy
and heteronomy, a metaphysics of freedom, even if such a metaphysics is not articulated
as such in the text itself.82
For Maimonides (and for Aquinas), the freedom entailed in the doctrine of
creation demands creative intention behind the existence of the world that goes a step
beyond the assertion of the world’s relation of dependence upon God. His criticisms of
the emanation scheme coalesce on this principle. For while emanations from the One
have a relation of dependence upon the One, their existence is not the effect of an
intention, but of the nature of the One. The emanations exist insofar as the One exists.
But they require no “let there be.” As Burrell summarizes,
Creation means the free origination of all from the one God, who gains nothing
thereby. Moreover, what the notion of free primarily concerns is the lack of any
constraint, even a natural constraint; so it need not involve choice, as it
spontaneously tends to for us, except quite secondarily. That creating fills no need
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in God and so is an utterly spontaneous and gratuitous act: that is the cumulative
message of the scriptures appropriated by Maimonides and Aquinas.83
The spontaneity and gratuity of divine action in causing the existence of what is not
divine to be rules out the spatial, picture-thinking that commonsense notions of
transcendence invite. But in order not to be reduced to silence, a strategy or method of
predication is required, one carefully purged of contrastive or competitive images. As we
will see, the theorem of the supernatural itself can be reassigned precisely to this purpose.
But first, we must examine the way in which the notion of transcendence not only arises
from and informs a theology of creation, but emerges in a special way in the theology of
incarnation. For while the distinction between exegesis and doctrinal formulation
considerably lowers the existential stakes concerning the “literal” meaning of Genesis
1:1-2, it is important to recognize how that text itself is significantly reimagined in light
of the Christian affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth is God incarnate.

Incarnation and Transcendence
Taking Levenson’s work as a departure point, Catherine Keller argues that creatio
ex nihilo is an interpretive strategy shot through with ideology. This ideology, which she
terms “dominology,” is a habit of thinking, living, and reading in which the violent
erasure of potency establishes a normative economy of hierarchical structure with a
static, transcendent God at the top and its more fluid others (the non-male, the non-white,
the non-cisgendered, the non-heterosexual) at the bottom.84 Far from undoing cosmic
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dualism, creatio ex nihilo inscribes it into the grain of the universe. The God who
wrestles being out of nothingness can only relate to such being through the competitive,
violent relations of Lordship.
This hierarchy is established in an originary act of violence: God’s banishment of
the tehom, the void. This dominological hermeneutics of orthodox Christian doctrine,
however, is alien to the text itself. For Keller, the “in the beginning” of Jewish and
Christian revelation, the site of the assertion of creatio ex nihilo, speaks of a different
kind of order than the one violently grasped from nothing. The Genesis poem “assumed
that the universe was created from a primal chaos: something uncreated, something
Other, something that a creator could mold, form, or call to order.”85 This chaos, this sea
of indeterminacy that admits the possibility of strange, polymorphic potentialities, was
interpreted as a threat to a creator god whose universe could admit no contending
otherness, and so the tehom was banished. Keller writes, “theological orthodoxy had
defined itself by an unprecedented nihil. Classical theism created itself in the space of the
erased chaos.”86 Despite the ubiquity of the dominological interpretation, Keller,
following Levenson, stresses “the untoward fact that the Bible does not support it.”87 By
her lights, “In as much as the creatio ex nihilo lacks biblical warrant, its foundational
authority (not its possible meaningfulness) would be based on false pretenses.”88
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One might respond by noting that Keller’s decision to read from Genesis a
univocal metaphysics of Deluezian process is no more original to the text or an obvious
deduction from it than is the metaphysics of the real distinction between esse and essentia
as interpreted by Maimonides and Aquinas. But this is not the neuralgic issue. Inasmuch
as Levenson has recovered the text’s nexus of poetic associations by pealing back layers
of philosophical and doctrinal interpretation, he has shown that its organizing question is
not metaphysical, but rather political. But a literalism that restricts the possible meaning
of a text only to its originating question results in a positivism that cannot admit of
distinct kinds of questions and corresponding methods of inquiry. Not only does this rule
out philosophical interrogations, but also the reinterpretations that occur even within the
textual tradition itself, as new situations of community yield new questions. In the
Christian tradition, the new situation is the life of Christ. The texts of the New Testament
that recount and respond to that situation “not only tell us about Christ; they also tell us
about God. They tell us what God must be if Christ is to have been both human and
divine.”89 And part of that telling involves a reinterpretation of creation and the texts that
assert it. Such reinterpretation resolved, at least in the Christian imagination, the
ambiguities of the doctrine of creation by placing its significance in a new context.
Robert Sokolowski notes that “[T]he Christian notion of God as creator was most
completely disclosed in the life of Jesus and in the church’s understanding of who and
what Christ was.”90 The process by which this understanding developed is, of course, a
point of perennial debate among New Testament exegetes and scholars of early
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Christianity. But it is also a process that can be traced in distinct registers. One can follow
the development of a theoretical account of the ontological and psychological
constitution of Christ from Nicaea to Chalcedon, and focus on the ways philosophical
terms are repurposed and redefined in order to lend explanatory precision to scriptural,
creedal, and homiletical teaching. But one can also trace development within that
teaching itself. The experience of the collapse of the nation, the destruction of the temple,
and the corruption of the priesthood motivated the reinterpretation of Torah in accord
with distinct ideological strategies of exilic and second temple theologies, each with its
own etiological explanation of creation and evil.91 In analogous fashion, the historical
experience of Jesus of Nazareth—his teaching, his death, and the testimony of his
resurrection—led early Christians to reinterpret the Torah in its light. The prologue to the
Gospel of John offers perhaps the most obvious example. Structurally parallel to Genesis
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1:1–2, the Johannine author locates “the beginning” with the Word, the one who both is
and is with God, the one through whom all things were made and apart from whom
nothing was made, and the one who became flesh and dwelt among us. And while this
reinterpretation of Genesis is presented progressively from eternity to history, its
theology is developed analytically from the historical experience of Christ and the
incarnation to the transcendent eternality of the Word and God’s free creative act through
the Word that results not only in all that is, but also, significantly, in nothing else.
Sokolowski argues accordingly that “The Christian distinction between God and
the world, the denial that God in his divinity is part of or dependent upon the world, was
brought forward with greater clarity through the discussion of the way the Word became
flesh.”92 Incarnation, for Sokolowski, is the privileged theological disclosure of the
meaning of divine transcendence, for it is by God becoming what is not God that the
theologian is invited to consider what transcendence would mean if the metaphor of
spatial distance were ruled out by definition. And given the affirmation of the incarnation
of the Word of God in Jesus Christ, what becomes clear in a developed Christology is
that “clarifying the ‘ontological constitution’ of Jesus will help us to articulate that evermysterious relationship of creator to creation.”93 Because of incarnation and redemption,
the distinction between God and the world “becomes more fully visible to us. . . .”94
But if the doctrine of the incarnation gives new and expanded significance to the
doctrine of creation, it remains that “the new significance is always reciprocal.”95 Not
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only does each doctrine recast the meaning of the other, but apart from such a
hermeneutics of reciprocity, “each will be misunderstood.”96 As Burrell puts it, “one
cannot speak of redemption without presuming creation, nor can one speak properly of
creation without the idiom supplied by revelation. Indeed, the operative faith of
Christians has always presumed this inner connection; the task of theologians is at best
not to betray it.”97 Thus, the theorem of the supernatural, an articulation of “the
distinction” opaquely traced in creation and fully disclosed in the incarnation, both
clarifies the non-contrastive relation of transcendence between God and the world, and
organizes the intellectual procedures in which the nexus mysteriorum can be thought. As
we will see, there is a double significance to this organization. The theorem establishes
two domains of reference from which analogical terms for speculative understanding of
the nexus mysteriorum can be drawn. It also functions dialectically to regulate the results
of speculative endeavors by coordinating the complementary and diagnosing the
contradictory. And in so doing, the generalized theorem of the supernatural has an even
more generalized significance; it is the basic dialectical element of speculative pluralism.

4. Dialectical Application and the Theology of Theologies

The Theorematic as Methodical
The foregoing considerations of Lonergan’s historical reconstruction of the
theorem of the supernatural and its generalization to the notion of transcendence have not
been undertaken for their own sake. The ulterior motive throughout has been to assemble

96

Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 236.

97

Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 240.

154

from these interrogations the basic elements required for a repurposing of the theorem of
the supernatural to the modern speculative question of the theology of theologies. With
the historical and metaphysical elements in place, this motive can now be made explicit.
The theorem of the supernatural, as we have seen, denotes, in both its historical and
generalized metaphysical registers, an entitative disproportion between the natural and
supernatural orders. This disproportion is neither spatial nor temporal, and so cannot be
expressed in terms like “beyond, “outside,” “before,” or “prior.” No, the disproportion
pertains to the act of existence itself, and to whether or not that act is consequent to any
particular essence, dependent upon a prior act, or is identical with essence itself. God is
that unity of identity between essence and existence, that one who is by virtue of
himself—not as self-caused, but rather as uncaused—whose name is “I AM that I AM.”
Regardless of how we refer to it—“the world,” “creation,” “the natural order,” “the
universe of proportionate being,”—that which is not God is a structure of entitative
relation between whose essence and existence there is a real distinction, and thus whose
esse depends upon a causally prior, unrestricted act of existence. Simply put, “nature” is
whatever exists that cannot truthfully be called the reason for its own existence. God, on
the other hand, is not only his own existence, but is also the reason for the existence of
anything that exists which is not God.
But this metaphysical articulation of the theorem of the supernatural has a further
methodical function that Lonergan’s historical reconstruction helps to bring into focus.
Because the entitative disproportion is an intelligible relation and not some already out
there now real, its significance lies in thought, in the ordering of thinking, and in the
coordination of that which is the subject of thought. The theorem of the supernatural
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clarifies the formally disproportionate from the formally proportionate, and organizes
possible terms of inquiry into distinct theorematic domains. These domains are not
ontological buckets or regions on a map. They are lines of reference within thinking
itself. Thus, those terms which are formally disproportionate to created natures and are
knowable solely on the basis of divine revelation are distinguished intellectually from
those terms that belong to the line of reference termed nature.
Much of what is known on the basis of revelation, it must be said, does not belong
to the realm of technical, metaphysical language. Despite the utility the analogy of habit
provided to the articulations of the theological virtues or the notion of consubstantiality to
the unity of ad extra operations, it remains that many, even most of the contents of
Christian belief lack a metaphysical explanation, let alone an explanation that has moved
from a speculative hypothesis to a church doctrine. As Robert Doran notes, “the element
of mystery extends beyond what has been or perhaps ever will be formulated in explicit
dogmatic pronouncements. Systematic theological understanding must find a way to
include these elements.”98 But if the theorem of the supernatural clarifies the domain of
thinking in which disproportionate terms of intelligible relations are given as revelations
of divine meaning in history, then the historical ordo of salvation becomes not only a
question for speculative theology (there is as yet no term that stands to the pro nobis as
the homoousion stands to inseparable operations), but also a source of meaning, perhaps
even a source of analogies, which might be brought to bear upon other speculative
questions.
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But if such a theorematic domain were to be a lively, fruitful source of analogical
mediation, then the theologian must contend with the fact that
The affirmed truth of the redemption, the doctrine of redemption, lies rather in the
domain of permanently elemental meaning. That is to say, it is possible that its
meaning will always be better expressed in the symbolic, aesthetic, and/or
dramatic terms of scripture, literature, and drama, and be lived forward from the
narrative, than it will be formulated in the quasi-technical type of formulation that
most dogmas provide.99
If these symbols are to be analogical structures, then there must be “. . . some kind of
explanatory employment of symbols themselves through a further immersion into the
symbols that enables one to grasp in their relations to one another first the symbolic
meanings, and through those meanings the elements of the drama that are affirmed
precisely by employing these symbols.”100 Such immersion in the symbolic is not without
risk. To speculate at all, however, is always risky.
Part of the difficulty in admitting of explanatory methods of symbolization in
speculative theology is the fact that speculation’s hard-won and well-worn path to
progress in theological understanding has been charted through metaphysical, technical,
and “natural” analogies. And certainly one should not wager those gains lightly. Yet, we
can—and indeed should—ask with Doran, “must all systematic theological construction
eventually take a metaphysical turn?” If we answer in the negative, there is a consequent
question, “where are the analogies to be found through whose help the mysteries of faith
are understood?”101 While Doran poses this question with an eye toward an aestheticdramatic modality of speculative analysis to be deployed in the examination of the pro
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nobis, one can equally ask whether an aesthetic-dramatic modality of speculative analysis
might employ the terms of the pro nobis in the speculative examination and explanation
of the in se. And it is precisely this kind of speculative directionality that is opened up
when the theorem of the supernatural is allowed to both clarify its domains of inquiry,
and to elucidate the relations between them.
Doran points to a little-noticed passage in the epilogue of Lonergan’s Insight that
is instructive. “[T]he theologian,” writes Lonergan, “is under no necessity of reducing to
the metaphysical elements, which suffice for an account of this world, such supernatural
realities as the Incarnation, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and the beatific vision.”102
Consequently, “. . . there is nothing to prevent the analogies that would enable a properly
theological understanding of at least some of these mysteries of faith from being aesthetic
and dramatic analogies.”103 The contention offered here is that the “nothing to prevent” is
an effect of a properly generalized and methodically applied theorem of the supernatural.
For not only does the theorem classify, organize, and correlate terms of inquiry into
distinct theorematic domains, it also invites speculative interrogations to make use of
those terms, and (as we will see) also provides the regulative, dialectical means of
controlling the fruits of their analogical deployment (be they sweet or sour). For Doran,
the possibility of an aesthetic-dramatic method of analogical predication must wrestle
with a fundamental question, “Whence the analogies that will render such technical
discourse possible?”104 A generalized, repurposed theorem of the supernatural offers the
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beginnings of an answer: a theorematically controlled deployment of the symbols of
revelation themselves.

Nature and Supernature as Theorematic Domains

The question of analogical predication is a famously vexed one, ostensibly pitting
Thomas Aquinas against both later scholastics and his own interpreters. As Burrell wryly
notes, “Aquinas is perhaps best known for his theory of analogy. On closer inspection, it
turns out he never had one.”105 The traditional “Thomist” theory of analogy is actually
that of Cajetan, who proposed a doctrine of formal analysis of “proper proportionality”
wherein the relation of A to B is identical to that of C to D.106 But if there is an entitative
disproportion between the relations of terms, then there can be no straightforward
predication in the manner of formal analysis. And so, for Aquinas, a full-blown theory of
analogical relations will not be of much use in speculative theology. Burrell even
suggests that “‘Dialectical’ offers a useful rendering of ‘analogous,’ as Aquinas himself
employs analogous discourse.”107 A theological analogy, then, is not a relationship of
proper proportionality. Burrell writes,
Indeed for Aquinas [analogy] seems to refer to any manner of establishing a
notion too pervasive to be defined or too fundamental or exulted to be known
through experience. More often than not, this is accomplished via examples
designed to point up enough relevant aspects of these notions to use them
responsibly. The word coined for this technique was manuductio.108
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An analogical term is thus more than a mere similitude or vestigium, but less than a
formal proportion.
If analogical predication cannot be a strictly controlled procedure of formal
analysis, then analogical understanding will prove difficult without examples. These
examples function as phantasmata for the intellectual grasp of the intelligibility of
analogical predication, like the images Socrates sketched in the sand for the benefit of
Meno’s servant. And yet, if the theorem of the supernatural has the expanded significance
that has been claimed for it in this chapter, one must clarify the domains of analogical
reference at work in a given theological discourse, and examine the relationship that
obtains between those domains of reference. Insofar as the theorem of the supernatural
clarifies the properly theological domain of terms from the line of reference termed
nature, it becomes the controlling theorematic term for two domains of intellectual
reference: one delimited by the proportionality of a term to human understanding, and
another formally disproportionate to understanding and yet revealed to it through the
absolutely supernatural self-communication of God in history.
To understand how the pro nobis can be a source of analogical terms for the in se,
it is worth repeating once again the basic insight of the theorem of the supernatural and
the consequences that follow from it. “The theorem of the supernatural,” writes Doran,
“names what it is that makes a question and a discussion distinctly theological. It gave
theology access to what Lonergan would later call its special categories, those categories
that are proper to theology.”109 This access is what allowed Thomas Aquinas to locate
human freedom in human nature and merit in the elevated life of grace, thereby
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eliminating the mistaken view that because freedom is difficult to understand, it must be
a divine mystery, and that merit, because it accrues on the basis of acts, must owe to
some native capacity of human willingness and operation. As a consequence of
correlating terms with their entitative orders, the theorem also “freed human speculation
to investigate what is not supernatural, what belongs to the domain of ‘nature’—to
investigate it in its own right, and to relate it to the realities that could be included under
the rubrics of the supernatural.”110 Because speculative method requires analogs as
intellectual pivots between any series of affirmed mysteries and the nexus of relations
that must be grasped to understand their affirmation, such a method, when informed by
the theorem of the supernatural, looks to both the natural and the supernatural orders for
such analogs and the theorematic domains that organize them. The natural order that is
clarified by the theorem of the supernatural and that corresponds to its general form
makes available to speculative theology the analogs whose basic intelligibility is
knowable by reason per se and whose analogical intelligibility is capable of occasioning
an imperfect but highly fruitful understanding of the nexus mysteriorum. The supernatural
order, whose terms are knowable solely on the basis of divine revelation, also serves as a
theorematic domain for speculative analogies inasmuch as the formal intelligibility of the
analogical term is de facto revealed in the ordo of salvation history.
Since the theorem of the supernatural, in both its general and specific forms,
regards one and the same structural insight into entitative disproportion, and because
grace is not contrary to nature, one should anticipate a complementarity between
speculative theological products effected through the mediation of analogs from both
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orders of terms. This position has numerous consequences for contemporary and future
speculative theologies. Much of the contemporary disdain for the psychological analogy
for the trinitarian processions, for example, is motivated by a sense that this classical
achievement of speculative theology is severed from the revelatory sources that compel
trinitarian belief in the first place; namely, the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection
of Jesus of Nazareth. As Anne Hunt notes,
In our prayer, lex orandi, the cross and the Trinity are in this very concrete way
intimately and inextricably connected and yet, when we turn to the study of
classical expressions of trinitarian theology, the credenda, as expressed in the
Augustinian-Thomistic synthesis at the apogee of Latin trinitarian theology, we
find no direct or explicit connection at all between the Trinity and the Easter
events of Jesus’ death and resurrection, even though it was through precisely
those events that Jesus’ disciples came to proclaim that Jesus is Lord and that God
is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.111
One can, and should, take umbrage with many of the modern characterizations of the
Augustinian-Thomist tradition of trinitarian reflection.112 However, such rebuttals should
not obscure a fundamental insight in the critique. Hunt writes, “The redemptive
significance of Jesus’ death and resurrection was clearly recognized, but not its
revelatory significance.”113 From within the bounds of speculative method, one might say
that the analogs for the trinitarian processions favored, developed, and advanced by
Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan had their central intelligibility in the line of reference
termed nature. The fruits of such speculation could be deployed in an effort to further
explore the meaning of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, but those events themselves
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are not generally used as the analogical means for understanding the immanent
constitution of divine life itself. And yet, if one follows the path marked out by the
theorem of the supernatural, one can say that there need not be a competitive relationship
between natural and supernatural analogies for the trinity any more than there needs to be
a competitive relationship between charity and amor.
The Augustinian-Thomist analogy for the processions (which the next chapter
will explore in detail) belongs properly to the theorematic domain that is the line of
reference termed nature. Other analogies, however, are on offer. As the life of Christ in
all its historical specificity discloses or reveals the supernatural order, so too can it be a
source of analogies for understanding further that which is revealed but not fully
understood, including the divine processions themselves.
The trinitarian theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar exemplifies this latter strategy.
It looks to the theorematic domain that the theorem of the supernatural clarifies as the
properly theological domain for revealed analogs that can further illuminate what has
been revealed. Whether a particular analog is drawn from the natural or the supernatural
theorematic domain, the same theorem of entitative disproportion regards the
intelligibility of any speculative result. Thus, if a speculative theology confuses, violates,
or undoes the entitative disproportion that makes analogical understanding analogous, it
should be regarded as the negative pole of a dialectic of contradictories, and set aside on
the basis of the theorem of the supernatural’s regulative function.
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The Regulative Function of the Theorematic
According to Lonergan, dialectic “deals with conflicts.”114 In theology, these
conflicts “may regard contrary orientations of research, contrary interpretations, contrary
histories, contrary styles of evaluation, contrary horizons, contrary doctrines, contrary
systems, contrary policies.”115 Speculative pluralism is, in a rather narrow sense, an
attempt to come to terms with the diachronic and synchronic facts of contrary systems of
speculative thought in the Christian religion. It takes as its point of departure the notion
that theology is the mediator between a religion and its significance and role in a culture,
and that there are as many cultures as there are sets of meanings and values incarnated in
the shared lives of people. Such plurality rules out any singular theological mediation,
and places organic limits on the time any particular mediation is capable of doing its
work. But rather than considering material transmission of the past in research,
interpretation, and history, the conflictual horizons of foundations, or fundamental
doctrinal disagreements about what has truly been revealed by God, speculative pluralism
deals with conflicts in contrary systems, in contrary patterns of intellectual labor in
pursuit of the coherence of faith.
The efforts of this chapter to retrieve and generalize the theorem of the
supernatural have had as their main goal to equip the dialectical element of speculative
pluralism with a theorematic tool for its work of addressing the genetic, complementary,
contrary, and contradictory relationships between and among speculative understandings.
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The repurposed theorem of the supernatural clarifies the intellectual lines of reference or
theorematic domains in which speculative, analogical structures are born. It coordinates
the relationships obtaining between structures that arise from distinct domains, and it
dialectically discerns the resulting plurality of speculative understandings, be it genetic,
complementary, contrary, or contradictory. The theorem of the supernatural thus
exercises a regulative function in theological science.
As Kathryn Tanner notes, “A rich diversity in theological forms of Christian selfexpression has always existed; orthodoxy in the sense of limits to acceptable Christian
statement has never demanded uniformity.”116 The fact of such diversity is no guarantee
of coherence. To the contrary, incoherence is to be expected. For Tanner, “the coherence
of Christian theology hinges on principles that regulate the construction of theological
statements whatever the particular vocabulary or conceptuality or metaphysical substrate
of beliefs about human beings and the world.”117
Two such principles predominate in Tanner’s account: “God transcends the
world; God is directly involved with the world as its creator.”118 These two principles are
maintained through the observance of two rules that help form a deep grammar for
coherent Christian speech. First, the theologian must “avoid both simple univocal
attribution of predicates to God and the world and a simple contrast of divine and nondivine predicates.”119 Second, she must also “avoid in talk about God’s creative agency
all suggestions of limitation in scope or manner. The second rule prescribes talk of God’s
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creative agency as immediate and universally extensive.”120 These rules proscribe
contrastive or competitive modes of predication, and make possible the counterintuitive,
but theologically compulsory assertion that “God’s transcendence alone is one that may
be properly exercised in the radical immanence by which God is said to be nearer to us
than we are to ourselves.”121
Despite the uniformity that a focus on “rules” would suggest, Tanner argues that
“Major divergent theological strands within the Christian tradition will be considered as
functional complements in virtue of such differences of emphasis in their utilization of
the same basic rules for coherent Christian discourse.”122 These rules constitute “a force
for theological diversity” both across epochs and within them “because they have two
sides.”123 The positive side of this grammar broadly corresponds to the theorem of the
supernatural’s clarification of the line of reference termed nature. Because God’s creative
act establishes a relation rather than occasions an event, its application is universal, and
thus capable of a methodical bracketing in the investigation of created causes and their
effects. Such investigations yield knowledge of natural structures, which, in turn, become
the reserve of analogs for speculative theologies that turn to the natural theorematic
domain for analogical pivots to understanding. But Tanner also notes a negative side to
her rules, which stress the radical, universal dependence of all created things upon God,
and so highlight the divine goodness, mercy, and initiative in both creation and
redemption. This negative side corresponds to the theorem of the supernatural’s
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clarification of the properly theological, of the mystery of God made known through the
communication of the divine nature in history. Tanner writes. “Some theologians
emphasize the negative side, some the positive, depending upon the intellectual climate,
their method of exposition, the theological topics of special importance to them, and their
practical agendas.”124
This unity-in-diversity is characteristic of genetic, complementary, and even
contrary varieties of speculative pluralism. But theology is not immune from conflicts of
a deeper sort, conflicts born not of ignorance of relevant data or “the complexity of
historical reality,” but rather of “an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, and ethical
stance, a religious outlook.”125 Such conflicts yield contradictory theologies that cannot
be coordinated in an integral pluralism. Taken as a regulative structure, the theorem of
the supernatural helps the community of theological inquiry to identify these
contradictories, and apply the techniques by which the advancement of the positive pole
and reversal of the negative becomes more probable. Many such conflicts arise not
accidentally, but by design. Tanner notes that “modern theologians tend to form their
statements about God and the world in violation of our rules.”126 They do not find
themselves innocently or unwittingly in violation of the regulative grammar. They style
themselves rather as outlaws. Tanner offers many examples, including Gabriel Biel’s
exaggerated account of autonomous human agency and the de Auxiliis debate about
divine and human freedom. To these, more could be adduced. What unites these
examples is their inability to hold divine transcendence and the universal immediacy of
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creative relation together in a coherent whole. Put another way, they fail to maintain the
theorematic perspective that grasps the entitative disproportion between lines of reference
and the non-reciprocal relation of dependence obtaining between them. The result is
either contrastive, zero-sum relations, or some franchise of monism.
A theorematic perspective has a further benefit. Beyond bringing to light the
conflicts imbedded in contradictory forms of speculative pluralism and providing the
basic technique for reversing the negative pole, it also brings with it the bedrock principle
of speculative theology, that because such theology is in the order of understanding while
doctrine is in the order of existence, speculative failure is not the same as heresy. This
principle considerably lowers the stakes concerning the speculative task. To risk
speculation need not mean risking salvation. A theorematic and dialectical approach to
speculative pluralism can help identify dead-ends, promote integral, constructive
plurality, and keep always in view the finite, imperfect, fruitful, and ultimately temporary
nature of the speculative task.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to articulate a starting point in the open-ended frame
of speculative pluralism. Toward that end, it has charted a path through Lonergan’s
historical reconstruction of the theorem of the supernatural within the context of the
theologies of grace and freedom. It has labored to generalize the theorem out of its
specific context regarding the debates around those specific historical theologies and into
the notion of transcendence itself. Finally, it has tried to show that such a generalized
notion of transcendence can function as a dialectical theorem for speculative pluralism by
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opening up distinct lines of intellectual reference, populated by distinct nexuses of terms,
some of which are capable of bearing the weight of analogical disclosure in the
speculative task. Beyond clarifying these domains of reference, the generalized theorem
of the supernatural can take on a regulative function of directing the flow of speculative
thinking, identifying the places in which the regulative structure has been violated with
contradictory results, and providing the techniques by which the positive pole of the
dialectic can be advanced and the negative pole reversed.
The first three chapters of this study have been methodical in nature. They have
sought to grasp the historical and modern meanings of speculative theology in operational
terms. But operations have objects. The final chapter will attempt to show how these
methodical clarifications can function in at least one speculative locus: the theology of
the divine processions. It will demonstrate how the repurposed theorem of the
supernatural can aid in the generation of distinct theologies of the processions, how those
theologies themselves can develop in both orders of analogs, and ultimately, how the
resulting plurality, contrary to all appearances, can evince an authentic unity-in-diversity
in the mission of theological understanding.
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V) THEOREMATIC DOMAINS AND THE THEOLOGY OF THE DIVINE
PROCESSIONS

1. Introduction

Early on in Insight, Lonergan reminds his readers that the primary concern of his
philosophy is not with the contents of knowing, but rather with knowing itself. The
former are extensive, diverse, specialized, incomplete, and subject to radical revision.
Their sheer volume and ongoing production outpace the philosopher’s investigations, and
offer her no hope of catching up. Knowing, however, is invariant. It is dynamic, but also
structured. It is the activity of knowers, and knowers are the source of all accumulations,
revisions, and the questions upon which accumulations and revisions follow. For all its
interdisciplinary complexity, Insight is an investigation not of disciplines, but of inquiry
itself. Its objective contents are no more than a series of examples. Examples, however,
are important. Knowing cannot be without its content. Knowing is intentional. And
intentions intend objects.
This study has so far been concerned with knowing. It has sought to recover and
renew the structure of speculative theological operation. And while examples, mainly
historical ones, have been adduced along the way, the methodical questions guiding the
forgoing have been the following: What am I doing when I speculate? Why do I
speculate? How do differences in one’s historical-cultural matrix inform speculation?
What are the 169heorematics coordinates of thought by which a plurality of speculations
might be dialectically ordered? And while answers have been ventured, it remains that a
sustained application of the methodical elements of this work to a speculative locus has
yet to be attempted. This chapter is such an attempt. Its aim is twofold. First, it shows
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how the systematic exigence for speculative Trinitarian theology arises from the doctrinal
matrix of Christian belief about God in se and explores how distinct patterns of analogy
can meet the determinations of that exigence. Second, it explains how the repurposed
theorem of the supernatural dialectically orders the resulting plurality of speculative
theologies. This chapter is thus both an interpretation of two different analogical
strategies for a speculative theology of the divine processions, and an exploration of the
theology of theologies within the determinate context of trinitarian theory.
A speculative theology of the divine processions has as its first and primary task
the elucidation of an analogical conception of the processions that is adequate to the
specific doctrinal determinations of simplicity and procession, while also effectuating an
intellectual grasp of the intelligibility of those doctrines from within the horizon of
meaning of a given age, culture, life, or orientation. This chapter looks at two such
theologies, paying special attention to the entitative orders from which analogs are drawn,
the methods of speculation deployed, and the dialectical comportment among this
plurality of theologies. Given these restrictions, this chapter aims at little more than a
“proof of concept” for the more substantial methodical proposals offered in the first four
chapters, proposals that, I hope, will find a far wider range of application than the modest
one attempted here.
In applying the method of speculative pluralism, this chapter looks at two
apparently incongruous approaches to the theology of the divine processions and shows
how that apparent incongruity resolves into authentic plurality through methodical
analysis. It looks first to the often-pilloried tradition of analogical reflection associated
with Augustine and Aquinas and evoked by the term “psychological analogy.” The
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chapter examines the genetic structure of the various theologies within this tradition,
beginning with the proto-speculative explorations of Augustine’s De Trinitate,
developing through Aquinas’s Summa to Lonergan’s De Deo Trino, before coming to rest
in the present with Robert Doran’s Trinity in History. In tracing the development of this
tradition, the chapter explores the entitative order of the analogy of spirit, the genetic
plurality that attaches to developments in meaning over time, the centrality of selfappropriation as the term underlying all psychological analogs, and the possibilities for
an analogical conception of the divine processions drawn from the divine indwelling and
its supernatural elevation of spiritual acts.
Second, the chapter examines the trinitarian theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,
which emphasizes the divine kenosis as revealed in the incarnation, cross, and
resurrection as an analog for the divine processions themselves. In so doing, the chapter
examines the respect in which the mysterium salutis is an analogical domain controlled
by the theorem of the supernatural in the same way as the line of reference termed nature.
It explores the immanent and economic functions of kenosis as an analogical linkage
between procession and mission. And it draws out the hidden analogy of spirit that
unifies the various strands of kenotic analogy.
By showing how the theorem of the supernatural controls the analogical domains
of these distinct speculative approaches and the relations obtaining between them, this
chapter provides one basic example of how the methodical elements of speculative
pluralism can be deployed to promote the integral plurality of theological understandings
in the hope that further, more significant examples could be added by others.

172

2. Coordinating Analogical Lines of Reference

The Systematic Exigence and Theorematic Domains

The basic problem of trinitarian theology, according to Lonergan, is that, in their
respective and distinct ways, the Son and the Spirit both are and are not a se.1 To put the
matter in creedal language and in an interrogative form, how can there be, in the “one
God” a term that is “begotten” and another that “proceeds”? For Thomas Aquinas, this is
the first question in a systematic theology of the trinity—is there procession in God? The
aporia that establishes the systematic exigence for speculative understanding lies at the
conjunction of divine simplicity and the divine processions. Both elements are matters of
binding Catholic faith, but the apparent contradiction of one by the other demands an
intellectual intervention of a theoretical sort. The speculative theology of the divine
processions is that intervention. It seeks to offer a hypothetical, analogical, imperfect, but
fruitful way of understanding how it can be true that divine life is perfectly simple while
being constituted by internal processions, relations, and persons.
But finding the analogical means by which to grasp the meaning of procession
within simplicity is a major intellectual project, one fraught with traps, tripwires, and
dead ends. For Aquinas, the archetypal heresies of the Christian faith have in common
(though each in its own way) a notion of procession that, because it is prima facie
irreconcilable with divine simplicity, involves one form or another of denying true
divinity to the Son or the Spirit.2 Arius, Thomas notes, understands the biblical language
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of procession to denote the relation an effect has to its cause. Thus, to say that the Son
proceeds from the Father is to say that the Son is the effect of the Father’s causal act. But
whatever is caused is also created. Therefore, the Son proceeds in the mode of a creature,
not as true God.
Procession can also be understood as the impression of a likeness of the cause to
an effect. It is thus, according to Thomas, that Sabellius interprets the language of
procession to assert that God is to be called “Son” only insofar as he takes on flesh, and
“Spirit” inasmuch as he sanctifies the creature. Both the Arian and Sabellian notions of
procession are united around a common conception; namely, that a procession implies a
movement from some interior principle to some other external term and is thus an
outward act. So long as procession is understood as an outward act, the relationship
obtaining between principle and term will always be one of cause to effect, and while true
divinity can be predicated of the cause, it cannot be so predicated of the effect without
violating the principle of divine simplicity, and, with it, the notion of divinity itself. And
for all their errors, neither Arius nor Sabellius had any confusion about divine simplicity
and the strictures it places upon what can meaningfully be called “God.”
For Lonergan, the problem at the source of the various contestations over the
meaning of divinity in early Christianity is one of competing conceptions of the real.
“Insofar as Christianity is a reality,” writes Lonergan, “it is involved in the problems of
realism.”3 He identifies three modalities of this involvement: a remote involvement that
concerns problems that “have not yet appeared,” a proximate involvement wherein the
problems “gradually manifest themselves and meet with implicit solutions,” and an
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explicit involvement that attaches to the vexed question of the possibility of a distinctly
Christian philosophy.4 The remote involvement follows upon Christianity’s mediation in
the meanings communicated by its preachers, believed by its faithful, and enacted by its
saints. But these mediations of Christian meaning do not exhaust the Christian world.
Immediacy is also part of the remote involvement. This immediacy is conversion. And
conversion is “primarily, not the product of the preacher, not the fruit of one’s free
choice, but the effect of God’s grace.”5 As such, Christian constitutive meaning is
affected by “the ambiguity of realism,” by the immediacy of the meanings effectuated by
grace, meanings which, as experienced, are conscious, but not known—not understood,
not verified by reflexive insight, and therefore not affirmed.6
While the remote involvement of Christianity in the problem of realism owes to
the duality of consciousness and knowledge in the experience of grace, the proximate
involvement pertains to the historical, dialectical process of development in Christian
understanding. Lonergan notes three historical examples that represent stages in the
development of Christian doctrine, and, by extension, stages in the development of the
notion of the real. He considers the Stoic materialism of Tertullian, the Platonic idealism
of Origen, and the nascent critical realism of Athanasius.
One of the first luminaries of the Latin church, Tertullian engaged in an
apologetic dispute with Praxeas concerning the relation between the Father and the Son.

Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism (1972),” CWL 13, 206–207. In a 1961 essay by the
same name, Lonergan treats of the Francophile debate among Gilson, Blondel, and Emile Bréhier over
Christian philosophy in more explicit terms. See Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism (1961),”
CWL 6, 81–82. See also, Gregory A. Sadler, ed. and trans., Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s
Christian Philosophy Debates in France (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011).
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For Praxeas, the absolute identity between Father and Son results in a kind of transitive
property between what is predicated of the one and the other. Thus, for Praxeas, insofar
as it is true to say that the Son was crucified on the cross, it is true to say that the Father
was crucified on the cross. Tertullian argues, on the basis of Scripture and early creedal
dogmatics, that the Son of God is “both real and really distinct” from the Father.7 While
the thrust of the argument is doctrinal, Lonergan argues that there is a philosophical
notion of the real beneath the argument that leads to a decidedly materialist interpretation
of the Trinity. Following Zeno and Cicero, Tertullian asserts that the real is the corporeal,
that whatever has existence exists as a body. What it means, then, that the Son is real is
that the Son has a body or shape. The Son’s distinction from the Father is likewise a
distinction between corporalities. The Father possesses his Wisdom eternally, but when
the Father creates, he utters that eternal Wisdom as his Word, as the Son. The Son as Son,
therefore, is not created, but is nevertheless Son only in and through the creative act. The
Son is the root’s shoot, the spring’s stream, the sun’s ray.8 As such, God is three
according to sequence, aspect, and manifestation.9
Against the notion of the real as the corporeal, Origen argued for “the strict
immateriality of both the Father and the Son.”10 For Origen, the real is the ideal, and thus
the same idea of eternality and divinity that governs the affirmation of the Father as God
governs that of the Son as God. At the same time, however, the distinction of the Father
from the Son must, accordingly, be a distinction between ideas. So while Origen has no
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trouble affirming that the Son is no less eternal than the Father, that divine generation
cannot be according to the manner of that of animals, that the Son proceeds spiritually by
means of the volition of the divine mind, he nevertheless must distinguish the divinity of
the Son from that of the Father by means of a doctrine of participation. The Son—as
eternal, as divine—participates in the pure idea of divinity that is the Father. The Son as
Son is true light, true wisdom, truth itself, life itself, but beyond all these, the Father is
still the unthinkable, mysterious source and fullness of each.11 The Son is the Father’s
image, “an image in which participation reaches its supreme perfection for it consists in
the Son’s eternal contemplation of the Father and his constant acceptance of the Father’s
will.”12
The issue at the core of the difference between Tertullian and Origen, according
to Lonergan, is their respective, diametrically opposed notions of reality. But as neither
Tertullian nor Origen managed to articulate an interpretation of the data of faith and
reason in a manner that accords entirely with the later, fully-formed pro-Nicene
understanding of consubstantiality, it is worth questioning whether either the extroverted
materialism that stands behind Tertullian’s apologetics or the idealism undergirding
Origen’s doctrine of perfect participation are sufficient philosophical positions with
which to interrogate the relation of the Father and the Son. But if Tertullian’s
extroversion conceives of divinity on an analogy with the corporeality of the world of
immediacy and Origen’s strict immateriality of divinity with the world mediated by
meaning, it remains that “there is a third possibility,”13 one “in which one’s apprehension
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of reality is in the world mediated by meaning, where the meanings in question are
affirmations and negations, that is, answers to questions for reflection.”14 It is thus that
Athanasius put forward his “fundamental little rule” that “all that is said of the Father
also is to be said of the Son except that the Son is Son and not the Father.”15
If reality is known through the affirmation of correct understanding, then the
systematic exigence that calls for speculative theory consists in the questions for
understanding that follow upon the affirmation of the truth of God as one, of the Son as
begotten, and of the Spirit as proceeding. If all are true God, then the relevant aspect of
“procession” cannot be the movement from interior principle to external term. It cannot
be a relation of cause to effect. It cannot be a matter of spatially distinct corporalities or
spiritually distinct ideas. Procession in God, as procession, must be an act. But procession
in God, as God, must be an internal, intelligent act that remains within the agent. As
Thomas notes, while we should not understand God according to the mode of bodies, we
must also recognize that even the likeness between divine procession and intellectual
substances, “falls short in representation of divine objects.”16
This matrix of doctrinal determinations concerning simplicity and procession, the
entitative disproportion between the finite and the infinite, and the intellectual—even
spiritual—demand to understand these doctrines in a way that avoids heretical errors all
create the conditions for an analogical conception of the divine processions. And as we
have already seen in the previous chapter, there are multiple analogical domains that
correspond to the intellectual coordinates of the theorem of the supernatural, and thus
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there are multiple analogical structures which can be deployed in the development of a
theology of the processions. This chapter will look at two such structures, their respective
analogical domains, and the possibilities they evince for an integral speculative pluralism.

Two Analogical Structures

Any adequate theory of procession, if it is to emerge successfully from the critical
press of dogmatic formulation, must offer an understanding of how it can be true that
procession exists within divinity itself, not merely as divinity’s self-communication in
creation, but as the immanent constitution of divine life. Such a theory requires an
analog, known to human understanding either by reason or by revelation, which can serve
as the intellectual pivot between the truth affirmed and the truth understood. That pivot
must meaningfully signify the intelligibility of a divine procession—an intelligibility
beyond the proportion of created intellect—while also, and more fundamentally,
signifying some proportionate or at revealed human reality. As Thomas notes, “whatever
is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God
as their source and cause in which all the perfections of things pre-exist
transcendently.”17
For Aquinas, once one rules out any meaning of procession in God that involves
the movement toward external matter (like that of Arius or Sabellius), one is left
searching for a corresponding mode of procession by which what proceeds from the
agent has its term also within the agent. He finds precisely this kind of procession in
created intellect itself. He writes, “procession always implies action; and as there is an
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outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be
an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies
most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent
agent.”18 But what is this intellectual procession? For Aquinas, such a procession is the
emanatio intelligibilis that is the word of concept that proceeds from the act of
understanding. He writes, “For whenever we understand, by the very fact of
understanding there proceeds something in us, which is a conception of the thing
understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our
knowledge of that thing.”19 From this natural act-from-act spiritual procession, Thomas
concludes, “Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies. . . .
Rather it is to be understood by way of intelligible emanation, for example, of the
intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains within him. In that sense
the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.”20
The emanatio intelligibilis is a natural analog. It belongs among those data whose
immanent intelligibility can be known through the application of human reason. And
while such knowledge, as we will see, requires philosophic differentiation and selfinterrogation, the term in question does not per se require the light of faith to be known,
even if, de facto, religious conversion precedes intellectual conversion in the ordinary
course of human living.
But what of revelation? If, in fact, there is a word from God, should not that word
make visible to human eyes, if only through a mirror dimly, what is the truth, structure,
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and being of divine life? What, after all, would a word from God reveal if not God
himself? In the wake of Karl Rahner’s Grundaxiom, many theologians have sought to
recover the revelatory elements of the paschal mystery. Perhaps no Catholic theologian
looms as large in this arena as Hans Urs von Balthasar. And yet, while many (maybe
most) post-conciliar theologies have taken Rahner’s insight to entail a rejection of all
speculation regarding the immanent Trinity, Balthasar’s consistent thesis is that if the life
of God is revealed in the mysterium salutis, then the immanent constitution of divine life
is “the ever-present, inner presupposition of the doctrine of the Cross.”21
The resulting speculative approach argues that the kenosis made manifest on the
Cross has its foundation and possibility in an eternal kenosis. Balthasar argues that “the
Father’s self-utterance in the generation of the Son is an initial ‘kenosis’ within the
Godhead that underpins all subsequent kenosis.”22 The divine kenosis, by definition, is
not a natural human reality, and therefore not a likely candidate to serve as the analogical
base for a theology of the divine processions. Yet, if the mysterium salutis is understood
in revelatory and not only redemptive terms, one can say that inasmuch as the mystery of
salvation is made known to the world through the events of the pascal mystery, God has
revealed God’s own life to human understanding through those events. If kenosis tells us
the structure of the divine missions, then, in Thomistic fashion, it can also tell us of the
structure of the divine processions. The kenotic analogy for the processions is, as we have
said, a supernatural analogy, one whose prime referent lies within the economy of
revelation and hidden in the mystery of God. But as the theorem of the supernatural
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indicates, the specifically theological, supernatural elements communicated through the
economy of revelation, inasmuch as they are understood through the eyes of faith and
faith’s illumination of reason, can shed further analogical light on the mystery of God in
God’s self. In what follows, both of these analogical structures will be treated in greater,
though by no means comprehensive, detail.

3. The Psychological Procession

Any modern exploration of the psychological model of the divine processions
must contend with three inconvenient facts: the near complete misunderstanding of the
psychological analogy from the late medieval period down to the modern era, the postconciliar rejection of the psychological analogy on the basis of that misunderstanding,
and the ongoing influence that rejection still exercises in contemporary Catholic thought.
While it is tempting to attack each in turn, it is not the purpose of this section, nor of the
chapter as a whole, to provide a comprehensive response. They are already available.23
Instead, the procedure in what follows is more positive. It aims to replace
misunderstanding with understanding by walking the reader down the path illuminated by
the psychological analogy. Most of all, it clarifies for the confused what, in fact, the
psychological analogy is.
But this section aims at more than an exposition of the psychological model of the
divine processions. Its larger goals are to demonstrate how the methodical tools proffered
by the theorem of the supernatural inform the conception of the analogical domains from
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which the psychological analog is drawn, to propose a clarification of that analog, and to
show how the basic structure of the psychological analogy can be found in multiple
theorematic domains, thereby offering at least one instance of an integral speculative
pluralism.

Nature, Action, and the Analogy of Spirit
In the aftermath of Karl Rahner’s influential 1967 essay, “Der dreifaltige Gott,”
an ecumenical cohort of theologians have sought to purchase a post-conciliar renewal of
Trinitarian theology with a critical currency. The main object of that criticism has been
the Augustinian-Thomist tradition. Rahner, for his part, famously observed that most
modern Christians are “mere monotheists,” for whom the hypothetical falsification of the
doctrine of the Trinity would have no measurable practical or spiritual effect.24 Rahner
diagnosed the isolation of the Trinity from Christian living as an illness caused by the
doctrine of appropriations, the division between the De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino
schemes of scholastic summae, and the “mere hypothesis” of the psychological analogy
for the divine processions. So long as these elements of the so-called western tradition
endure, the trinity remains ever behind the veil of methodical abstraction from salvation
history, from creation, fall, and redemption, from sin, grace, and glory, and thereby ever
at a remove from the lives of the faithful. And so, into the chasm between speculative
notions of divine aseity and the drama of salvation, Rahner posited his Grundaxiom that
the economic trinity is the immanent trinity and vice versa.25
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This claim, at once obvious and opaque, has been at the center of Trinitarian
thinking ever sense. Owing in no small part to its inexactness, the axiom has been
interpreted in various and contradictory ways, from speculations about divine futurity and
self-realizing negativity in the theologies of Moltmann, Jüngel, Pannenberg, and Jenson,
to Roger Haight’s rejection of all theologies of aseity, to Catherine Mowry LaCugna’s
positing of a real relation between God and the world, such that God simply is his pro
nobis.26 What unites these revisionary proposals—from Rahner’s relatively mild
criticisms of the concept of person to Moltmann’s social trinitarianism—is the shared
belief in the illegitimacy of the psychological analogy and the deleterious effects of
speculative theologies built upon it.27
But the psychological analogy has the distinction of being misunderstood by its
champions and detractors alike. The reason is simple. As Lonergan notes of the strange,
widespread misunderstanding of Thomas’s theology of the divine processions and the
psychological analogy that lies at its center, “Its simplicity, its profundity, and its
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brilliance have long been obscured by interpreters unaware of the relevant psychological
facts and unequal to the task of handling merely linguistic problems.”28 The key to
understanding the significance of the psychological analogy is also the key to
understanding the analogy itself; namely, a personal experience, understanding, and
affirmation of oneself as intelligent and of one’s operations as intelligible. But before
those relevant psychological facts can be properly investigated, it is beneficial to clarify
the theorematic domain of the psychological or spiritual analogy and to offer a few
comments on the notion of action.
As discussed in the previous chapter, for Aquinas, the act of existence rather than
essence receives the accent in metaphysical analysis, even while essence remains ever the
object of understanding. While this allowed Thomas to overcome Avicenna’s problem of
a zero-sum relation of essence to existence, and thus of a denial of essence to divinity, it
also meant that existence, particularly the act of existence would serve as the
foundational notion for conceiving of divinity in itself. It is thus that Thomas famously
refers to God as pure act in question 3 of the Prima Pars. But this assertion contains a
twofold difficulty. First, God as God is not knowable by his essence (which is his act of
existence), so it is not immediately clear what aspect of actus is relevant to analogical
affirmation. Second, even proportionate actus is only intelligible analogically, since, by
definition, proportionate act is distinct from the proportionate essence that is the content
of understanding. As it relates to divine realities, Aquinas makes this one term, actus, the
central analogy for three distinct aspects of the divine reality: the divine act of existence
(ipsum esse subsistens), the divine processions (emanatio intelligibilis per modum
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operati), and the divine ad extra agency (creare). What actus means in all these senses
(and, indeed, even in its created, proportionate sense) can only be glimpsed through
examples.29
For Aquinas, the paradigm for understanding actus is the act of understanding
itself. So effective is this strategy that Thomas applies it to all three major contexts of
divine actus. Most significant to the present argument, however, is Thomas’s notion that
the controverted matter of the divine processions can be resolved through recourse to the
act of understanding not only as a predicate of the divine name (ipsum intelligere), but as
an analogy drawn from ordinary human intellectual life. It is in this respect that the
psychological analogy can be said to be both natural and spiritual. Its analogical base lies
with the relation between intellectual consciousness, the light of agent intellect, and the
uncreated light of being. Its analogical structure, though, centers on the determination
that the act of understanding adds to that base, for from the act of understanding, “there
proceeds within our intellectual consciousness a conception or definition of the reality
understood.”30 Foundational to the psychological theory of the trinitarian procession of
the eternal Word, then, is the theorematic control whereby the natural terms and relations
of understanding and intellectual procession are distinguished from among the various
data of proportionate being, clarified as themselves proportionate to reason, affirmed as a
participation in uncreated light, and investigated accordingly as a means of understanding
the divine processions themselves.
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Intelligible emanation, then, as Lonergan argues, “is the conscious origin of a real,
natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual
consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the
prior act.”31 According to this definition, “act” is not defined through genus or species but
is rather “clarified by a familiar proportion, namely, act : form : potency :: seeing :
eyesight: eye :: hearing something : the faculty of hearing : the ear :: understanding
something : the intelligible species : the possible intellect :: willing : willingness : will ::
existence : substantial form : prime matter.”32 That this act is “real,” means that the act is,
in fact, the case. And that the act is “natural” means that it belongs to intelligence as such
(not merely to intelligence as intentional).
So defined, the act from act procession of the inner word from the act of
understanding that is the ordinary process of human intellection can serve as an analog
for the procession of the eternal Word. But this analogy did not fall fully formed from
heaven. It is the fruit of centuries of biblical interpretation, doctrinal clarification, and
speculative exploration. Distinguishing the meaning of the psychological analogy from
its various verbal formulae, then, benefits from some rudimentary familiarity with that
development. Such development, moreover, provides an example of diachronic or genetic
speculative pluralism.
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The Genetic Pluralism of the Analogy of Spirit

Biblical Foundations

While popular convention assigns to Augustine credit (or blame) for the
psychological analogy’s genesis, Lonergan argues that there is a biblical basis for the
notion that often goes unexamined. “The psychological analogy,” he writes, “is not only a
theory but is rooted deeply in both the New Testament and tradition.”33 Lonergan
organizes the biblical data under three main rubrics: the Word of God, the missions of the
Son and Holy Spirit, and the eternal processions and persons themselves. The Word of
God includes not only such biblical actions as speaking, listening, hearing, but also “the
notions of gospel, commandment, precept, testimony, truth, to observe, to keep, to
believe, to accept, and so on.”34 What unites this nexus of terms is an affirmation of the
word by which humanity is addressed as “the word of God, of the Lord, of Christ, of the
kingdom, of salvation, of grace, of truth.”35 The truth of this word, moreover, is not its
objective contents alone, but the subjective truthfulness of the speaker and the trusting
receptivity of the hearer. It is a word that is believed. Because the word of truth is also the
word of salvation, it “regards values, expresses them, and commends them.”36 The word
as practical, as a judgment of value means that the “one who hears this word of life (1
John 1.1) in the fuller sense experiences a manifest and radical religious conversion.”37
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Because an intelligible emanation is “nothing other than what begins to be known by
anyone who has reached the age of reason, what even a child discovers within himself as
soon as he is able to say sincerely, ‘This is not true,’ and ‘It’s not my fault,’” then one
must say that insofar as the apostles in their sincerity “proclaimed a word as true,” there
is “an intelligible emanation by way of truth.”38 Furthermore, insofar as the first
Christians in their moral integrity “accepted a word as good,” there proceeds within them
“an intelligible emanation by way of goodness.”39
Besides the notion of intelligible emanation that one discovers in the word of truth
believed and proclaimed and in the word of value willed or acted upon as good, the
notion of intelligible emanation is found in the biblical testimony to the missions of the
Son and Holy Spirit. The Johannine testimony is especially insistent that the Son is the
one who has been sent by the Father. He speaks not his own word but only the Father’s
word. He was born to testify to the truth. That word of the Father that is not only spoken
but is also heard, however, is the work of the Spirit who is also sent. The Spirit teaches
even what the apostles cannot bear. The Spirit abides in truth. The Spirit is sent, poured
out, given to the human heart. The truth of God is spoken through the sending of the Son.
The divine affirmation of value is heard through the Spirit that is sent.40 From the
testimony of these sendings, Lonergan concludes,
With this we have reached our objective. For the intelligible emanation by way of
truth that we acknowledged in the apostles as preaching we must similarly
acknowledge in the Son as man, since he said, ‘We speak of what we know and
testify to what we have seen’ (John 3.11). And the intelligible emanation by way
of goodness that we acknowledged in the first Christians hearing the word, we
must also acknowledge in the Spirit who is sent, not only inasmuch as he makes
38
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others hear, but also formally as he himself really and truly, albeit analogously,
hears.41
Lonergan traces the residues of the emanation by way of truth and the emanation
by way of goodness not only through the preaching of the apostles, the religious
conversion of the early Christians, and the missions of the Son and the Spirit, but also in
the persons themselves in their eternal proceeding. His approach is deductive. According
to John 16:13, the Spirit does not speak on his own. Rather, the Spirit hears the Word that
is spoken by the Father. As eternal, simple, and immutable, what is predicated of the
Spirit is predicated eternally. Thus, the emanation by way of goodness traced to the
Spirit’s mission is the temporal determination of the Spirit’s eternal emanation by way of
goodness. The Spirit’s hearing, then, “signifies the procession of love, the intelligible
emanation by way of goodness.”42 But when he turns to examine the procession of the
Son, Lonergan notes that here the deduction is not so straightforward. For the Son is both
human and divine, and therefore, “one cannot conclude to the eternal procession by way
of truth from the fact that his temporal mission is by way of truth.”43 Yet, Lonergan goes
on to argue that when one takes the Johannine “word” in its totality and leaves out those
elements that belong to the materiality of the created order, one can conclude “that the
Word is the Father’s and from the Father, not by being created or made (for he is God),
but by the intelligible emanation that is by way of truth.”44 Furthermore, there is a mutual
relation between these processions. The Father eternally speaks the Word. The Word is
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eternally spoken and heard. The Spirit eternally hears what the Father speaks. Once the
material elements are bracketed, there remains only the spiritual elements, which “are
nothing other than the intelligible emanations by way of truth and by way of goodness.”45

Augustinian Experimentations
The opening sentences of Augustine’s De Trinitate stand as a permanent caution
to anyone daring to speak of God as triune. The Trinity, Augustine tells us, is the starting
point of faith. And yet, its mysterious nature, its unthinkability and so unspeakability,
invite sophistries of various kinds—procedures of reason that, owing to their disordered
affections, irrationally distort the triune mystery into alluring but mundane forms of
sensation and imagination. He writes of the tendency of those that use reason “to transfer
what they have observed about bodily things to incorporeal and spiritual things, which
they would measure by the standard of what they experience through the senses of the
body or learn by natural human intelligence, lively application, and technical skill.”46
Corporality—even in its most concrete biological valence—can exert so great a
force upon the imagination that “the body” can become the criterion of the real. This was
the mentality, Augustine recounts, that so dominated his thinking prior to his encounter
with Platonism.47 God’s reality, he thought, must be of a piece with God’s corporality.
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“Hence,” he writes, “although I did not think of you as being in the shape of a human
body, I was forced to think of you as something corporeal, existent in space and place,
either infused into the world or even diffused outside the world through infinite space.”48
Augustine’s notion of truth, and so his notion of God, was undermined by an all-toocommon tendency to think of the real as the already-out-there-now.49
And while his own thinking underwent a radical conversion as he came to realize
that veritas intends not corporality, but reality, Augustine quickly cautions that the return
to a biologically extroverted theological mentality is an ever-present danger for those
trying to comprehend divinity in terms borrowed from human experience, however much
augmentation the terms undergo. Augustine’s counsel of caution, though, does not
prevent him from speaking of God; it is not a false humility that uses pious silence as a
cloak for ignorance. It is, rather, precisely this risk of bodily confusion that establishes
the exigence for a theology that moves beyond the sensorial and imaginal. If Christians
are not to be reduced to a laconic agnosticism toward the object of their adoration, then a
theology of the triune God is required.
In De Trinitate, Augustine searches for structures of human knowledge that, when
purified of all bodily determination, might illuminate the mystery of Trinity. In Book
VIII, he considers how the triadic relations of a lover, a beloved, and the love between
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them might be an imago in the creature. In Book IX, however, he moves to exclude from
his analysis any residual corporality that might corrupt his results. He thus delimits the
generic relations of the original triad to the specific case of the mind’s love of itself. This
specification leads to an augmentation of the triad, which is now considered as mind,
knowledge, and love (IX.1). Vital to Augustine’s experiments with spiritual analogy,
however, is not only that the terms of the triad undergo the purgation of corporeal
division, but that they be related, one to another to another, so as to demonstrate their
oneness and uniqueness. Thus, while still considering the imago as mind, knowledge, and
love, Augustine takes up the question of whether and in what way knowledge and love
are verba mentis, inner words. The mind, he argues, perceives in temporal things the form
by which they are, and “by this form we conceive true knowledge of things, which we
have with us as a kind of word that we beget by uttering inwardly, and that does not
depart from us when it is born.”50 And while this process of conceptualization obtains in
all circumstances of coming-to-know, the theological application of this structure
requires the unity of the act as directed to itself. Augustine writes,
From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves of itself, this
knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it
and identical, since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like a body nor of a
superior one like God. And while any knowledge has a likeness to the thing it
knows, that is to the thing it is the knowledge of, this knowledge by which the
knowing mind is known has a perfect and equal likeness. And the reason it is both
image and word, is that it is expressed from the mind when it is made equal to it
by knowing it; and what is begotten is equal to the begetter.51
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In Book X, Augustine aims “to remove some of the knots and polish some of the
roughness out of our draft presentation of these matters.”52 His worries about the problem
of self-knowledge and self-presence lead him to modify his triad one last time. He moves
to the indubitable structures of mind: memory, understanding, and will. Through his
examination, he shows that these three are one with regard to life, mind, and substance,
and are three as they regard one another. They are terms that have their distinction
through their relations. In those relations, they can be said to contain each other: memory
remembers memory, understanding, and willing. Understanding understands memory,
understanding, and willing. And willing wills memory, understanding, and willing. Each
term, then, is said to contain all the others through the unique relations that obtain among
them. After a thorough discrediting of all material triads, Augustine returns to this mental
triad in Book XIV. There, he concludes that in the operation of memory, understanding,
and will in self-knowledge, the image of God is manifest in the human soul. But this
remains an imperfect manifestation until those same operations operate with regard to
their divine source. The full image of God in the human person, then, is the person
remembering, understanding, and willing God. This, Augustine tells us, is wisdom.53

Thomistic Synthesis
Through the iterative process of Augustine’s experiments with mental triads, one
can detect the various elements that, in the hands of Aquinas, will become the full
articulation of a systematic treatment of the Trinity: relations of opposition, the verbum
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mentis, etc. Yet, it remains that Augustine’s approach, and, in fact, his aims are distinct
from those of the Summa Theologiae. But even granting those distinctions, there is an
integral genetic relation—both historically and intellectually—between De Trinitate and
the Summa. As Burrell states,
In his de Trinitate, Augustine carried the issue beyond the spare logic of relations
to the region of intentional activity. This domain is rich with analogies, and any
activity which qualifies as intentional is ipso facto a relating as well. What
Aquinas added to Augustine’s triad of memoria, intelligentia, and amor, was a
cognitional analysis which showed how verbum and amor each represent
activities within divinity. More exactly: how the activity generating an interior
word goes on to elicit a loving assent.54
Furthermore, one can detect in Aquinas a keener and clearer sense than one finds in
Augustine of just how and why the systematic exigence emerges within theological
reflection and why analogia (as a strategy of reason beyond similitude or the search for
vestigia) is the proper tool to meet it. And one suspects (though proving the case
materially is difficult) that Aquinas’s procedure in the context of trinitarian theory is
made possible by the same theorematic breakthrough regarding the line of reference
termed nature that made possible his synthetic elaboration of the speculative
reconciliation of grace and freedom. We have already seen how Thomas’s treatment of
the matter is illustrative of his conception of speculative theology as a whole. But now we
can look more singularly at his account of the psychological analogy for its own sake.
To understand how Thomas augments the Augustinian framework, one must
begin with his thorough appropriation of the Aristotelian maxim that knowing is identity
in act. To know something is to reproduce its act. When an act of understanding achieves
the reproduction of the intelligible species of the thing understood, understanding, in fact,
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occurs. “Nothing more is required.”55 The act of understanding is thus conscious. It is not
the passive impression or intuition of externalities upon the intellect. Knowing, as
Lonergan often remarked, is not like taking a good look. Furthermore, if knowing is
identity in act, then to know is to be really related to the known.56
As even Augustine saw, the immediacy of understanding is little more than the
affectivity of what Lonergan calls the release of the tension of inquiry. It is the nexus of
feelings resulting from the flash of insight. For insights to be useful, applicable, or even
available, they must be expressed. By this expression a knower is sustained in real
relation to the known. Burrell summarizes, “The act of understanding something makes
over the one knowing by really relating him to what he knows. If the new relation is to
last, however, and have a chance to alter his comportment, he must be able to express this
new understanding.”57 Such expression is the inner word, and such expressing is the act
by which the inner word is produced. For Thomas, this production is immanent to
consciousness, to the operative structure of intelligence as such. He thus refers to the
production of an inner word as an intelligible emanation (emanatio intelligibilis). As
intelligible, the inner word is more like a “ratio or logos” than it is a “nomen.”58 It is not
the “private language” so criticized by Wittgensteinians.
The foregoing is indicative of Thomas’s overall conception of word and idea, of
cognitional structure, of the rational soul. But how is any of this an analog for the divine
procession of the eternal Word? For Thomas, the proceeding inner word attains a likeness
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according to species between the thing understood and the expression of that
understanding. There is, furthermore, a second procession, a movement of the will that
loves what is known and expressed because it is good and loveable. Thus, while the first
procession pertains to the likeness of the intellect, the second procession pertains to the
will’s inclination to what is loveable.
The Word of God, by analogy, proceeds in the mode of an intelligible emanation
from the Father as Dicens. This procession, like its analog, is natural, autonomous, and
spiritual. It is an act proceeding logically and causally from an act. It is a perfect
expression of the identity, fullness, and totality of that from which it proceeds. The Holy
Spirit, by analogy, proceeds in the mode of an intelligible emanation of love from the
judgment of value that affirms what is known to be loveable. Inasmuch as that emanation
of love regards what is expressed in the Word, the procession of the Spirit is coprincipled, even while remaining a single procession. The Spirit proceeds from the Father
and the Son.
By situating and augmenting Augustine’s mental triads within a more
differentiated rational psychology and by putting the resulting transformation to explicitly
speculative use, Thomas resolved the tension long detected at the intersection of
simplicity and procession, and, with it, showed how hard-won doctrinal achievements can
be reconciled with each other through the application of theorematic control. It remains,
however, that Thomas’s version of the psychological analogy is limited by the
metaphysical approach to the study of the soul (faculty psychology). In the twentieth
century, Lonergan transposed the Thomistic achievement by both rigorously retrieving
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Thomas’s doctrine of Verbum and renewing it on the basis of a modern, empirical
cognitional theory.

Lonerganian Transpositions
The relative neglect of Bernard Lonergan’s unique contributions to Trinitarian
theology has two main sources. First, Lonergan’s two principal texts: The Triune God:
Doctrines and The Triune God: Systematics were, like most of Lonergan’s dogmatic
works, written in Latin as textbooks for scholastics at the Gregorian University in Rome
in the midst of the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, and so were largely ignored
during their initial rounds of publication. Second, the tradition of Trinitarian reflection
within which Lonergan worked was the Augustinian-Thomist line of psychological
analogical reasoning, a tradition of theological thinking much maligned during the
renaissance Trinitarian theology has enjoyed in the decades following the publication of
Rahner’s “Der dreifaltige Gott.” This comes despite the numerous references to
Lonergan’s text throughout that work. As a result, the linguistic and intellectual trends
within modern systematics have set conditions under which a theology student is unlikely
to encounter Lonergan’s work, and if they do, is unlikely to recognize it as a unique or
groundbreaking text.
The foundational work in Lonergan’s development of the psychological analogy
is the collection of five Theological Studies articles published from 1946 to 1949
compiled in book form as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. In Verbum, Lonergan
endeavors to retrieve Thomas Aquinas’s theory of knowledge, especially in his
articulation, explanation, and expansion of Augustine’s proceeding “inner word.” For
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Lonergan’s Aquinas, there are two proceeding inner words that are the immanent
terminal objects of intellectual operation corresponding to the two principal intellectual
operations in human knowing: understanding and judging.
The first operation, understanding, is the operation by which one answers the
question quid sit? (“What is it?”). Understanding (intelligere) is intelligence coming to
possess some intelligible species immanent to the manifold of sensation or consciousness
through insight into phantasm or image. Understanding is not satisfied with imaginal
objects, and so consequent upon its own actuality, the act of understanding makes for
itself an inner word, a concept, a formulation, a definition, a quod quid est. The actuality
of the inner word proceeds from the actuality of the act of understanding. What proceeds
from the act of understanding is an emanatio intelligibilis (intelligible emanation). The
intelligibility of the emanatio intelligibilis is active and actual not passive and potential,
because it is the intelligibility of the act of understanding acting, as understanding itself.
“It is native and natural,” Lonergan writes, “for the procession of the inner word to be
intelligible, actively intelligible, and the genus of all intelligible process; just as heat is
native and natural to fire, so is intelligible procession to intelligence in act.”59 As the
active, intelligible effect of an active, intelligible cause, the emanatio intelligibilis of the
procession of the inner word in human understanding is a created base and fruitful
analogical term in the human mind that images the triune constitution of divine life,
wherein the divine Word proceeds natively, naturally, actively, and intelligibly from the
Father.
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Many of the disagreements among Thomists about the nature of Aquinas’s
Trinitarian theory stemmed, Lonergan argues, from an almost universal failure to grasp
both the meaning and importance of Thomas’s notion of the act of understanding
(intelligere) for both his psychology and for his Trinitarian theology. Lonergan argues
that Thomas’s notion of intelligere differs drastically from most accounts of his
intellectual psychology. On the basis of this recovery of Thomistic intelligere, Lonergan
argues that Thomas’s principal natural analogy for the Trinitarian procession of the
Word, emanatio intelligibilis, can only be understood adequately as the act of the
proceeding inner word of concept from the prior act of intelligere. If, in human
intellectual and rational psychology, there proceeds something both real and nonmaterial, that proceeds as act from a prior act, then it may prove a fecund place from
which, however dimly and with the caution of Lateran IV always in mind, to conceive of
the act from act procession of the Son from the Father, and of the Spirit from the Father
and the Son.
What the Verbum articles already gesture toward, is a transformation of the
Thomistic inner word beyond the strictures of Aristotelian faculty psychology, so as to
grasp more completely not just a theory of knowledge predicated on a metaphysics of the
soul and its powers, but a theory of consciousness predicated on the structured
operational performance of the knower. Such a theory is articulated in Lonergan’s 1957
philosophical masterpiece, Insight. In it, Lonergan is able to propose a reordering of all of
human inquiry on the basis of the self-appropriation of one’s conscious performance of
knowing. Understanding, he argues, is the supervening of intelligence upon experience, it
is a cluster of operations in the subject that emerge in consciousness as answers to
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questions. Questions themselves spontaneously arise on the basis of experience, and act
as operators moving the conscious subject from one class of operations to another. From
the acts of understanding proceed concepts, formulations, expressions, and definitions.
These are the articulations of the answers grasped by intelligence to the interrogation of
experience. Yet, at the level of understanding, these answers remain only hypothetical
and potential. Some intelligible form has been understood, but the human knower wants
to know if what has been understood is, in fact, true. And so, questions for intelligence
(what is it?) give way to questions for rational reflection (is it so?), and acts of
understanding give way to acts of judgment. The operations of rational consciousness
weigh the evidence, evaluate, grasp the conditions of understanding’s truthfulness, and
judge whether or not those conditions have been fulfilled. Only after grasping both the
conditions of a concept’s veracity and the fulfillment of those conditions can one
reasonably affirm as true any particular insight, and only then can one truly be said to
know.
Lonergan’s achievements here are twofold. He both sets the natural ground of the
psychological analogy on the firmer footing of empirical cognitional theory—thereby
making the natural terms and relations clearer, more concise, and more available to
philosophical inquiry—and brings to the service a correlated and essential fact: The
natural analog underlying the psychological analogy is not an already-out-there-now
object of the natural world, but the theologian’s own appropriation of themselves as
intellectual, rational, volitional, and loving actors in an intelligible and loveable universe.
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Self-Appropriation as Analog

Few theologians today express much affection for the psychological analogy.
Even those who are otherwise defenders of Thomas’s teaching on Trinity often express
misgivings about the analogy.60 This was not always so. But even when it enjoyed the
cultural and intellectual superstructure of neo-scholastic hegemony, Lonergan argued that
few Thomists had anything more than a conceptual grasp of Thomas’s doctrine. “Not a
few vigorously affirm [the psychological analogy],” he writes, “and yet clearly have
never attended to that root from which this whole theory proceeds.”61 Lonergan contends
that such opinions are “poorly propounded” in that they “employ the psychological
analogy, but in a way that overlooks to some extent the proper force and efficacy of the
analogy.”62 This oversight of insight may entail an affirmation of the likeness between
the divine processions and those of human intelligence, but mere verbal ascent to this
likeness differs in kind from understanding it.
For Lonergan, this difference is explained by distinguishing between two models
of understanding. In the first model, understanding is the intelligent grasp of the
intelligible through the act of organizing insight. It is an answer to a question. In the
second model, intelligence is conceived on an analogy with sensibility, especially the
sensible act of vision. To “understand” the psychological analogy, according to the
second model, is to utter its verbal expressions with accuracy. It is to know how to use a
word. Procession, accordingly, is “from external words to universal concepts . . . from the
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corporeal act of seeing to some simple apprehension whereby concepts become known to
us.”63 But insofar as sensation is not yet intellectual, processions from sensation are not
yet intelligible. And a procession that is not intelligible cannot serve as the basis for an
analogical conception of the divine processions.
“Therefore,” Lonergan concludes, “not only should the psychological analogy be
employed, it must also be understood in such a way that the likeness is not sought
between the sensitive part of our nature and the triune God.”64 To avoid this error,
Lonergan encourages us to “attend even for a few moments to our own internal and
intellectual experiences.”65 When we do, we make three discoveries: 1) When we
understand anything, something proceeds in us as the definition or concept of what we
understand; 2) Love proceeds only from such concepts; 3) Perfect procession perfectly is
one with that from which it proceeds. These discoveries, in turn, are the heart of the
psychological analogy.66 But the key to these discoveries is the pattern of attention in the
inquirer and the success the inquirer has in interrogating their own conscious operations.
The functions of human consciousness may be empirical, but the only data set to
which an inquirer has empirical access is their own. The data of consciousness are only
experienced in the first person. The natural analog for the divine processions is therefore
not just the intelligible emanation, but my experience, understanding, and affirmation of a
proceeding inner word in me that proceeds from my act of understanding. This is the
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process that Lonergan refers to as self-appropriation. Not only is self-appropriation the
key to solving the entrenched philosophical problems Lonergan addresses in Insight, it is
also the key to the psychological analogy. It is, in fact, the natural term underlying the
psychological analogy itself.

Divine Indwelling and the Supernatural Elevation of Spiritual Acts

The theorem of the supernatural, insofar as it clarifies the intellectual coordinates
of the line of reference termed nature, sets the speculative conditions for the
disengagement of a natural analogy for the divine processions. Those conditions have
been fulfilled by a tradition of speculative rationality that has its material origins in
scripture, its historical origins in Augustine, its refinements and perfections in Aquinas,
and its transposition from soul to subject in Lonergan. But it remains a tradition quite
consciously and intentionally wedded to the line of reference termed nature in order to
secure its control of meaning. But what of the supernatural term? Recent speculative
theology demonstrates that one can take the basic structure of the natural analogy found
in human conscious operation and re-found it as a supernatural analogy, where the
analogs are not the operations of consciousness as naturally operative, but those
operations as operative under the principle of sanctifying grace and charity, which is to
say, to operate under the new conditions of consciousness made possible by the historical
missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. There is, thus, an incipient authentic speculative
pluralism, constituted by both natural and supernatural analogies, within the
psychological analogy itself—analogies controlled by the dialectical operation of the
theorem of the supernatural.
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In his recent work, The Trinity in History, Robert Doran argues that “the
trinitarian structure of created grace provides a psychological analogy for understanding
Trinitarian life, an analogy whose structure is isomorphic with the analogies suggested by
Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan. There is thus established an analogy for
understanding Trinitarian processions that obtains in the supernatural order itself.”67
Following Lonergan’s lead, Doran takes the implications of the transposition from soul to
subject all the way to their conclusion, asking after the cognitional/conscious correlates to
the metaphysical doctrines of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, absolutely
supernatural created terms that have their trinitarian base in the uncreated relations of
active and passive spiration.
In scholastic theology, sanctifying grace is an entitative habit, an accidental
formal cause that is posited in the essence of the soul. Its effects flow through the natural
structure of relations between the essence, the powers, habits, and acts. It is thus the root
and source of the habit of charity in the will. In Doran’s transposition, the conscious
correlate to sanctifying grace as accidental form is the retrospective recollection of being
on the receiving end of unrestricted love. The love is unrestricted because it is God’s own
love. It has neither conditions nor limitations. As such, it is known only through
retrospective recollection, or what Lonergan called an undertow in retrospect. Between
retrospection and Augustinian memoria, there is an obvious affinity. It is thus that Doran
argues that the retrospective interpretation of being on the receiving end of unrestricted
love is memoria as an operative cognitional act when that act occurs under the principle
of sanctifying grace.
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Memoria, however, is not an emanatio intelligibilis. Or, in Doran’s gloss, it is not
an autonomous spiritual procession. And yet, insofar as the retrospective interpretation of
being on the receiving end of unrestricted love is an acknowledgement of that experience,
it grasps the sufficient evidence for the judgement of value that assents to that love—
specifically that such love is good— and does so in faith. That judgment of value is an
inner word. It proceeds from memoria’s grasp of sufficient evidence. As Doran
summarizes, there are two steps: “The gift itself recollected and acknowledged in
memoria and the inner word of a judgment of value that proceeds from the evidence of
memoria and acknowledges the goodness of the gift.”68 These two steps, in turn, together
constitute the “conscious manifestation” of the active spiration by which the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father and the Son. From this, Doran synthesizes the whole,
Thus it may be said that the three divine persons dwell in us and among us, are
present to us, precisely as the uncreated terms of created supernatural relations:
supernatural, because their subjects are created participations in divine life,
namely, sanctifying grace (gift and word, notionaliter diligere) and charity (amor
proceedens). Sanctifying grace and charity, thus conceived, are the special basic
relations that ground the derivation of special categories in theology.69
The supernatural analogy for the psychological procession, as Doran articulates it,
represents a development from within the speculative tradition of the psychological
analogy that looks for its prime referent in the supernatural, rather than the natural order.
Because of the theorem of the supernatural, this development can be classified as an
integral, diachronic, but also dialectical development (in the precise sense described in
the previous chapter). Yet, the supernatural analogy is not exhausted with consciousness
and grace. As we will see in the next section, a supernatural analogy for the divine
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processions can be found within the mysterium salutis not only in the invisible missions,
but the visible missions as well. In particular, we will see how Balthasar’s kenotic
analogy both issues from the revelation of God in the visible mission of the Son, his life,
death, and resurrection, and backs its way into its own psychological conception of
kenosis, and thus of the divine processions.

4. The Kenotic Procession
No traditional trinitarian axiom is as central to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s kenotic
analogy as the Thomistic teaching the that missions are the processions, that the former
relate God to history as the latter relate God to God’s self. In contrast to the social
trinitarians with whom his thought is sometimes (and mistakenly) linked, Balthasar’s
fundamental speculative trinitarian question is not one of personal vestigia, but of
procession and its economic correlate—mission. But while Thomas begins his
speculative theology of the trinity with the processions, Balthasar, in ways both
converging and diverging with and from Doran, begins his speculative theology with the
missions—without ever forgetting the identity between the two.
But how can a divine mission, which has as its constitutive condition the eternal
self-communication of divine life, be a source for the analogical, intellectual mediation of
that life? The missions presume the processions. And the processions are made known
only through revelation. If revelation reveals the formally disproportionate reality that is
divine life, how can what it reveals also be a source of analogs for speculative theology?
Can the historical missions, which have as their purpose the redemption of the world, also
be analogs for the processive life of God? As we saw with Doran’s account of the
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supernatural elevation of spiritual acts, a speculative theology drawn from a supernatural
analog is possible because the theorem of the supernatural controls the meaning of both
natural and supernatural intellectual domains. As we will see, that same theorematic
control governs the relationship between the historical mission of the Word, its kenotic
modalities, and its formal condition in the eternal divine self-communication. First, this
section clarifies how the mysterium salutis can be both soteriological and theorematic.
Second, it charts Balthasar’s theology of the processions from its Christological
manifestation in the Aesthetics, to its kenotic content in the Dramatics, to its expression
in a modified analogy of spirit in the Logic. This triad—manifestation, content,
expression—is Balthasar’s characteristic manner of theologizing.

The Mysterium Salutis and Analogical Disclosure

Analogical mediation, whether considered as a formal metaphysical relation or as
an intellectual interval of semantic predication has at its core the notion of disproportion.
In the context of theology, the disproportion is between the finite and the infinite,
wherein the former refers to the mode of existing in which the cause, reason, and
explanation of a thing is independent of the essence of the thing itself, and the latter
refers to the identity of essence and existence. This disproportion is absolute. It admits of
no gradation according to magnitude. Yet, fundamental to theology is the affirmation that
even so absolute a disproportion between relata contains a relation. The formally
unconditioned, theology claims, reveals itself in and among the conditioned. As the
previous chapter outlined, the theorem of the supernatural governs the intellectual
structure of this relation. It represents the coordination of properly theological terms and
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relations with the supernatural order, thereby clarifying by contrast those terms and
relations whose intelligibility is, in principle, explicable according to “the line of
reference termed nature.” The repurposing of the theorem proposed in this work suggests
that that intellectual frame not only clarifies and relates terms and relations with their
proper ordo essendi and the two ordines to one another, but it also disengages the
theorematic domains from which terms can be selected and applied in the speculative
pursuit of analogical mediation.
The psychological analogy, at least as it has been articulated from Augustine to
Lonergan, finds its analog (emanatio intelligibilis) in the line of reference termed nature.
But clarification of that line of reference has the further entailment of correlating properly
theological terms with the supernatural order. But once the theorem is operative and the
properly theological elements are grasped and distinguished from the natural elements,
speculative theology can utilize one theological element as an analog for understanding
others. The reason for this intra-theological analogizing owes to the revelatory character
of the underlying data of theology. The basic claim of Christianity is that God,
unknowable in himself, makes himself known (through a mirror dimly) in the law, the
prophets, the incarnation, and the divine indwelling. Once what God reveals is known to
those to whom it is revealed, it enters into the fund of insights through which the
intellectual and practical lives of Christians are lived.
Soteriology, as Katherine Sonderegger has argued, is not all of theology.70
Furthermore, soteriology itself is more than soteriological. Inasmuch as it names the

70
This thesis is a key feature of the argument in Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology,
Volume 2: The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: Processions and Persons (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2020).

209

economy of divine self-communication in history through creation and redemption, it
also names the economy of revelation itself. As revelatory, the mysterium salutis is a
theorematic domain of special terms and relations revealed through the visible and
invisible missions of the Son and the Spirit. With the theorem of the supernatural as its
control of meaning, the mysterium salutis itself provides a basic set of terms and relations
for an analogical conception of the divine processions. Furthermore, as a theorem of
disproportion, the theorem of the supernatural allows for a precise interpretation of the
regulative function that dissimilitude exercises (according to Lateran IV) over speculative
relations of analogy.
For Balthasar, the visible mission of the Word, the incarnation—and with it the
full arc of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection—is not merely soteriological. It is also
revelatory. What Christ’s life reveals progressively through the various modalities of his
obedience to the Father is the processive life of God. By linking Christic authority,
obedience, poverty, expropriation, and self-abandonment with historical kenosis,
Balthasar shows how the economic unity of Christ’s historical life discloses the intradivine kenosis, and with it, the processive life of God’s immanent constitution. Christ’s
form is “the revelation of [God’s] absolute freedom, as this is in God himself, the
freedom of eternal self-giving out of unfathomable love.”71 Such unrestricted self-giving
and the freedom according to which it proceeds eternally “is poured out over the entire
form of revelation, gives it its being and structure, and is present in it.”72
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Kenosis as Explanatory Term
While the locus classicus of Balthasar’s theory of kenotic relations is volume four
of his Drama, the grounding for that content is the manifestation of Christic obedience in
the concluding volume of the Aesthetics. In it, Balthasar attempts to synthesize the whole
of history’s manifestation of uncreated glory into the Gestalt of Christ’s historical life. In
his examination of the gospels, especially the gospel of John, Balthasar characterizes
Christ’s manner of being in the world through three seemingly contradictory descriptors:
authority, poverty (obedience), and self-abandonment. His authority owes to his relation
to the Father as the Father’s Word. As the one sent from the Father, Christ is possessed of
the Father’s authority. But the content of the Father’s Word and thus of the Word’s
authority is poverty—dependence, obedience, prayer, faith, and Spirit. In Christ’s
historical mission there is thus a “paradox” in which Jesus “ makes his absolute claim [to
authority] in equally absolute poverty, in the renunciation of all earthly power and every
earthly possession.”73And as “perfect poverty is one with perfect obedience,” so “Jesus
himself is the one who is absolutely poor.”74
The contradiction between Christic authority and poverty is transposed into a
higher synthesis in Christic self-abandonment, which clarifies that both authority and
obedience are functions of freedom, of self-giving. But sublimating the paradox of
authority and obedience in this way does not yet reach the ground of their possibility. As
Balthasar writes, “For such obedience, a divine decision must truly be required, a
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decision that as such implies the ‘surrender’ of the forma Dei. . . .”75 Readers of the
Vulgate can already see where he is going. Forma Dei is how the Vulgate translates the
Pauline phrase, morphe theou, in the kenotic Christ hymn of Philippians 2:6–11. But
unlike many kenotic theologians of the nineteenth century and their twentieth century
heirs, Balthasar insists that Christic kenosis, inasmuch as it is the kenosis of the divine
person, “cannot postulate any alteration as this is found in creatures, nor any suffering
and obeying in the manner proper to creatures.”76 Divine self-divestment, then, has to be
proper to divine life itself in order to be economically extended.
Divine selflessness, “pure relations of love within the Godhead” is “the basis of
everything,” including creation (the first kenosis) and the cross (the second kenosis).77
Balthasar explicitly connects the pure relation of kenosis to the Son’s eternal “being
begotten.” When Christ surrenders the forma Dei, he “translates his being begotten by the
Father (and in this, his dependence on him) into the expressive form of creaturely
obedience.”78 In the act of Christic surrender, “the whole Trinity remains involved.”79
The Father sends, the Son surrenders, and the Spirit unites and expresses their relation.
By surrendering the forma Dei, Christ manifests economically the immanent,
processive relation of the Father to the Son. The kenotic existence of Jesus, Balthasar
concludes, “was an existence of expectation and of readiness for the ‘hour,’ condensed in
the unity of claim, poverty, and self-abandonment.”80 In the Aesthetics, kenosis is the
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explanatory term that organizes the seemingly contradictory affirmations of Christic
authority, poverty, and self-abandonment. It names the modalities of appearance of the
processions in the historical appearance of Christ. But in the Dramatics, kenosis is also
the explanatory term that unites Christ’s mission with the Word’s eternal procession. It is
the content of what Christ manifests. The transition from one to the other entails a
transition from a focus restricted to the economic appearance of Christ’s mission to a
focus dilated to include a formal description of the immanent trinity.
In the Aesthetics, divine freedom is the exigence that leads Balthasar to use
kenosis as unifying term for Christ’s authority, obedience, and self-abandonment. In the
Dramatics, the relation of divine to human freedom is the central matter. For Balthasar,
the economic appearance of Christ’s form and mission is unthinkable apart from the
“inner presupposition” of trinitarian doctrine.81 But a one-sidedly economic account of
the trinity cannot be that inner presupposition. “Many theologians,” Balthasar writes, “in
attempting to establish the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity, seem to
lay such weight on the latter that the immanent Trinity, even if it is still distinguished
from the other, becomes merely a kind of precondition for God’s true, earnest selfrevelation and self-giving.”82 In reaction to Rahner and Moltmann, Balthasar argues that
the immanent trinity “must be understood to be that eternal, absolute self-surrender
whereby God is seen to be, in himself, absolute love; this in turn explains his free selfgiving to the world as love, without suggesting the God ‘needed’ the world process and
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the Cross in order to become himself (to ‘mediate himself’).”83 The dramatic soteriology
considers the trinity not just in terms of the pro nobis, but goes on to speculatively
explore the ways in which the pro nobis sheds light on the inner life of God in se.
Kenosis in the analogical pivot for this speculative exploration. From the kenotic
structure disclosed in the modalities of Christ’s historical form, Balthasar considers
kenosis as the Ur-act that throws light on the mystery of simplicity and procession. In the
procession of the Son, the Father surrenders the fullness of divinity. But because the
procession is eternal, the full surrender does not rob the Father of divinity, but rather
demonstrates his constitutive attribute as the One who, by love, begets the Son. “The
Son’s answer to the gift of Godhead (of equal substance with the Father)” writes
Balthasar, “can only be eternal thanksgiving (eucharistia) to the Father, the Source—a
thanksgiving as selfless and unreserved as the Father’s original self-surrender.”84 And as
if to prove that the kenotic act by which Son is can be fully expressed only by a
correlative act of kenotic love, there proceeds from the Father and the Son the Spirit, who
“as the essence of love, he maintains the infinite difference between them, seals it and,
since he is the one Spirit of them both, bridges it.”85
With a control of meaning supplied by the theorem of the supernatural, Balthasar
is able to risk the pro nobis starting place of Rahnerian and post-Rahnerian trinitarian
theology without letting the immanent trinity fade into apophatic silence. Through the
kenotic analogy drawn out of the historical Christ form, Balthasar repurposes soteriology
in service of a speculative theology of the divine processions. In so doing, he draws a line
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in the sand beyond which such a theology must not cross. His theory of kenotic relation is
the eternal relations of love that constitute divine life. They are extended temporally in
the missions of the Son and Spirit, but that extension does not alter, enhance, or sublate
the eternal processions. Rather, the processive life of God is the sine qua non of creation,
revelation, and salvation. But to claim as Balthasar does that the content of what appears
in Christic kenosis is the eternal relations of love in God still must be expressed. If the
kenotic analogy effectuates an intellectual grasp of the coherence of procession in a
perfectly simple God, it remains that apart from an articulation of that intelligible content,
the immediacy of understanding is just a feeling that the tension of inquiry is resolved. In
the Theo-Logic, Balthasar provides the expression for the speculative theology of the
processions, and he does so by articulating how kenotic love—as an operation of
consciousness—illumines the mystery of the processions and makes possible the selfappropriation of the mystery.

Imago, Kenosis, and a Hidden Analogy of Spirit

In the second volume of the Theo-Logic, Balthasar offers some of his most indepth engagements with Augustinian and Thomistic Trinitarian theology. And while his
analyses are not without hesitations and even some criticisms, one should not conclude
from them that his intention is to reject that tradition. What is more surprising, however,
is that despite those hesitations and cautious critiques, Balthasar elaborates, perhaps
without realizing it, a modified psychological analogy—taken from the supernatural
order—that sets his speculative theology of kenosis into the terms and relations of
consciousness. The central question, both in his critique and his articulation, is what it
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means for the Logos to have been spoken not by some anonymous speaker, but rather by
a father. For the father to speak there is presumed “a corresponding power and a
corresponding will at the base of one’s utterance and communication. In the present case,
what ‘motivates’ the will can only be love.”86 The Father thus speaks the Word not out of
silence but out of love. But the love that motivates the Father’s utterance is also the
substance of what is communicated in the utterance. The Word is the expression of the
love of the Father, out of which the Father speaks the Word.
If the Word expresses the Father in the Father’s self-expressing, groundless love,
then the expression of the Father in the Word must itself be in its own mode, as Word, an
expression of self-expressing groundless love. As Balthasar writes,
precisely for this reason, since it is not the mere objectification of a subjective
principle but also co-represents this principle in its mirroring or imaging, it cannot
content itself with merely being an expression; it must likewise image, that is,
coexecute, the movement of groundlessly loving self-expression, and do so,
indeed, together with the source and ground that produces the Logos. This means
that the Logos has a ‘toward’ together with his ‘from’: the groundlessly loving
production of the one whom we call, for want of a clearer term, the Holy Spirit.87

With this statement, we have an initial approximation of a Balthasarian scheme for the
immanent constitution of divine life. And from this approximation, Balthasar can then
work out the analogical correlates whereby the operational structure of loving can
manifest, even through the dim mirror of the ever-greater dissimilarity, the truth of that
immanent constitution. He writes, “we can say that truth belongs primarily to the Son,
both within God and in the economy, but that theologically it rests upon the wonder of
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the Father’s generative act, which, considered from the standpoint of the hypostasis of the
Logos, is groundless love.”88 This groundless love is thus the “from which” of the
Word’s procession, and so an analogical term for the Father from whom the Word
proceeds. But if what proceeds from the Father is truth, then the Son can be analogically
conceived in terms of an eternal judgment that means or expresses the total self-giving of
groundless love. The analogical term for the Son is thereby the true expression of
groundless love. And because the character of groundless love is complete self-giving in
processive expression, the Word only expresses groundless love insofar as it is itself a coprinciple of expressing groundless love. The Word as the truth of groundless love
transcends itself together with the Father into the Holy Spirit, who, as Balthasar writes,
“is neither the Father nor the Son but exposits into infinity their hypostatic sphere—the
love that belongs to each (Jn 16:13–15).”89 And with this we have the analogical term for
the third person of the Trinity. Thus, the Father as groundless love expresses that love
truly and without remainder in the Word. The Word as true expression of groundless love
must itself groundlessly love, together with the Father, as expression. The groundless
loving between the Father and the Word is the Holy Spirit, who subsists as co-principled
loving. And so as the Word truly expresses the groundless love of the Father, so the Holy
Spirit exposits the love between the Father and the Father’s Word.
The compactness of Balthasar’s presentation leaves its technical and existential
brilliance vulnerable to being overlooked. However, a comparison between Balthasar’s
account of the divine processions in terms of groundless love and Lonergan’s so-called
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“later” psychological analogy helps bring clarity to what Balthasar accomplishes here.
Readers of Lonergan’s essay, “Christology Today,” will recognize a structural similarity
between Lonergan’s analogy what Balthasar elaborates in the Theo-Logic. Whereas
Lonergan’s early writings, both in Verbum and in The Triune God: Systematics work out
a Thomistic psychological analogy in terms of the inner word of concept that proceeds
causally and logically from a prior act of understanding, “Christology Today” insists that
the starting point of the psychological analogy is the “higher synthesis of intellectual,
rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love.”90 The
dynamic state of being in love truly expresses itself as a judgment of value, and the
sincerity of the judgment is enacted in acts of loving. Now, regardless of whether or not
the dynamic state here refers to natural love or Christian charity, the operational structure
itself remains a created base for conceiving of the processions, relations, and persons of
the divine Trinity.
Drawing from the Johannine assertion that the Father is love, Lonergan shows
that the Word that proceeds from the Father is accordingly a verbum spirans amorem, a
judgment of value, a judgment that affirms the truth of the love on the basis of the
evidentiary grasp of that love’s worth. The judgment, in turn, grounds the act of loving
that is the Holy Spirit. The structure of the later analogy unfolds in the same ordo
disciplinae as the earlier one, in which the correlates of the two analogical terms are the
processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit respectively. An analogical grasp of the two
processions makes possible a shift in perspective that allows the mutually opposed
directionality of the processions to be conceived as four real relations, three of which are
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really distinct not only relationally but also in their mode of subsisting. These three
distinct subsistents can thus be understood as three persons.91
Lonergan’s more systematic presentation can help to organize Balthasar’s
scheme. The same Johannine conviction leads both Balthasar and Lonergan to affirm, on
the basis of revelation, that God the Father is love. Lonergan specifies that love as
“originating,” while Balthasar calls it “groundless.” But both modifiers attest to the
unoriginated character of the Father. In both cases, eternal, groundless, originating love
expresses itself completely and without remainder in a proceeding word. For Lonergan
the proceeding word is a judgment of value that communicates the truth of originating
love. Balthasar argues that the Word is the true expression or image or communication of
groundless love in its totality, including groundless love as self-gift (kenosis). And for
both Lonergan and Balthasar, the true expression of groundless love itself becomes a
principle of proceeding loving expression together with the groundless love that is the
Father. And in this way, the Spirit is the active, proceeding loving between the Father
who speaks and the Word that is spoken.
But there is another important element of congruence between these two accounts
of proceeding love. Because both Balthasar and Lonergan affirm with Thomas that the
divine missions have as their constitutive condition the divine processions, it becomes
possible and necessary to verify the a priori speculative structure of intra-divine life in
light of the economic communication of that life in salvation history. And thus neither
Lonergan nor Balthasar can be legitimately implicated in Rahner’s criticism of the
divorce between the immanent and the economic trinity.
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Recognizing the structural correspondence between Balthasar’s notion of the
situatedness of the Logos in divine life and Lonergan’s later psychological analogy has
several small advantages and at least one very significant one. First, It helps to
complicate our picture of Balthasar’s place within post-Rahnerian revisionary theologies.
If Balthasar elaborates his own psychological analogy based in loving that emphasizes
that God in God’s self is eternally love in act, then he can hardly be the Catholic
Moltmann. And, further, highlighting Balthasar’s point-by-point correspondence with
Lonergan on this issue might have some apologetic value for convincing skeptical
Balthasarians to take the psychological analogy more seriously. But beyond these gains,
there is a much larger, but also more provisional and tentative possibility. If what I’ve
described as Balthasar’s psychological analogy shares with Lonergan’s analogy the same
explanatory ordo, then we have in Balthasar’s psychological analogy a systematic
framework for interpreting some of the more provocative, imaginative, and dramatic
imagery that populates the first two panels of the trilogy, imagery that on first blush
seems to violate the metaphysical principles much more clearly indicated in this later
scheme.
The vexed issue of kenosis that haunts the interpretations of the trinitarian
theology of the Theo-Drama become explicable when placed within the immanent
scheme of the Theo-Logic. Balthasar seizes upon the Pauline image of the Son’s selfemptying as an analogical term for the intra-divine processions. And because it is an
analogy for the processions, it is also an analogy for the missions. And as a result, the
Theo-Drama tends to understate the contingency of the missions. It is clear about the
constitutive condition of the mission (namely, the procession and nothing else), but is
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unclear about the contingency of the consequent condition that makes it true to say that
the mission is the procession. But if we interpret kenosis as a specification of selfexpressing love, then we can differentiate different senses of kenosis in accord with the
different elements of love: the groundless love’s self-communication in a true expression,
the active loving between the Father and the Word that proceeds from them as the
decision to love. Further, mapping kenosis onto the analogy can help make the vital
distinctions between kenosis as immanent constitution and kenosis as the missions in
history.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide one example of how speculative pluralism,
informed by the application of the repurposed theorem of the supernatural, can provide
the means for comparing, correcting, and, ultimately, mutually affirming speculative
theologies whose analogs are drawn from distinct theorematic domains. In the course of
that pursuit, the philosophical contours of the speculative terrain have been clarified, the
psychological theory of the divine processions has been explained, and the kenotic
structure of intra-divine love has been articulated.
While the details of these two approaches to the theology of the divine
processions have been explored at some length, the overriding and undergirding intention
of the foregoing expositions has been to show how the repurposed theorem of the
supernatural can function in a particular speculative context. In the course of executing
that intention, this chapter has provided an analysis of how the natural and supernatural
theorematic domains relate to one another. It has presented both a developmental and a
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synthetic account of the psychological analogy for the divine processions—from
Augustine and Aquinas to Lonergan and Doran—and it has confronted and
complemented that tradition with the supernatural, kenotic analogy evinced in the work
of Hans Urs von Balthasar. These two approaches, like the theorematic domains from
which their prime analog is drawn, are distinct, but not separate from one another.
In the middle ages, the Augustinian-Aristotelian debates brought hard-won
achievements the medieval synthesis under suspicion. In the centuries since, these two
legitimate expressions of Christian theology have developed at a safe distance from one
another. But, as this chapter has shown, this distance can be overcome when these
traditions are placed within an adequate methodical frame. But while the disputes of postconciliar trinitarian theology are ripe for the application of speculative pluralism, more
pressing applications lay in the future.
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VI) CONCLUSION

This study opened with a counterintuitive claim. It asserted (and with any luck has
by now demonstrated) the strange thesis that speculative theology’s renewal in modern
theology requires a commerce with the revolutions in modern thought that led to its
decline. Prosecuting that case has followed a curious route from scholastic retrievals of
Thomas Aquinas, to the empirical turn in philosophy, science, and culture, to the
development and repurposing of the theorem of the supernatural, to the theology of the
divine processions. Now, at the end of that case, the whole brief must be recapitulated in
a closing argument that concludes the succession of individual theses that have been
articulated and advanced in this work, along with the structural architecture that ties each
element to the others in a synthetic whole. But it is also time to venture guesses and cast
visions. About the opportunities for renewal in the present. About the possibilities for
emergences in the future. And about what is demanded of us by both.
Speculative theology, like all forms of inquiry, finds its exigence in the existential
horizon of an inquirer. It is the method—the road, way, path—that the eros of intellectual
desire follows as the mind migrates from the immediacy of wonder, to the articulation of
questions, to the fantastic, irreducible delight of discovering answers and sharing them
with others. But questions are specifications of intellect’s eros to circumstance. They
arise not as logical emanations from universal eros, but from the slings and arrows of
living in a world. Speculation is a tool of understanding. And understanding is the answer
to questions that arise in someone, at some time, in some place, about something.
Abstract too far from the concrete contexts of its exigence, and speculation becomes a
method for answering questions that no one is asking.

223

The tortured pluralism of the late patristic and early medieval world was the
consequence of a shared existential circumstance that desired, desperately, to know what
it meant to be free in a world of sin and grace. Everyone knew what the Catholic faith
proclaimed, but no one seemed able to explain how such a proclamation could be
reconciled with the demands of intellectual consciousness. It was only by adopting a new
mentality, by mapping the coordinates of the problem onto that mentality, and by holding
relevant mental distinctions in a theorematic frame that high medieval theology found its
footing on centuries of nettlesome questions and at long last made progress on answering
them. Through such a mentality, theology became a scientia—the regina scientiarum.
The flowering of theologia speculativa in the soil of thirteenth century thought is an
inflection point in the development of Christian (indeed, human) intellectual life, but that
life itself was held aloft by a superstructure of cultural and social institutions whose
hegemony has long since passed into the realm of memory.
Today, modern empirical methods are legion. Having subordinated the abstract
rigor of logic and metaphysics to the canons of empirical science, philosophy, theology,
and the notion of culture itself have been remade, each according to the determinations of
their respective objects of inquiry. Contemporary theologians—if they are to be truly
contemporary—must set their faces toward the complexity, growth, transpositions of
context, and dynamism of spirit that establish the exigence for authentic pluralism. This
self-possessed spiritual dynamism is more than the condition of possibility for authentic
theological performance. It is also an analogy for the speculative theology of the divine
procession of the eternal Word.
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Where theology goes in the future will in large part be determined by decisions
made in the present. If today’s revanchist forces prevail—even in the short term—
understanding will suffer. Their capacity for curiosity is meager. And their hunger for
certainty (especially for the sort that can be weaponized) is profound. The integralist
fantasy is that—by hook or by crook—classicist culture will reassert itself through the
machinations of strongmen. But the flight from understanding, even its gilded forms,
have the liability of lionizing stupidity. No serious revanchist thinks their scheming will
win the day. They cast their vituperations only to be heard, with the hope that in being
heard, their voices matter and won’t be forgotten. But they are cursing into the wind.
They can stand athwart history shouting “stop” until they are hoarse, but history’s
momentum will be conserved. Time marches on. And their time is over.
Speculative theology is both local and global. Its geography still encompasses the
institutions and legacies of the medieval world. But it extends to those places in which
the systematic exigence is only now beginning to emerge (and in response to a quite
distinct set of concrete questions). The paradigmatic question for contemporary theology
is not whether and where a new Aquinas will arise. Contemporary methods do not admit
of a singular genius. Instead, the question is how speculative mediations that come to the
fore of theology in distinct places, cultures, and times will be related, one to the other, in
an authentic whole—a Catholica.
Speculative pluralism is one answer to that question. Speculative pluralism is a
form of catholicity that responds to the emergence of the systematic exigence in new
cultural, religious, and intellectual situations. It is a realist, liberal rejection of the
romantic, integralist fantasy. It is a declaration that power is an effect of cooperative
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thinking, not the cause of what one should think or how one should live. A perceptive
critic might ask how demonstrating the compatibility of two storied theologians of the
previous century (and even then on only one particular question) proves the validity of
speculative pluralism’s methodical frame for the less familiar, less conventional—to be
frank, less white—theologies of the future. All I can say in response is that any future
theology, if it is to be Catholic, must reconcile itself not only to its present, but also to its
past. As such, the “proof” offered here is meant only as an initial step in a much longer
journey, one that will be trod only by those who believe that in authentic understanding
lies liberation.
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